Petitioner asks that this court by writ of mandate direct respondent Secretary of State of California not to submit to the electors, at the general election to be held on November 2, 1948, a “purported initiative amendment” to the state Constitution and “not to certify it to the Registrars of Voters and County Clerks in the State, and ... to desist from any act in aid of the submission of said purported initiative amendment to the electors.” Since the issuance of the alternative writ the proponents of the measure, as intervenors, have filed, as in the nature of a return; a general demurrer, motion to strike, and an answer to the petition, and the attorney general, on behalf of respondent, has filed, by way of a return, a demurrer and answer. As will appear from the text which follows, the issues raised by the answers and by the motion to strike are immaterial in relation to the ground of our decision, and, hence, are not discussed in detail. From an examination of the proposed measure, itself, considered in relation to the terms of our Constitution as now cast, we find it clear beyond question that, as urged by petitioner, the proposed initiative enactment amounts substantially to an attempted revision, rather than amendment, of our state Constitution; and that inasmuch as the Constitution specifies (art. XVIII, § 2) that it may be revised by means of a constitutional convention but does, not provide for revision by initiative measure, the writ must be granted.

The right of initiative is precious to the people and is one which the courts are zealous to preserve to the fullest tenable measure of spirit as well as letter. As said in Gage v. Jordan (1944), 23 Cal.2d 794, 799 [ 147 P.2d 387 ], “All doubt as to the construction of pertinent provisions is to be resolved in favor of the initiative and such legislation is to be given the same liberal construction as that afforded election statutes generally [citations]. However, the interpretation adopted must be reasonable and ... it is the duty of the courts to accept that intended by the framers of the legislation, so far as its intention can be ascertained. ’ ’ The conclusion we have reached—that the proposed measure is revisory rather than amendatory in nature and that as such it is barred from the initiative upon any legally permissible construction of the pertinent constitutional provisions—is overwhelmingly impelled by the far reaching and multifarious substance of the measure itself and by the terms of the present constitutional provisions relative to the initiative and to amendment and revision of the Constitution, which provisions are not only clear in themselves but have heretofore in controlling aspects been the subject of scrutiny and exposition by this court.

The only method provided in the Constitution by which it can be revised is set forth in section 2 of article XVIII. That section requires (1) a vote of two-thirds of the Legislature to recommend that the electors vote “for or against a convention for the purpose”; (2) a vote in favor of such a convention, by a majority of the electors voting; (3) the calling of such a convention and the election by the people of delegates thereto; (4) the adoption by the convention of a proposed constitution; (5) ratification by the people of such constitution.

In Livermore v. Waite (1894), 102 Cal. 113, 117-119 [ 36 P. 424 , 25 L.R.A. 312 ], this court declared, “Article XVIII of the constitution provides two methods by which changes may be effected in that instrument, one by a convention of delegates chosen by the people for the express purpose of revising the entire instrument, and the other through the adoption by the people of propositions for specific amendments that have been previously submitted to it by two-thirds of the members of each branch of the legislature. [The provision for amendment by initiative was added in 1911, art. IV, § 1.] It can be neither revised nor amended except in the manner prescribed by itself, and the power which it has conferred upon the legislature in reference to proposed amendments, as well as to calling a convention, must be strictly pursued. Under the first of these methods the entire sovereignty of the people is represented in the convention. The character and extent of a constitution that may be framed by that body is freed from any limitations other than those contained in the constitution of the United States. If, upon its submission to the people, it is adopted, it becomes the measure of authority for all the departments of government, the organic law of the state, to which every citizen must yield an acquiescent obedience. . . . The legislature is not authorized to assume the function of a constitutional convention, and propose for adoption by the people a revision of the entire constitution under the form of an amendment . . . The constitution itself has been framed by delegates chosen by the people for that express purpose, and has been afterwards ratified by a vote of the people, at a special election held for that purpose, and the provision in article XVIII that it can be revised only in the same manner, and after the people have had an opportunity to express their will in reference thereto, precludes the idea that it was the intention of the people, by the provision for amendments authorized in the first section of this article, to afford the means of effecting the same result which in the next section has been guarded with so much care and precision. The very term ‘constitution’ implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which .it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term ‘amendment’ implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed.” (See also 5 Cal.Jur. § 11, pp. 559-560; 16 C.J.S. § 7, pp. 30-31; 11 Am.Jur. § 25, p. 629.)

