This is an action for declaratory relief in which respondent seeks a judgment defining and declaring the rights and duties of the appellant and respondent under a promissory note, trust deed, lease, subordination agreement, and trustee’s deed affecting the title and right to possession of a certain parcel of real property in Fresno and the right to receive payments under the subordination agreement. Appellant filed its answer setting up additional documents affecting the rights of the parties, an assignment of rents made to respondent, a modification of the lease, a letter addressed by respondent to appellant, and appellant’s reply thereto. It likewise prayed for a judgment declaring and determining the rights and interests of each of the parties under the documents above described. Since the answer of appellant admitted all of the material facts of the complaint but set up additional facts which must be here deemed to be true, and since mere legal conclusions and claims of the parties are not a part of the factual picture, we will outline the facts as they appear through the admitted facts in the complaint and the fact's alleged in the answer.

On May 1, 1932, Ka Ra Investment Company, hereinafter referred to as Ka Ra, was the owner of certain real property in Fresno, with a store building situated thereon. On that day Ka Ra executed to respondent its promissory note for $187,750, and to secure that note it executed a trust deed to the real property to Corporation of America, as trustee, and to respondent, as beneficiary, which trust deed was recorded June 7, 1932. In addition to the usual provisions it also provided that upon default of the trustor the beneficiary could record a notice of default in accordance with section 2924 of the Civil Code, and that the trustee could sell the property in the manner required by law. On May 20, 1934, the entire amount evidenced by the promissory note and secured by the trust deed became due, and thereafter Ka Ra was in default. On June 27, 1935, Ka Ra executed and delivered to appellant a lease of the real property for the period from September 1, 1935, to August 31, 1955. It provided that the lessee should pay as rental a percentage of the gross receipts derived from the lessee’s business, and provided no fixed or minimum rental. On July 23, 1935, Ka Ra executed an assignment of all rentals to become due under the lease to respondent. On July 26, 1935, appellant and respondent entered into the following subordination agreement the interpretation of which is the main source of contention in this case. It provides generally as follows:

The lease became effective on August 22, 1935, and was recorded on the same day. The assignment of rents by Ka Ra to respondent was recorded on August 30, 1935. On October 1, 1935, appellant entered into possession of the real property under the lease, and the rental under the lease commenced on that date. Appellant has been ever since, and now is, in possession of the property under the provisions of the lease. On September 22, 1937, with the consent of respondent, appellant and Ka Ra entered into a modification of the lease which increased the rent for the period from October 1, 1937, to July 25, 1940, and fixed a minimum rent for that period of $29,000 per year. It also fixed the portions of the building which appellant was required to use in its business. Appellant has performed all of the terms and conditions of the lease as modified. It gave no notice of termination of the subrogation agreement or of the lease within five years of the date of the execution of the subordination agreement. It commenced the payment to respondent of the $31,250 per year provided for in the subordination agreement on July 27, 1940, and has continued to pay that sum ever since under protest. Ka Ra continued in default under the promissory note and trust deed. On June 15, 1941, there was due on the promissory note and trust deed the full principal, together with interest, taxes and advances, amounting in all to $236,246.50. On June 14, 1941, respondent mailed a letter to appellant reciting the fact that respondent, on June 16, 1941, intended to record a notice of default under the provisions of the trust deed and sell the real property unless all sums secured thereby were paid. Appellant did not answer that letter until after the real property was sold and conveyed by the trustee to respondent. On June 16, 1941, respondent recorded a notice of default and election to sell the real property to satisfy the obligations of Ka Ra under the promissory note and trust deed. The Corporation of America, as trustee, sold the property and respondent bought it at the trustee’s sale for $150,000. The trustee’s deed was recorded on October 18, 1941. On November 14, 1941, appellant wrote a reply to respondent’s letter of June 14, 1941, enclosing with it a check for the monthly installment of the $31,250 annual payment required by the subordination agreement. The letter acknowledged receipt of the notice of default and the intended sale under the trust deed, and informed the respondent that the appellant “believes that its obligation to make payment under the terms of the subordination agreement terminated upon purchase by you of the property at the foreclosure sale. The undersigned, however, transmits herewith its check ... in the amount of $2,604.17 ... In making payment in the amount above stated, or any future payments in amounts equal to the amount specified in the subordination agreement, the undersigned pays under protest the amounts included in the above sum ... in excess of the amounts required to be paid under the terms of said lease as modified ...” Since that time appellant has paid the amount required under the subordination agreement, but accompanied each cheek with a letter similar to the one above mentioned.

