The petitioner seeks his release on a writ of habeas corpus for the delay in bringing his case to trial within the 60-day period specified in section 1382 of the Penal Code.

The facts are without dispute. An information was filed on January 14, 1954, charging the defendant with the crime of grand theft and three prior convictions of a felony. On January 22, 1954, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. On February 11, 1954, the ease was continued successively to March 3d, March 26th and April 12th. All these continuances were granted over the objection of the defendant who asserted that he wanted an immediate trial. The ground for each continuance was that the court was then engaged in the trial of another defendant, one who in each case had been informed against prior to the information filed against this plaintiff. The record inescapably shows that no one of the orders continuing the case for trial was arbitrary or capricious but that each was made solely on the ground that the court was then engaged in the trial of other defendants whose cases preceded in date of information filed that of this petitioner.

On almost identical facts the District Court of Appeal in Dearth v. Superior Court, 40 Cal.App.2d 56 [ 104 P.2d 376 ], granted a writ of mandate to dismiss a criminal action because it was not brought to trial within 60 days as- prescribed by article I, section 13, Constitution of California and no good cause to the contrary was shown. The court there held:

Here, as in Dearth v. Superior Court, supra, the motion to dismiss was made after the 60th day. Here, also, no showing was made that the Chairman of the Judicial Council had been notified that a sufficient number of judges were not available to try criminal cases. Here, also, no showing has been made as to why more departments of the court were not assigned to hear criminal matters.

We conclude that no good cause, or any cause, has been shown why petitioner was not brought to trial within the 60-day constitutional limit.

Let a writ issue as prayed discharging petitioner from custody.

Dooling, J., and Kaufman, J., concurred.