The initiative power reserved by the people by amendment to the Constitution in 1911 (art. IV, § 1) applies only to the proposing and the adopting or rejecting of “laws and amendments to the Constitution” and does not purport to extend to a constitutional revision. That amendment was framed and adopted long after the decision in Livermore v. Waite (1894), supra, 102 Cal. 113 . By well established law it is to be understood to have been drafted in the light of the Liver-more decision. (Seé 50 Am.Jur. §§ 321, 322, pp. 312, 313.) As said in Estate of Moffitt (1908), 153 Cal. 359, 361 [ 95 P. 653, 1025 , 20 L.R.A.N.S. 207 ], “[A] familiar and fundamental rule for the interpretation of a legislative statute is that it is presumed to have been enacted in the light of such existing judicial decisions as have a direct bearing upon it. (See also, to the same effect, In re Halcomb (1942), 21 Cal.2d 126, 129 [ 130 P.2d 384 ], and cases there cited.) It is thus clear that a revision of the Constitution may be accomplished only through ratification by the people of a revised constitution proposed by a convention called for that purpose as outlined hereinabove. Consequently if the scope of the proposed initiative measure (hereinafter termed “the measure”) now before us is so broad that if such measure became law a substantial revision of our present state Constitution would be effected, then the measure may not properly be submitted to the electorate until and unless it is first agreed upon by a constitutional convention, and the writ sought by petitioner should issue. (See Livermore v. Waite (1894), supra, 102 Cal. 113 .) Mandamus is a proper remedy. (Gage v. Jordan (1944), supra, 23 Cal.2d 794, 800 , and cases there cited.)

The measure proposes to add to our present Constitution “a'new Article to be numbered Article XXXII thereof” and to consist of 12 separate sections (actually in the nature of separate articles) divided into some 208 subsections (actually in the nature of sections) set forth in more than 21,000 words. The Constitution as now cast, with the amendments added since its original adoption as revised in 1879, contains 25 articles divided into some 347 sections expressed in approximately 55,000 words. The provisions of the proposed measure may be summarized as follows:

As previously mentioned the Constitution as now east contains 25 articles divided into 347 sections. It is apparent that in mechanical composition the sections of the proposed measure correspond to articles of the Constitution and subsections of the measure to sections of the Constitution. Comparison of the provisions of the measure with those of our present Constitution indicates that the measure will, or under conceivable circumstances may, affect at least the following articles and sections of, and will add at least the following new subjects to, the present Constitution, all as respectively indicated:

To recapitulate, at least 15 of the 25 articles contained in our present Constitution would be either repealed in their entirety or substantially altered by the measure, a minirrmm of four (five, if the civic center provision be deemed new) new topics would be treated, and the functions of both the legislative and the judicial branches of our state government would be substantially curtailed.

Our review of the subjects covered by the measure and of its effect on the totality of our plan of government as now constituted does not purport to be exhaustive. It is amply sufficient, however, to demonstrate the wide and diverse range of subject matters proposed to be voted upon, and the revisional effect which it would necessarily have on our basic plan of government. The proposal is offered as a single amendment but it obviously is multifarious. It does not give the people an opportunity to express approval or disapproval severally as to each major change suggested; rather does it, apparently, have the purpose of aggregating for the measure the favorable votes from electors of many suasions who, wanting strongly enough any one or more propositions offered, might grasp at that which they want, tacitly accepting the remainder. Minorities favoring each proposition severally might, thus aggregated, adopt all. Such an appeal might well be proper in voting on a revised constitution, proposed under the safeguards provided for such a procedure, but it goes beyond the legitimate scope of a single amendatory article. There is in the measure itself no attempt to enumerate the various and many articles and sections of our present Constitution which would be affected, altered, replaced, or repealed. It purports only to add one new article-but its framers found it necessary to include the omnibus provision (§ XII, subdiv. (7)) that “If any section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase of the constitution is in conflict with any of the provisions of this article, such section, subsection, sentence, clause or phrase is to the extent of such conflict hereby repealed. ’ ’

Interveners concede that, “In an initiative which has as broad a purpose as the ‘ California Bill of Rights, ’ many sections of the present Constitution are bound to be affected in some measure,” but they urge that “The inclusion of several apparently unrelated subjects in a proposed constitutional amendment does not require the use of the method of revision set forth in article XVIII, section 2, of the Constitution to the exclusion of the use of the initiative provisions of the Constitution.” To support their argument intervenors rely upon Wright v. Jordan (1923), 192 Cal. 704, 711 [ 221 P. 915 ]; Epperson v. Jordan (1938), 12 Cal.2d 61, 68-69 [ 82 P.2d 445 ]; and Brown v. Jordan (1938), 12 Cal.2d 75, 77-78 [ 82 P.2d 450 ]. But those cases do not undertake to determine that a substantial constitutional revision may be accomplished through the medium of a single initiative amendment. They hold, merely, that the express requirement of section 1 of article XVIII of the Constitution that, in the case of constitutional amendments proposed by the Legislature, “Should more amendments than one be submitted at the same election, they shall be so prepared and distinguished, by numbers or otherwise, that each can be voted on separately,” does not apply to amendments proposed under the initiative process. In none of those cases did the proposed initiative enactment effect such extensive alterations in the basic plan and substance of our present Constitution, or at all approximate in coverage the variety of additional subjects or separate fields of governmental activity, as the measure now before us would encompass; and in none of those cases was the effect of section 2 of article XVIII, dealing with revision of the Constitution, mentioned.

