This appeal by the widow- of Marion A. Lewis, deceased, has been transferred by the Supreme Court to this court for decision pursuant to the provisions of article VI, section 4, of the Constitution of the state of California. It is from the portion of a decree of distribution declaring a trust in certain real property hereinafter described after trial before the court without a jury.

The essential facts are:

In. July, 1936, Marion A. Lewis married Mary Anna White, now Mary Anna Lewis, appellant. On November 17, 1936, Mr. Lewis died leaving a last will and testament which he had duly executed April 31, 1936, reading in part thus:

The real property described in the will is also known as the “Lewis Apartments”.

December 16, 1,937, the probate department of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County entered a decree of distribution reading in part thus:

The sole question for determination is:

This question must be answered in the affirmative. Where the testator by his will gives the income of real property to a designated beneficiary for a stated period and by the same instrument disposes of the corpus of said real property to others, the real property is impressed with a trust and the beneficiary does not take a life estate in the real property. (3 Thompson’s Commentaries on the Law of Real Property (1924) 704, sec. 2569; Collier v. Grimesey, 36 Ohio St. (1880) 17, 21.)

Applying the foregoing rule to the facts in the' instant case, since no technical language is necessary in order to create a trust (Colton v. Colton, 127 U. S. 300, 310 [8 Sup. Ct. 1164, 32 L. Ed. 138 ]), nor is it essential that the will appoint a trustee (Estate of McCray, 204 Cal. 399, 403 [ 268 Pac. 647 ]) of the corpus of the trust, it is evident from a reading of decedent’s will that he intended to impress a trust on the real property described as the Lewis Apartments, “the income’’ of said property to be paid to his widow, appellant, during her lifetime or until she remarried and that, subject to said trust, the property should be distributed as designated in his will.

It thus appears that the decree of distribution correctly followed the intention of the testator as declared in his will.

For the foregoing reasons the decree is affirmed.

Grail, P. J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on September 13, 1938, and an application by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on October 17, 1938.