This is an appeal from an order denying the appellant’s application for an order confirming an arbitration award and granting the motion of respondent for an order vacating the award.

Arbitration proceedings were held between Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, Los Angeles, California, respondent (hereinafter referred to as the Company) and United Rubber Workers of America, Local Union No. 100, AFL-CIO, appellant (hereinafter referred to as the Union), to resolve a dispute between them with reference to the matter of certain wages of certain persons who were employed by the Company and who were members of the Union.

There was an agreement made and entered into between the Company and the Union in November, 1956, and which was, by further agreement, supplemented from time to time. That agreement at the times with which we are here concerned provided under article XI titled, “Procedure for Adjustment of Grievances, ’ ’ in part as follows:

The agreement also provided, under article VI titled “Wage Application Provisions,” in part as follows:

A hearing was held by the board of arbitration and the arbitrators set forth, in their report, that among the classifications in Department 3B there are the following:

The decision of the arbitrators was as follows:

The Company appointed arbitrator dissented from the decision. The Union made a motion and application for an order to confirm the arbitration award. The Company filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion to confirm the award and made a motion to vacate the award under the provisions of section 1288, Code of Civil Procedure.

The trial court made an order wherein it denied the motion of the Union to confirm the award, and granted the motion of the Company to vacate the award. The memorandum prepared by the trial judge at the time of his decision discloses that he was of the belief that the award as made was not within the power of the board of arbitration.

The appeal is from that order.

The Union contends that:

(a) the merits of the award are not subject to review, and

(b) the award was within the power of the board of arbitration.

There is, under the particular circumstances of this case, no contention upon the part of the Company that the merits of the award are subject to review.

Bach side essentially agrees that the only question for determination is whether the arbitrators disregarded the terms of their employment and the scope of their authority as set forth in the arbitration contract.

We believe the trial court was correct in vacating the order.

The question as submitted to the arbitration board was precisely and concisely stated. The language used was clear and even specified the particular job classifications by number and designation. Reduced to the simplest of terms, the question put was, what is the applicable rate of pay for an employee in classification A (lathe and mill machinist) when he is temporarily working in classification B (turret lathe machinist) ?

The agreement between the Union and the Company (art. VI, § 14-S) provided in effect that when an employee in classification A is temporarily assigned to classification B, he shall receive the rate of pay of classification A, or of classification B, whichever is higher. The agreement did not provide that a board of arbitration can decide that while so temporarily employed in classification B, the employee shall receive the rate of pay of classification C (general machinist).

There is no question here as to any classifications of jobs, or as to whether the employees in question were dayworkers (hourly workers) paid as provided for in article VI, section 1(b) of the agreement.

The arbitration board in this case, in effect, took upon itself the authority of deciding to which classification the employee (the lathe and mill machinist) was temporarily transferred. The parties previously had determined that matter in the agreement and it was so set forth in the question which was to be decided by the board (namely from classification Job 3-41 to classification Job 3-87) and the board had no authority to make such a determination. In other words, the board attempted to add to, subtract from or modify the contract of the parties in excess of the powers expressly conferred upon it. (See Crofoot v. Blair Holdings Corp., 119 Cal.App.2d 156, 184 [ 260 P.2d 156 ]; Christenson v. Cudahy Packing Co., 198 Cal. 685, 692 [ 247 P. 207 ]; Screen Cartoonists Guild v. Walt Disney Productions, 74 Cal.App.2d 414 [ 168 P.2d 983 ].)

It was appropriately said in Drake v. Stein, 116 Cal.App.2d 779 (at p. 785) [ 254 P.2d 613 ] :

“Arbitrators are not bound to a strict adherence to legal procedures. They are not required to find facts, give reasons for their awards, or describe the processes by which they arrived at their decisions. (Pacific Vegetable Oil Corp. v. C.S.T., Ltd., 29 Cal.2d 228, 232 [ 174 P.2d 441 ].) But they are not, because of such freedom, released from the obligation to be guided by the basic agreement of the litigants. When appellants agreed in clear and unambiguous language to transfer a specific parcel of real estate and a policy of title insurance for the faithful performance of certain services by respondent it was not intended thereby to authorize the future arbitrators to award something else to respondent in case of an arbitration. But that is exactly what was done by . . . [the arbitrator]. Instead of the lot, he awarded to respondent the sum of $7,500 in cash. . . . Even with such a broad arbitration clause as paragraph 16, how could there be any doubt that Drake had only the right to a certain specific piece of property as his compensation under the contract?