Interveners concede also that “When our Constitution was framed different procedures were provided for amendments and revisions, and therefore some distinction between the two must have been contemplated.” Certainly it cannot be solemnly announced as a general rule of thumb that an initiative measure which would affect all the articles of the Constitution would constitute a revision thereof, whereas a measure which would affect all except one (or all, less two-fifths) of the articles would thereby be reduced to the status of an amendment. Yet that is, in substance, the position taken by the intervenors. They urge that if any less than all sections of the Constitution are altered, and if any less than all old sections are discarded, the change is merely an amendment. We cannot accept such an arbitrary and strained minimization of difference between amend and revise. The differentiation required is not merely between two words; more accurately it is between two procedures and between their respective fields of application. .Bach procedure, if we follow elementary principles of statutory construction, must be understood to have a substantial field of application, not to be (as argued in intervenors’ Answering Memorandum) a mere alternative procedure in the same field. Bach of the two words, then, must be understood to denote, respectively, not only a procedure but also a field of application appropriate to its procedure. The people of this state have spoken,- they made it clear when they adopted article XVIII and made amendment relatively simple but provided the formidable bulwark of a constitutional convention as a protection against improvident or hasty (or any other) revision, that they understood that there was a real difference between amendment and revision. We find nothing whatsoever in the language of the initiative amendment of 1911 (art. IV, § 1) to effect a breaking down of that difference. On the contrary, the distinction appears to be scrupulously preserved by the express declaration in the amendment (particularly in the light of the Livermore case as noted, supra) that the power to propose and vote on “amendments to the Constitution” is reserved directly to the people in initiative proceedings, while leaving unmentioned the power and the procedure relative to constitutional revision, which revisional power and procedure, it will be remembered, had already been specifically treated in section 2 of article XVIII. Intervenors’ contention—that any change less than a total one is but amendatory—would reduce to the rubble of absurdity the bulwark so carefully erected and preserved. Each situation involving the question of amendment, as contrasted with revision, of the Constitution must, we think, be resolved upon its own facts. A case might, conceivably, be presented where the question would be close and where there would be occasion to undertake to define with nicety the line of demarcation; but we have no such case or occasion here.

The delegation of far reaching and mixed powers to the commission, largely, if not almost entirely in effect, unchecked, places such commission substantially beyond the system of checks and balances which heretofore has characterized our governmental plan. It will be remembered that the measure prescribes no qualifications for holding the office of commissioner, other than that the person “shall have been an elector of this state for two years next preceding his election”; he is, as of absolute right, eligible for re-election; the commission, itself, may fill vacancies for unexpired terms; it has unlimited powers to propose and submit “amendments” to the “article”; every sentence and clause of our Constitution in conflict with the article is to “the extent of such conflict” repealed; the commission is given practically uncontrolled power over the funds collected, including, apparently, the substantially absolute power to give “reimbursement or compensation for expenses incurred by” a “volunteer worker in a political campaign”; the commission is given power to issue subpenas and, apparently, to punish for contempt and subject persons “to the same penalties as if such disobedience or false swearing occurred in an action in the superior court.” The governor, the Legislature, and the courts are made powerless to remove a commissioner for any cause, or directly “to interfere with the effectiveness or operation of this article,” apparently as construed by the commissioners; or, without approval by a vote at a general election “subsequent to 130 days after such decision or order shall become final,” to enforce “any decision or order” of a court “in any action or proceeding in law or equity” “which adversely, or at all, either affects this article or the administration thereof or affects the submission, by the pension commission, of any proposed amendment to this article.” Thus, in litigation anywhere within the vast sweep of the measure (from gamblers to ministers ; from mines to civic centers; from fish to oleomargarine; from state courts to city budgets; from liquor control to senate reapportionment; from naturopaths to allopaths; from proposing constitutional amendments to reimbursing political campaign workers; and from taxes to pensions), our heretofore zealously guarded principle of justice equally available through the courts for poor and for rich, for weak and for strong, and for all of every station alike, would be fettered, if not discarded, and justice, in its final attainment, would depend not alone on the justness of the cause, not as of right on the verdict of a jury or on truth or law or equity, but on the political sagacity and acumen, and the financial ability, of the litigant to wage a successful political campaign in defense of the judgment to which the court had found him entitled.