The foregoing are the undisputed facts upon which the rights and obligations of the parties were determined by the trial court and upon which the judgment of the trial court must rest. Upon these facts the parties in their pleadings made the following contentions:

Respondent contended that by the provisions of the subordination agreement the rights of the parties under the promissory note and trust deed were subordinated to appellant’s lease for a period of ten years only, upon the condition that appellant should perform the provisions of the lease and pay to respondent the minimum sum of $31,250 per year during the last five years of that period; that the subordination of the rights under the trust deed to the lease will cease and terminate on July 26, 1945, at the end of the "ten-year period specified in the subordination agreement; that respondent is entitled to the payment by appellant of the rentals under the lease as modified, but in any event to the minimum amount of $31,250 per year specified in the subordination agreement; and that on July 26, 1945, respondent will be entitled to the immediate possession of the real property.

Appellant claims that the subordination agreement was in full force and effect up to the time of the sale of the real property to the respondent by the trustee; that it operates to completely subordinate the title acquired by respondent at the trustee’s sale to the lease for the full term specified in the lease and that it has no further force or effect; that by purchasing the property at the trustee’s sale respondent acquired the title to the real property subject to the lease as modified, for the full term of the lease, expiring on September 30, 1955; that appellant’s obligation to make further payments in the sum of $31,250 each year under the provisions of the subordination agreement terminated upon the purchase of the real property by respondent at the trustee’s sale; and that thereafter appellant is only required to pay the rentals specified in the lease. In support of these contentions appellant cites the rule in volume 25 California Jurisprudence, page 94, section 78 that “When a transfer of the property through a sale under a deed of trust occurs, the deed ceases to exist and there is then no encumbrance on the property by virtue thereof, ’ ’ and in this connection cites the general rule that a lease executed prior to a mortgage or trust deed is superior to the mortgage, and the title acquired on foreclosure of the mortgage will be subject to the lease. (Enos v. Cook, 65 Cal. 175 [ 3 P. 632 ] ; Security -First National Bank of Los Angeles v. Marxen, 28 Cal.App.2d 446 [ 82 P.2d 727 ]; San Mateo County Bank v. Dupret, 124 Cal.App. 395 [12 P.2d- 669].) It is therefore argued that under the above cited cases, the deed of trust herein ceased to exist after the foreclosure sale, and that the priority of the subordination agreement must therefore be determined as of the time of the sale, and the rights of the parties are measured as of that time.

In view of the fact that there was no denial of any of the material facts in either the complaint or the answer, the motion for judgment on the pleadings was an appropriate remedy for the determination of the rights of the parties, and the conflicting conclusions of the parties as to their rights and obligations based upon those facts raised no issue requiring a trial. (Northern Light M. Co. v. Blue Goose Mining Co., 25 Cal.App. 282 [ 143 P. 540 ] ; Davies v. Ramsdell, 40 Cal.App. 424 [ 181 P. 94 ] ; McNew v. Mulcahy, 24 Cal.App.2d 656 [76 P.2d 143]; Griffin v. County of Colusa, 44 Cal.App.2d 915 [ 113 P.2d 270 ].) Respondent moved for a judgment on the pleadings. The motion was regularly heard and argued by both parties and it was conceded that the trial court was required to accept as true all allegations of fact in the complaint admitted by the answer and all allegations of fact in the answer. Appellant did not at that time dispute the propriety of the motion or the trial court’s right to enter judgment upon it but contended that the judgment should be in accordance with the claims of appellant. The trial court granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings and entered a judgment which was in fact a judgment in favor of respondent, which in effect followed the contentions and legal theory of the rights of the parties as advanced by respondent.

