The defendant was convicted by a jury of the crime of incest, and he presents this appeal from the judgment in pro. per. The complaining witness was his 15-year-old daughter. The sordid details of the daughter’s testimony need not be enlarged upon but, as so often happens in such cases, the testimony of the daughter concerning the alleged offense was not substantially corroborated by any other witness and was flatly contradicted by the appellant. The daughter had fallen in love with a Filipino whom she desired to marry and the appellant had had the Filipino arrested charging him with the possession of a pistol in violation of the law forbidding the possession of firearms by aliens. The daughter’s accusation against the father followed closely on the arrest of her lover and it was appellant’s theory on the trial that his daughter’s accusation against him was motivated by her resentment at his action in having her lover arrested. The daughter recanted her accusation against appellant in two letters written to the authorities and then again changed her story and testified against him on the trial. That such accusations are not infrequently fabricated by minors the experience of any trial judge will attest.

A reading of the record makes it very clear that the case was extremely close, depending upon the resolution of the conflicting testimony of the defendant and his 15-year-old daughter, and the decision of the jury was almost wholly dependent upon the result of its weighing the conflicting stories of these two witnesses. The courts have frequently remarked that in cases of this nature the very accusation arouses feelings of revulsion and animosity which impose upon the trial judge the highest standards of fairness in the conduct of the trial. It will suffice to quote the following from People v. Long, 63 Cal.App.2d 679, 686-687 [ 147 P.2d 659 ] :

On the defendant’s cross-examination he was asked if he had ever been convicted of a felony. He answered that he had been convicted of burglary in Baltimore, “but it was under circumstances that I wasn’t guilty of it.” The trial judge interjected himself into the cross-examination to ask: “Is the statement that you never committed the crime just as true as the—you never committed the crime of which you were convicted in Baltimore, is it equally true ? Are these just as-false as the other burglary?” From the form of the question the jury could only infer that the trial judge was not only questioning the truth of the defendant’s testimony concerning the burglary conviction but the truth of his denial of the commission of the crime for which he was on trial as well. “Jurors rely with great confidence on the fairness of judges, and upon the correctness of their views expressed during trials. For this reason, and too strong emphasis cannot be laid on the admonition, a judge should be careful not to throw the weight of his judicial position into a case, either for or against the defendant.” (People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 626-627 [ 258 P. 607 ].)

Our courts have many times reversed convictions in criminal cases because of intimations by the trial judge during the taking of testimony that the defendant or his witnesses was not believed by the judge. (See People v. Mahoney, supra, 201 Cal. 618, 621-627 ; People v. Boggess, 194 Cal. 212, 239-240 [ 228 P. 448 ] ; People v. Bowers, 79 Cal. 415, 417 [ 21 P. 752 ] ; People v. McNeer, 8 Cal.App.2d 676, 681 [ 47 P.2d 813 ] ; People v. Singh, 78 Cal.App. 488 [ 248 P. 986 ]; People v. Conboy, 15 Cal.App. 97 [ 113 P. 703 ] ; People v. Long, supra, 63 Cal.App.2d 679, 682-686 .) The conduct of the trial judge in the case before us was not comparable in degree to that considered by the courts in any of the cited cases, but the task of an appellate court must in every such case be to weigh the intimation of the judge of his lack of credence in the testimony against the facts of the particular case and to determine whether under all the circumstances the defendant has suffered prejudice in the minds of the jury. In view of the closeness of this case, the fact that the defendant was forced to rely exclusively on his own testimony, and the repugnance which the very nature of the charge would arouse in the minds of any jury of normal men and women we are satisfied that the defendant suffered prejudicial error. The case is not unlike that considered by the Colorado Supreme Court in Laycook v. People, 66 Colo. 441 [ 182 P. 880 ]. We quote from pages 880-881 [182 P.] :

While no objection was made to this question when asked by the court this in our judgment is one of those cases in which the damage was irreparable once the question was asked and hence the error may be urged on appeal despite the failure to object in the trial court. (See People v. Singh, supra, 78 Cal.App. 488, 495-496 ; People v. Freitas, 34 Cal.App.2d 684, 688 [ 94 P.2d 397 ].)

If the appellant is guilty a second jury will doubtless convict him. If he is innocent he has been irreparably injured unless he is granted a new trial.

The judgment is reversed and the defendant is remanded for a new trial.

Nourse, P. J., and Goodell, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied November 10, 1948, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the' Supreme Court was denied November 22,1948.