If the proponents of the measure, instead of relying on the guise of an additional article and a blanket repeal of every conflicting portion of the Constitution, had frankly recast the instrument in every detail in which it would be affected by the changes they seek—if they had recast it to accomplish exactly the ends they avowedly seek, neither more nor less— but to attain those ends by actually recasting all the affected sections and separately declaring the actual new articles, so that all the changes would fit in as integral parts of a coherent and consistent whole, then the fact of revision might be more obvious on the surface but it could be no more real in substance. As suggested by counsel for petitioner, one need only compare the changes wrought on the 1849 Constitution by the admittedly revised Constitution of 1879, with the changes sought to be impressed on the latter document by the pending measure, to make it altogether certain not alone that the new measure is revisory but also that the scope and depth and character of its proposed revision are more extensive than in the revision of 1879.

Applying the long established law to any tenable view of the facts which have been related, it is overwhelmingly certain that the measure now before us would constitute a revision of the Constitution rather than an amendment or “such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement or better carry out the purposes for which it was framed.” (Livermore v. Waite (1894), supra, 102 Cal. 113, 118-119 .) Indeed, as has been shown in some detail, the effect of adoption of the measure proposed, rather than to “within the lines of the original instrument” constitute “an improvement or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed,” would be to substantially alter the purpose and to attain objectives clearly beyond the lines of the Constitution as now cast. Consequently, as is established by the Livermore case and by the other authorities cited hereinabove, such a revised Constitution, as a single measure, may be submitted to the electorate only after it has been “agreed upon” by a constitutional convention called pursuant to the provisions of section 2 of article XVIII of the present Constitution.

It is to be noted that intervenors, in their reply memorandum, urge that the initiative amendment (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1) should in some way be construed to “give the people” the power to initiate directly a revision of, as well as amendments to, the Constitution. But intervenors actually do not seek to initiate the constitutional procedure for a revision (see art. XVIII, § 2) by proposing through the initiative a measure calling a constitutional convention; rather do they seek to by-pass the convention altogether, thus setting up a wholly new and constitutionally unauthorized procedure for revision. They argue that there may be “a frustration of the will of the people by the legislature” through its neglect to call an authorized constitutional convention. It should be obvious to intervenors that if a Legislature is not responsive to the will of the people, it lies in the power of the people to replace the members of that Legislature. But whatever may be the rights of intervenors here, or of other groups, to initiate proceedings looking toward the end of a constitutional revision through authorized procedure, we are satisfied that the basic method of revision prescribed by article XVIII—revision through a constitutional convention (however called) and a subsequent vote of the people on the proposed revised Constitution—does not purport to be dispensed with, alternatively or otherwise, by section 1 of article IV, reserving the power to propose, and prescribing generally, the procedure for bringing to a vote, “laws and amendments to the Constitution.”

Because of our conclusion that the measure proposes a revision rather than an amendment of the Constitution it becomes unnecessary for us to either consider or decide the several other contentions advanced by the petitioner and argued by intervenors or respondent. The motion of intervenors to strike certain portions of the petition is directed at matters which, as previously indicated, do not affect the ground on which we reach our conclusion; the inclusion of such matters, therefore, does not prejudice intervenors. Neither the answer of the intervenors nor that of respondent raises any issue of fact material to our conclusion. Other contentions advanced by intervenors for the first time in their reply memorandum, insofar as they are not specifically discussed above, are without persuasive force in any application to either the facts or the law which controllingly impel the conclusion we have reached.

The motion to strike is denied and the demurrers are overruled. Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed for.

Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.

Such state levy upon receipts from interstate and foreign transactions, it is asserted on behalf of petitioner, is void as in contravention of the United States Constitution. For reasons hereinafter stated we do not reach this question. One o£ the attacks made upon the measure, which we have found unnecessary to discuss as a separate ground, is the claim that its self-styled title “California Bill of Rights,” printed in large type on the initiative petitions, is misleading and in effect, a fraud upon the electorate, because of the widely heterogeneous subjects encompassed by the measure. It is to be noted that only this section (5 VIII) and section X, hereinafter summarized, do appear to relate to matters touched upon in the present constitutional “Declaration of Rights” as set forth in article I.