Defendants appeal from a judgment rendered by the court sitting without a jury awarding plaintiff $3,500 damages for injury to the optic nerve of his left eye, and progressive impairment of vision and blindness resulting therefrom. That injury-and other injuries resulted from a collision on April 5, 1939, in the day time between plaintiff’s motorcycle and defendant Sessions’ delivery truck, being driven by Sessions’ employee, defendant Bonnin. The collision occurred in the city of San Diego at the intersection of India and Redwood Streets, each of which is paved and curbed and 52 feet wide. By reason of the obstruction of the view of traffic within the statutory distance on Redwood Street to northbound traffic on India Street, the prima facie speed limit at the intersection was 15 miles per hour. (California Vehicle Code, sec. 511.) Under these circumstances plaintiff drove south on India Street and made a “U” turn about three-fourths of a block south of the intersection. He then drove north on India Street. Defendant Bonnin was driving south on India Street, and at a point about 16 feet north of the north line of the intersection with Redwood Street commenced to make a left turn into Redwood Street and in so doing crossed to his left of the center line of India Street, “cut the corner”, and proceeded across the northeast quarter portion of the intersection. Just prior to the collision both plaintiff and Bonnin were traveling 25 miles per hour. The collision was head-on and occurred 3 feet south of the north line and 16 feet west of the east line of the intersection. As a result of the collision plaintiff suffered mental and physical shock, a fractured left ankle and wrist, bruised back and arm, and cuts and bruises on the left side of his head and on the left eye; the optic nerve of his left eye was injured resulting in partial atrophy and 80 per cent loss of vision and the prognostication is total blindness in that eye. The damages were found to be $3,500 for the injury to the optic nerve and the results flowing therefrom, and $800 for all other damages.

Defendants denied that Bonnin was negligent and pleaded as special defenses a release from plaintiff and contributory negligence. From the foregoing facts it is obvious that the finding of the trial court that defendant Bonnin was negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision is supported by the evidence.

Defendants contend that the release was a complete defense to the action. After the accident, plaintiff, being a member of the United States Marine Corps, was taken to the United States Naval Hospital in an unconscious condition. He was totally unconscious until 9 o ’clock that night. While at the hospital he was under the care of Dr. Grindell, a physician attached to the hospital. The following day, April 6, 1939, at about 3 o’clock in the afternoon, A. B. Severance, an insurance company adjuster from defendant’s public liability carrier, called on plaintiff at the hospital. Severance was accompanied by Dr. Findley, who also came on behalf of the insurance carrier. At. that time, according to Severance’s testimony, there was a conversation with plaintiff with reference to plaintiff’s injuries and the settlement thereof. Dr. Grindell was present and Dr. Findley examined plain tiff. The conversation between Severance and plaintiff related to the settlement oí the case. Plaintiff wanted a new motorcycle and $1,000 and was hesitant about settlement until he knew the extent of his injuries. The upshot was that plaintiff executed a general release of all damages suffered, both personal and property, for the sum of $800; the release provided among other things, that section 1542 of the Civil Code was waived. A draft for $800 was given to plaintiff; he was told about the draft being held for him the following day but had no recollection of it. On the face of the draft appeared the following:

The court found that at the time the release was executed and the draft delivered on April 6, 1939, and for several hours thereafter, plaintiff was in a dazed and semiconscious condition and was without capacity to contract and was unaware of his rights and injuries; and further that he had no knowledge of the contents of the release until presented to him at the trial of the case. There is ample evidence to support those findings and, although there is a conflict in the evidence, under the familiar rule that an appellate court will not disturb a finding of the trial court where the evidence is conflicting, that finding cannot be here questioned. (Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal. (2d) 232 [ 73 Pac. (2d) 1163 ].) Plaintiff testified lie had very lit tie memory about what took place on the afternoon of April 6, 1939, that he did not remember signing any release or being examined by Dr. Findley. The evidence shows that less than 24 hours before the signing of the release and the conversation on April 6, 1939, he had suffered a fractured wrist and ankle, bruised arm and back, and injuries bn the face, head and left eye and concussion. His left eye and left side of his face were bandaged. He did not recognize friends who called at the hospital. To them he was in a dazed condition. Opiates had been administered to him the night before. We believe that this and other evidence was adequate to support the finding that plaintiff was not competent when the release was executed; and due to his physical and mental condition was not aware of what transpired on the afternoon of April 6, 1939. It must be concluded therefore that the release was void.

However, defendants claim that regardless of what plaintiff’s condition may have been when the release was executed and the draft delivered, the subsequent cashing of the draft by plaintiff and his endorsement with the releases stated thereon, on April 17, 1939, was a ratification of the release of April 6, 1939, or was a complete release in itself. It is not disputed that when plaintiff endorsed and cashed the draft he was fully competent and knew what he was doing. The theory of the trial court on this proposition clearly appears from its findings. It found:

The court then proceeded to determine that the damages for all of the injuries, except the injury to the optic nerve, was $800, the sum plaintiff had received on the draft. Under these circumstances it is clear that it was the court’s conclusion that plaintiff was not bound by the release arising from the endorsement and cashing of the draft because he did not then know of the injury to his optic nerve and therefore the case came within the provisions of section 1542 of the Civil Code.