“Although every presumption is in favor of the award (Popcorn Equip. Co. v. Page, 92 Cal.App.2d 448 [ 207 P.2d 647 ]) and mere unsound reasoning by an arbitrator in reaching a conclusion within the scope of proper arbitration will not invalidate the result (McKay v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 110 Cal.App.2d 672 [ 243 P.2d 35 ]) an award is properly vacated when arbitrators exceed their powers. (See Screen Cartoonists Guild v. Walt Disney Productions, 74 Cal.App.2d 414 [ 168 P.2d 983 ] ; Bierlein v. Johnson, 73 Cal.App.2d 728 [ 166 P.2d 644 ].)”

The Union relies heavily upon three cases, namely, Straus v. North Hollywood Hospital, Inc., 150 Cal.App.2d 306 [ 309 P.2d 541 ], Lang v. Badger, 157 Cal.App.2d 345 [ 320 P.2d 906 ], and McKay v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 110 Cal.App.2d 672 [ 243 P.2d 35 ], In our opinion, none of the cases is particularly helpful to the appellant. In none of the eases cited are the facts comparable to the facts in the instant case.

In the Straus ease, supra, an award was made that the contract between the hospital and the doctor be terminated, and that the doctor should receive from the hospital a certain money payment. The hospital, in contesting the award, said that it agreed to the termination of the contract and admitted that “the submission agreement ‘would permit a cash award under the circumstances. ’ ” The contract of the parties did not preclude the granting of the money award, and therefore, the arbitrators acted within their authority in that respect, In the ease presently before us for decision, the parties expressly prescribed the factual elements which the board could consider, and by their agreement they expressly provided the hourly pay scale. (Art. VI, § 14-S.) As said in the Straus case, supra, at pages 309 and 310, “An arbitration proceeding is grounded in the mutual assent of the disputants to the resolution of their controversy by such tri bunal, and the arbitrators derive their power from the submission agreement.” (Emphasis added.)

In Lang v. Badger, 157 Cal.App.2d 345 [ 320 P.2d 906 ], the question which was submitted to the arbitrators was not concise and precise, as in the instant case. In Lang, supra, the parties stipulated (p. 348) “ ‘that any and all disputes which have arisen by reason of that certain building contract . . . will be submitted to arbitration in accordance with said . . . contract, . . ” The building contract provided that (p. 347) “all questions [under the contract] are subject to arbitration.” This court, under the circumstances of Lang, supra, namely a vague, unqualified arbitration contract) applied liberal rules of interpretation. There is nothing vague or indecisive in the instant contract or the submission agreement presently before us.

In McKay v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., supra, the court simply held that although the reasoning used by the arbitrators was bad, their award was, in fact, within the authority granted them by the parties.

As stated in Drake v. Stein, supra, at page 785, “Although . . . mere unsound reasoning by an arbitrator in reaching a conclusion within the scope of proper arbitration will not invalidate the result (McKay v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 110 Cal.App.2d 672 [ 243 P.2d 35 ]) an award is properly vacated when arbitrators exceed their powers.”

The Union accuses the Company of bad faith in moving to vacate the award, claiming in effect that if the Company was of the view that there was only one answer to the question it should not have permitted the matter to go to arbitration. Most litigants are fairly strong in their belief that their views are the correct views and that any other view is contrary to the law and the facts. It would seem that although one of the parties is absolutely certain that there is only one correct answer to a dispute, that the dispute may, nevertheless, be arbitrable. In Butte Miners’ Union No. 1 v. Anaconda Co., 159 F.Supp. 431 , the court was confronted with an argument that no arbitrable dispute existed because the company had a perfect contractual defense to the claim of the union. In ordering arbitration, the court said (at p. 436) :

And in Arbitration Between Potoker and Brooklyn Eagle, 2 N.Y.2d 553 [ 141 N.E.2d 841 ], the court said (at p. 844 [141 N.E.2d]) : “. . . the issue is not whether petitioner is right, but whether it is entitled to have the issues determined in the forum (arbitration) designated in the agreement.” One writer expressed the view in 30 Rocky Mountain Law Review, 247, 261, in referring to a typical arbitration clause in collective bargaining agreements, as follows:

The policy in this state is to favor arbitration. (O’Malley v. Petroleum Maintenance Co., 48 Cal.2d 107 [ 308 P.2d 9 ]; Myers v. Richfield Oil Corp., 98 Cal.App.2d 667, 671 [ 220 P.2d 973 ] ; United States Plywood Corp. v. Hudson Lumber Co., 124 Cal.App.2d 527, 530 [ 269 P.2d 93 ].)

The order is affirmed.

White, P. J., and Lillie, J., concurred.