The trust deed was a first lien and incumbrance on the real property. Respondent never waived its primary and superior rights except by the express terms of the subordination agreement. That agreement recited that respondent was willing to subordinate its rights undenits trust deed only in the manner and subject to the terms of that agreement. The agreement specifically provided that the subordination of the trust deed to the lease should only be continued for a period of ten years and should terminate in any event at the end of ten years. It then provided four additional methods for termination of the agreement by act of the parties within the ten-year period. It is clear that the parties themselves carefully and expressly provided for the exact method for terminating the subordination agreement. It expressly provided that the subordination could be terminated by a trustee’s sale, but only in the event that appellant was in default. No other method of termination in the event of trustee’s sale was provided. Therefore, in the absence of any termination within the ten-year period by act of the parties, the agreement and the subordination it afforded were to continue for a period of ten years and then were to expire by its own terms. In the light of the facts pleaded, it is unquestioned that respondent’s trust deed was originally prior and superior to appellant’s lease. Under such circumstances a sale under the trust deed would terminate and cut off all rights in the real property which were created after the recording of the trust deed. (Metropolis Tr. & Savings Bank v. Barnet, 165 Cal. 449 [ 132 P. 833 ].) Appellant’s only right to pos session of the real property after the execution of the trustee’s deed to respondent, must rest alone upon the subordination agreement and the rights therein specifically granted to appellant, which alone can give that lease effect as against the rights of the purchaser at the trustee’s sale. Appellant’s right to possession, therefore, has ceased except for the protection afforded that possession by the subordination agreement. The subordination afforded by the agreement was granted only in the manner and subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement, and the first term of that agreement is that the subordination shall only be effective for ten years and shall terminate in any event at the end of ten years. In consideration of that period of subordination, appellant agreed to pay respondent $31,250 during each year of the last five years of the period. It therefore seems plain that under the terms of the agreement, the subordination of the rights under the trust deed to those under the lease was to continue for ten years and no longer. The sale and execution of the trustee’s deed did not affect or terminate the subordination agreement. It still remained as an existing agreement affecting the right to the possession of the real property and the obligations of the parties.

In Tanner v. Title Insurance & Trust Co., 20 Cal.2d 814 [ 129 P.2d 383 ], the Supreme Court applied and enforced the provisions of a subordination agreement after a sale and conveyance by the trustee, and determined the rights of a purchaser at the trustee’s sale under a lease subordinate to the trust deed in accordance with the terms of the subordination agreement. That such a limited and conditional subordination is valid and operates to subordinate in accordance with its conditions was directly decided in Cummings v. Jackson (1897), 55 N.J.Eq. 805 [ 38 A. 763 ].

The agreement itself lends no support to appellant’s view that it ceased to be a document under which payments were to be made after the trustee’s sale. Its express terms required the payment to be made “each and every year of said last five years of said ten-year period.” These payments are directly made a condition of the subordination, and without the payment required, appellant would not be entitled to any subordination. The subordination agreement was just as much a document affecting the title and right to possession of the real property as was the lease. Without it the lease had no validity as against the trust deed or the purchaser at the trustee’s sale. The subordination agreement remained an operative and effective instrument regulating the rights of the parties, and subordination being clearly a limited and conditional subordination, the respondent, as purchaser at the trustee’s sale, took the title subject only to the limited and conditional subordination granted by the agreement. The title of a purchaser at a trustee’s sale relates back to the date of the trust deed. (Carpenter v. Smallpage, 220 Cal. 129 [ 29 P.2d 841 , 30 P.2d 995 ]; Penryn Fruit Co. v. Sherman-Worrell Fruit Co., 142 Cal. 643 [ 76 P. 484 , 100 Am.St.Rep. 150 ]; Central Construction Co. v. Hartman, 7 Cal.App.2d 703 [ 47 P.2d 484 ].) Appellant could have no right at all to possession under its lease unless the subordination agreement was still effective and' an integral part of the chain of title. The cases cited by appellant are not opposed to this construction.

The trial court correctly determined that respondent was entitled to the payment of the rentals under the lease and to the minimum payment of $31,250 per year specified in the subordination agreement. That agreement granted a subordination only subject to certain terms and conditions, one of which was that in the event no election of termination was served upon respondent, the appellant agreed that it would pay $31,250 during each and every year of the last five years of the ten-year period in twelve equal installments. This was a definite consideration for the limited subordination granted, and the payments specified in the subordination agreement were required to be made without exception and were to be paid whether or not the rental under the lease was less than that amount. This is a reasonable interpretation of the agreement and the judgment of the trial court correctly declares the rights of the parties in strict accordance with the provisions of the documents upon which those rights rest. It therefore cannot be disturbed on appeal. (Johnston v. Landucci, 21 Cal.2d 63 [ 130 P.2d 405 , 148 A.L.R. 1355 ]; Estate of Northcutt, 16 Cal.2d 683 [ 107 P.2d 607 ].)

Judgment affirmed.

Barnard, P. J., and Marks, J., concurred.