From a judgment in favor of all defendants except defendant MacDougall after trial before the court without a jury in an action to recover damages for the alleged conversion by respondents of a building and loan certificate and passbook of the value of $8,020 plaintiff appeals.

The essential facts are:

December 22, 1930, L. W. Evinger, brother of plaintiff . purchased from defendant American Mutual Building and Loan Association one of its certificates and passbooks of the face value of $8,000. The certificate and passbook were issued to “L. W. Evinger, trustee for Coy Evinger”. The signature card was signed “L. W. Evinger”.

September 27, 1932, L. W. Evinger borrowed from defendant MacDougall, who was doing business under the name of Beverly Investor’s Syndicate, $2,000, and as security for the loan signed an agreement transferring and assigning the passbook above mentioned to Beverly Investor’s Syndicate, and also executed, leaving the name of the assignee in blank, an assignment of the passbook. September 28, 1932, H. C. Irish presented the above-mentioned passbook together with the assignment executed by L. W. Evinger, in which H. C. Irish’s name had been filled in as assignee, and also an assignment of the passbook certificate above described executed by II. C. Irish in favor of defendant People’s Finance Company of Redondo Beach to the American Mutual Building and Loan Association, whereupon a new certificate and passbook were issued to the People’s Finance Company of Redondo Beach as payee.

These are the questions presented for determination:

The first question must be answered in the negative. Whenever certificates for shares of a corporation have been issued to a person as trustee on the books or records of the corporation, whether or not such certificates describe the trust or identify the beneficiary, it is presumed in favor of such corporation that the trustee has the power to transfer title to the certificate and the corporation is not under a duty to inquire into or determine the existence or validity of any trust or the terms thereof or whether the trustee is committing a breach of his obligation or exceeding his authority. (Sec. 328b, Civ. Code.)

In 1932 section 328b, title 1, part 4, division 1 of the Civil Code read in part as follows:

At the time of the transaction here under consideration section 279 of title 1, part 4, division 1 of the Civil Code read in part thus:

Since mutual building and loan associations are not excepted from the provisions of section 328b of the Civil Code nor are there any specific provisions in regard to such corporations inconsistent with the terms of said section, it was applicable to the situation here presented and the American Mutual Building and Loan Association was under no duty to inquire as to the existence of the alleged trust between plaintiff and his brother or as to whether plaintiff’s brother was exceeding his authority in transferring the passbook and certificate in question. Therefore, the trial court properly gave judgment in favor of defendant American Mutual Building and Loan Association.

The second question must be answered in the affirmative. A deposit by one person of money in his own name as trustee for another standing alone does not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. Such trust is revocable at the will of the depositor until he dies or unless he completes the gift in his lifetime by some unequivocal act or declaration. (In re Totten, 179 N. Y. 112 [ 71 N. E. 748, 752 , 1 Ann. Cas. 900, 70 L. R. A. 711].)

The case just cited has received the approval of the appellate courts of this state in Kuck v. Raftery, 117 Cal. App. 755, 758 [ 4 Pac. (2d) 552 ],

Applying the rule just stated to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that plaintiff's brother, having deposited money in his own name as trustee for plaintiff and having signed the signature card with his own name solely, created at best a trust revocable at will during his lifetime. This trust he revoked when he pledged the passbook with defendant MacDougall. Therefore, defendants Irish and People’s Finance Company of Redondo Beach received in due course the passbook and certificate free of any trust or claim of plaintiff.

Plaintiff’s attempted distinction between the assignment of the passbook and the certificate of the American Mutual Building and Loan Association is without merit. In legal contemplation each of these documents constituted an indivisible and integral part of the transaction with defendant American Mutual Building and Loan Association, the net result being that the relation of debtor and creditor was created between defendant American Mutual Building and Loan Association and L. W. Evinger when the passbook and certificate were issued to him.

The trial court’s ruling relative to the question set forth in paragraph (a) of the third question was correct. The general rule is that answers to questions calling for the conclusion of the witness are properly excluded from evidence. The question here under consideration called for the conclusion of the witness as to what constituted “any agreement” and, therefore, the objection to the question was properly sustained. (Callahan v. Marshall, 163 Cal. 552, 559 [ 126 Pac. 358 ] ; Ackerman v. Channel Com. Co., 53 Cal. App. 259, 266 [ 199 Pac. 1101 ].)

The trial court properly sustained the objection to the evidence set forth in paragraph (b) of the third question, for the reason that such evidence was clearly hearsay so far as the defendants were concerned, there being no showing that any of them had knowledge of the alleged agreement prior to the time of the trial.

The final question must be answered in the negative. It is the established law of California that one to whom an assignment in blank is delivered is deemed to be authorized to fill in the name of the assignee. (Thomas v. Fursman, 39 Cal. App. 278, 280 [ 178 Pac. 870 ].)

Por the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.

Grail, P. J., concurred.

A petition by appellant to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on October 17, 1938.