A hearing was granted in this ease after decision by the District Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two. Upon further consideration we are satisfied that the opinion of Mr. Justice Sturtevant correctly determines the issues, and we hereby adopt it as part of the opinion of this court. The opinion reads as follows:

‘ ‘ This is an appeal by the defendant from a judgment rendered in favor of plaintiff in an action to recover on an insurance policy.

“The plaintiff is a corporation engaged in the transportation business. In California and Nevada it owns or operates from fifteen to twenty trucks, trailers, and automobiles. Prior to the 1st of July, 1930, it had insured each piece of its equipment. The insurance was written in three different policies. Each was pleaded in haec verba by the plaintiff and they are designated in the record as plaintiff’s exhibits 1, 2 and 3. In the early part of the year 1930 the plaintiff sold to Paul Colburn a car spoken of by the witnesses as a Hudson sedan. The sale was in the form of a conditional sales contract enumerating certain deferred payments. Before the 1st of May, 1930, all payments had been made. The registration certificate was delivered to Colburn on July 1, 1930. Mr. G. T. McNeely was the secretary-treasurer of the plaintiff corporation. Mrs. Adams, his daughter, was an employee of the Great American Insurance Company, hereinafter called the insurance company. In May or June of 1930 Mr. Mc-Neely delivered to Mrs. Adams the policies above mentioned and asked her to inquire of her employer if it would be willing to take over the business and give to the plaintiff policies providing the same complete coverage as plaintiff’s 1, 2 and 3, which were about to expire. Mrs. Adams took the policies and exhibited them to Mr. Benner, assistant manager of the insurance company, and repeated to him the inquiry made by Mr. McNeely. After examining the documents Mr. Benner expressed a hesitation on compensation, that is, as we understand it, he hesitated on liability for employer’s compensation liability. Thereupon, seated at Mr. Benner’s desk, Mrs. Adams called up Mr. McNeely and after certain conversations were had Mr. Benner stated that he would send a representative to the plaintiff to discuss the business. At that time and for some time previous thereto the insurance com pany had in its employment Miss Nielund, who was, as we understand the record, an expert in framing and writing insurance policies. A little later, Mr. Benner directed Miss Nielund and Mrs. Adams to call on Mr. McNeely and discuss the business tendered by Mr. McNeely. When they arrived at his office, with the old policies before them, Mr. McNeely explained the change in ownership of the Hudson sedan and they discussed what changes were to be made in the policies. Miss Nielund told him her company could and would handle the business. She also stated that the Hudson sedan could be put in a nonownership policy and that such policy would be so written. After leaving the plaintiff’s premises Miss Nielund telephoned to Mr. Kemper, superintendent of the casualty department of the Great American Indemnity Company, hereinafter called the indemnity company. Thereafter three new policies were written which the plaintiff pleaded in haec verla and which are numbered plaintiff’s exhibits 5, 6 and 7. A comparison of the documents shows that the Hudson sedan was covered by plaintiff’s 1 and 3. It was not covered by plaintiff’s 5 and 6, and as will presently appear, the sole question presented by this litigation is whether it was covered by plaintiff’s 7. After the new policies were written all w'ere delivered, the premiums were paid and are still retained. The new policies were so delivered some time in June. As we understand the record, Mrs. Adams delivered them in person. Be that as it may, the record is clear from the time Mr. McNeely had his conversation with Miss Nielund the plaintiff was not advised by anyone representing either the insurance company or the indemnity company that the policies contained anything to the effect that the policies did not give to the plaintiff the full coverage for which it had contracted. No written application was requested or was executed. No inquiries except as we have stated were made by the defendant, neither is there any claim that at any time or at all the plaintiff made any misrepresentation. A short time after plaintiff’s 5, 6 and 7 had taken effect Colburn drove the Hudson sedan into San Francisco. While there that car was stolen and while in the hands of the thief it met with a collision. When asked by the plaintiff to take over the litigation the defendant refused and thereafter this action was commenced.

“ The defendant contends that the complaint does not state a cause of action. Except as will hereinafter be noted it is not claimed that it did not contain every allegation necessary to recover on an insurance policy. Plaintiff’s exhibit 7 does not specifically designate any automobile but specifies the owners by name, the risks assumed, and the premium charged for each risk. One of its provisions is: ‘Exclusions . . . (c) This policy does not cover ... (6) For any automobile and/or motorcycle registered in the name of the named assured. . . . ’ The plaintiff did not allege that the Hudson sedan was registered in the name of Colburn (the employee using it), nor that it was not registered in the name of the plaintiff. Pointing to the absence of those allegations the defendant makes its attack. No duty rested on plaintiff to insert any allegation on the subject. (Cowan v. Phenix Insurance Co., 78 Cal. 181, 185 [ 20 Pac. 408 ].) As stated above, there is no claim that this plaintiff made any misrepresentations, hence Goorberg v. Western Assurance Co., 150 Cal. 510 [ 89 Pac. 130 , 119 Am. St. Rep. 246 , 11 Ann. Cas. 801, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 876], is not in point. (14 Cal. Jur. 498, 499.) If the defendant claimed a breach of contract by the plaintiff that subject was a matter of defense. (Raulet v. Northwestern etc. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213, 235 [ 107 Pac. 292 ].) In its complaint the plaintiff did set forth certain allegations which were in the nature of anticipating a defense, but by doing so it did not render its complaint, which was otherwise sufficient, subject to a general demurrer. (Kansaburo Ohsaki v. Ahern, 61 Cal. App. 787 [ 215 Pac. 714 ].)

“ It is next asserted that the plaintiff having accepted and retained the policy is charged with knowledge of its terms, is bound by it, and is estopped from asserting that it did not know the terms of the policy. It cites and relies on Madsen v. Maryland Casualty Co., 168 Cal. 204 [ 142 Pac. 51 ], and Burch v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 85 Cal. App. 542 [ 259 Pac. 1108 ]. Those cases involved statements made by the insured in their written applications. In neither one did it appear that there was no written application and that after the insured had made a request for full coverage the insurer delivered a document which it represented covered the demand as made. If defendant contends that the plaintiff may not recover because it did not read the policy, such contention may not be sustained. In Raulet v. Northwestern etc. Ins. Co., 157 Cal. 213 , at page 229 [ 107 Pac. 292 ], the court said:

Defendant contends that the above discussion is in conflict with the case of Madsen v. Maryland Casualty Co., 168 Cal. 204 [ 142 Pac. 51 ], in holding the company bound under a contract of insurance different from that actually written. They rely upon the general proposition that where, without fraud, or other invalidating cause, a contract of insurance is delivered to and retained by the insured, he will be -bound by the terms thereof. There is no dispute about the general rule, and the exceptions to it are equally well established. In the instant case, specific coverage was requested for a particular car; the Colburn transaction involving that car was called to the attention of the agent who negotiated for the insurance as the representative of the company; and in the policy itself the name of Paul Colburn appeared. Under these circumstances the company must be held bound to give the protection thus contracted for, and it cannot be permitted to perpetrate what would undoubtedly be a fraud on the insured by relying upon the exclusion clause of the policy. The fact that the premium differs in a non-ownership policy is utterly immaterial. Plaintiff paid the premium charged for the coverage requested, and if by some mistake it was not charged the proper premium, it is no doubt possible to recover the deficiency.

The judgment is affirmed.

Rehearing denied.