This matter comes before the Supreme Court upon hearing granted after decision by the Second District Court of Appeal, Division Two. The appeal is from an order of the trial court fixing the fees of a special administrator and the fees of an attorney who acted as attorney for the special administrators.

The following facts shown by the record are here given as stated in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal:

In California it is established law that if an executor, administrator or testamentary trustee, being himself a practicing lawyer, elects to act as his attorney in the performance of the services incident to the administration of an estate, the general rule is that he will not be entitled to an allowance against the estate for his professional services in the absence of some statutory provision entitling him. thereto. The rule is grounded upon the principal that the administrator in selecting himself to perform the duties of an attorney for the estate would become his own employer, and would be under temptation of self-interest which might lead him to act contrary to the duties of his trust. Therefore public policy establishes the rule as above stated. This rule and the legal history thereof has been restated by this court in Estate of Parker, 200 Cal. 132 [ 251 Pac. 907 , 49 A. L. R. 1025]. It is upon this case that appellants rely in support of their contention that respondent MacDonald should not be permitted to receive any fees for his services as attorney in the course of the special administration of this estate. Unquestionably the rule exists as stated in Estate of Parker, supra, and we have no disposition to modify the ruling made in that case.

But we are further of the opinion that the ease at bar presents a suitable exception to the rule set forth in the Parker case. The rule itself is not a rule of law as distinguished from equity. On the contrary it is a statement and illustration of a principle of equity. Equity or chancery law has its origin in the necessity for exceptions to the application of rules of law in those cases where the law, by-reason of its universality, would create injustice in the affairs of men. Therefore, while we recognize the equitable rule suggested by appellants as illustrated by the case of Estate of Parker, supra, we think that the case at bar involves and requires the application of further principles of equity which sustain the decision of the trial court. From the evidence it appears that this is not the ordinary case in which an attorney at law in the performance of the duties of an executor or administrator utilizes his own knowledge of the law in the performance of his official duty. Here it appears that the previous relations of MacDonald with the decedent and with appellants, had made him the one person peculiarly and completely familiar with the property and business affairs of an estate amounting to nearly seven millions of dollars. For reasons which have been indicated, it became necessary to institute a special administration pending the determination of the questions relating to two purported wills, and preliminary to the establishment of a regular administration of the estate. Apparently with the consent of all parties in interest the court was requested to appoint the bank and MacDonald as special administrators. If those special administrators when appointed had chosen to employ another attorney at law to advise them in connection with their duties, there is no doubt that the administrators would have been entitled to one fee and the attorney so selected would have been entitled to another fee under the limitations of the statute and the orders of the court. But in the particular ease it was apparent to all parties in interest that the principal part of the duties of administration in the way of routine work should be performed by the bank and that it would be greatly to the interest of the estate to have the duties of legal counsel performed by Mr. MacDonald.

We may concede that if Mr. MacDonald had been appointed both as special administrator and as attorney without knowledge of the parties in interest' that he was perform-’ ing the duties of an attorney and without knowledge of the court that such course of action was to be pursued, the principles stated in Estate of Parker, supra, might be applicable in the determination of this appeal. But it further appears that before anything was done to fix and determine the conditions under which this trust was to be performed, the fact was openly stated to the parties in interest, including appellants and their attorneys, and it was well understood by the court, that Mr. MacDonald proposed to waive all claim to fees as special administrator and look only to such allowance as might be made for his services as an attorney for the administrators. The record leaves no doubt that this was clearly understood by appellants, and although they were given full opportunity to state any objection which they might have to such arrangement, they made no such objection until the services had been fully performed, and the time arrived for payment. Under these circumstances we are of the opinion that appellants are now estopped by their own conduct. They have knowingly permitted Mr. MacDonald to expend much valuable time and to give them the benefit of important services without affording to him that opportunity of self-protection to which he was entitled if there was to be any challenge of his claim for compensation.

It has been suggested that the order should be reversed on the ground that it purports to be an allowance in full of the commissions and fees of the special administrator and of the attorney prior to final settlement of the estate. This is based upon the fact that under section 901 of the Probate Code the total amount of allowable fees is limited to a percentage of the amount of the estate accounted for, and it is contended that this means the amount of the estate as disclosed by the final account. In response to this contention it is necessary only to refer to section 467 of the Probate Code, contained in the chapter on Special Administrators. It is there provided that the commissions of the special administrator and the fees of his attorney shall be fixed by the court, but that the total fee paid to the attorneys both of the special administrator and executor, or of the special administrator and general administrator “must not, together, exceed the sums provided in this code as compensation for the ordinary and extraordinary services of attorneys for executors or administrators”. "From the record herein, including the findings of fact and order of the trial court, it does not appear that the order as made is in conflict with the provisions in the statute. Moreover, it appears that the objection now suggested by appellants was not made in the trial court. Under these circumstances we find no sufficient reason for further consideration of such objection.

The order is affirmed.

Waste, C. J., Shenk, J., Seawell, J., Curtis, J., and Thompson, J., concurred.

Rehearing denied.