Plaintiff filed her complaint for divorce against defendant on February 15, 1949. On March 7th of that year, they entered into a property settlement agreement. The preamble of that document recites their “desire to make provision for the custody, care and support of their two minor children and to settle the rights and claims of each in and to the community property . . . and separate property” of husband; and rights of inheritance.

By its terms each party released the other “from any and all rights, claims, demands and obligations of every kind and nature for past and future support and maintenance, alimony pendente lite, permanent alimony and from all other rights, claims, demands and obligations of every kind and character arising out of or by virtue of the marital relations of the parties.” Plaintiff wife was given custody of the two children, and it was agreed that the community personal property be mutually divided or sold.

Paragraph Sixth of said property settlement reads in part as follows:

On the same day, defendant husband assigned to plaintiff wife, three-fourths of his beneficial interest in the Moulton trust.

Thereafter, on April 4, 1949, an interlocutory judgment of divorce was granted to plaintiff in which the custody of the children was awarded to her. That decree confirmed and approved the property settlement “th'e same having been received in evidence herein marked Exhibit ‘A’ and made a part hereof by reference.” The executory provisions of the agreement were adopted as a part of the decree and the parties instructed and ordered to carry out all of its terms and conditions. In addition, defendant husband was ordered to perform specifically certain of its terms respecting (1) the transmittal of that portion of the trust income assigned by him to plaintiff; (2) completion of the assignment by him to plaintiff of three-fourths of the income payable to him under the Moulton trust; (3) sale or division of the household effects; and (4) execution of a will in favor of the two children.

Final judgment of divorce was filed April 11, 1950. This provided that “wherein said interlocutory judgment makes any provision for the custody and support of children or for the performance by defendant of the acts therein set forth, said provision be and the same is hereby made binding on the parties affected thereby, the same as if herein set forth in full, and that wherein said interlocutory judgment relates to the property of the parties hereto, said property be and the same is hereby assigned in accordance with the terms thereof ...”

Thereafter plaintiff remarried and, pursuant to the property settlement, the three-fourths beneficial interest in the trust became payable to the two minor children.

The instant proceeding was initiated on August 14, 1952, by defendant Henry S. Van Dyke on an order to show cause for modification of child support, i.e., why the payments to said children should not be reduced consistent with changed circumstances.

Both parties submitted written points and authorities in support of their respective contentions.

Upon hearing, the trial court denied the order to show cause re modification and referred the case to a court commissioner for findings of fact. In their oral arguments before the commissioner, counsel for appellant stated: “So we ask of this court an opportunity to show by evidence the nature of the property involved, that it was separate property and that it could not be a property settlement agreement for that reason; that the community property has never been divided or settled between these parties . . . and that although drawn to be a property settlement agreement superficially, actually from the intention of the parties and their property rights at the time, it could not have been anything else but a provision to support the children . . . And the law is clear in the latter instance this is always modifiable on changed circumstances. ’ ’

To this the court commissioner replied: “I think the court is bound to follow the language of the documents in the file that have been recognized by the court previously and have been incorporated in the interlocutory judgment. For two reasons, I am not going to hear any evidence on the modification, and grant the motion of Mr. Young for dismissal: First, that the property settlement agreement appears to be in complete settlement of property rights and not for alimony and support; and second, there is no order in the interlocutory judgment or final judgment for the support of minor children, and I cannot see that there is anything before the court to modify.”

The findings of fact of the commissioner recite that the interlocutory and final judgments of divorce “are silent as to any amounts to be paid for the support of the minor children, the custody of whom was awarded to the plaintiff and still remains with the plaintiff. No change in circumstances concerning the custody of the minor children. The property settlement agreement, which was incorporated by reference in the interlocutory judgment appears to be in complete settlement of the property rights of the parties and does not contain any provisions for alimony or support. Motion of plaintiff that no evidence be taken and that the Order to Show Cause re Modification be dismissed should be granted because of the above facts.”

From the order dismissing the proceeding, defendant appeals.

Appellant here asserts that a determination of what type of provision (property settlement or child support) is incorporated in the agreement “depends upon the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement . . . and it is the failure of the trial court to take the offered proof with respect to such circumstances that is the basis for this appeal. ’ ’

In support of his contention, appellant cites Pearman v. Pearman, 104 Cal.App.2d 250, 253 [ 231 P.2d 101 ], where it is stated:

However, an examination of the phraseology of the Puckett case reveals that the Supreme Court there stated:

And in Hamilton v. Hamilton, 94 Cal.App.2d 293, 297 [ 210 P.2d 750 ], where the principal contention was that “the court erred in sustaining respondent’s objection to her (appellant’s) offer of proof that the support money provided in the agreement was alimony and not made in lieu of a division of the property,”—the court held at page 298:

Likewise here. The contract is clear and unambiguous and can be interpreted without the aid of extrinsic evidence. Therefore, the court very properly rejected the evidence offered to explain it.

An examination of the property settlement discloses a comprehensive arrangement for the complete disposition of the property rights of the parties thereto. Custody of the minor children was given to respondent, subject to rights of reasonable visitation in appellant. By the express terms of paragraph “Sixth,” hereinbefore quoted, appellant assigned his beneficial interest in the Moulton trust to respondent “In consideration of the assumption by her of the support and maintenance of the two minor children . . . while in her custody and during the period the income payments . . . are received by her.” And in the event of respondent’s remarriage or death, such assigned income “shall be paid to the present children of the parties hereto or to the survivor of them.”

The following language in Puckett v. Puckett, supra, ( 21 Cal.2d 833, 843 ), appears particularly pertinent:

The District Court of Appeal in Streeter v. Streeter, 67 Cal.App.2d 138, 144 [ 153 P.2d 441 ], stated as follows:

For the reasons stated, the order appealed from is affirmed.

White, P. J., and Doran, J., concurred.