Defendants state in their brief that neither plaintiff nor defendants knew of the character of the injury to plaintiff’s eye. They state:

The trial court found that defendants did know of the injury to -plaintiff’s optic nerve and of the permanent impairment of vision, at the time he (Dr. Findley) examined plaintiff on April 6, 1939, and that having such knowledge defendants were fraudulent in concealing it from plaintiff. Be that as it may, it is not material whether or not they had such knowledge. Conceding that neither defendants nor plaintiff knew of the injury to the optic nerve at any time until after the draft was cashed, the trial court’s conclusion that plaintiff was not bound by the release or cashing of the draft was proper. Section 1542 provides -.

Assuming that the release, and draft and endorsement and cashing thereof may be considered all one transaction, it does not follow that the cashing of the draft was a ratification of the release in all its phases. This is true for the reason that there cannot be said to be a ratification or confirmation of a void instrument or agreement when the person alleged to have made the ratification did not know what the agreement contained or all the facts when the alleged confirmation took place. (International M. Co. v. National R. Co., 67 Cal. App. 498 [ 227 Pac. 918 ]; Schmidt v. Mesmer, 116 Cal. 267, 271 [ 48 Pac. 54 ].) Plaintiff knew nothing of the release or what it contained until after the draft was cashed; he knew nothing of it until it was exhibited to him at the trial. It is true he knew the draft contained release provisions and that by cashing it he was making a settlement but nothing was said in the release provision of the draft about known or unknown injuries or waiving section 1542 of the Civil Code as appeared in the release. Under such circumstances it is not material whether the cashing of the draft with the release thereon be considered as a ratification of the release or as an independent instrument constituting a release and settlement. The essence of the problem is therefore, whether the case comes within the terms of section 1542 of the Civil Code, providing that a release does not include claims for injuries not known or suspected to exist by the releasor when executed. Plaintiff could not know of the injury to his optic nerve when he signed the release because at that time he was not mentally competent and was not aware of what was transpiring. The lower court found that plaintiff did not know of the injury to his optic nerve and the impairment of vision and ultimate blindness which would result therefrom, when he endorsed and cashed the draft. Defendants urge that that finding is not supported by the evidence in that the most that plaintiff can be said to have been ignorant of was that the impairment of his vision would grow progressively greater to the final tragedy of blindness.

In this connection plaintiff testified that he had injuries on the left side of his face and around the left temple and eye; seven stitches were taken, some being in the eyebrow. His eye and the side of his forehead were bandaged for about two weeks. He did not know of his optic nerve being injured and that he would probably lose the sight of his eye until he consulted an eye specialist while still at the hospital, about June 17, 1939, two months after he had cashed the draft. He stated that he had difficulty with his eye since the injury, but what difficulty does not appear. It may have been because of the cuts and bruises alone. Defendants would have the court consider evidence of the conversation between Severance, Dr. Findley and plaintiff on April 6, 1939, as bearing on plaintiff’s knowledge that his vision was permanently impaired (and other matters), but the trial court has found on substantial evidence, that plaintiff’s condition was such that he was not mentally accountable for what transpired at that time; thus, such evidence should not be considered by us. It follows then that the evidence justifies the trial court’s finding that plaintiff did not know of the injury to his optic nerve and of the permanent impairment of his vision when he endorsed and cashed the draft. The case is simply one then where a person, when he signs a release for all injuries, has suffered cuts and bruises around the eye and other injuries of which he knows, but he is also suffering from an injury to the optic nerve which will result in a permanent impairment of vision and ultimate blindness of which he docs not know. Under these circumstances section 1542 is applicable. It is not a situation where unexpected and unknown consequences develop from a known injury. The impairment of vision and ultimate blindness are not consequences fiowdng from the bruising of the eye and the cuts thereabout, rather they are from the unknown injury to the optic nerve. O’Meara v. Haiden, 204 Cal. 354 [ 268 Pac. 334 , 60 A. L. R. 1381], is controlling here. There the action was for wrongful death of a minor, occurring seven months after the accident, caused by an injury to the spleen. The defense was a release of all known and unknown damages given prior to the minor’s death. It appeared that there was a bruise over the abdomen causing a hemorrhage in the spleen not visible to the naked eye; the bruise on the abdomen however was observed and known. This court held the release did not cover the damages for the death resulting from the injury to the spleen, stating at page 360:

In Gambrel v. Duensing, 127 Cal. App. 593 [ 16 Pac. (2d) 284 ], a general release for personal injuries was signed by plaintiffs when they were not aware of what they were doing and were under the impression that the $350 received therefor was. for property damage and hospital expenses rather' than the personal injuries. The court said at page 601, et seq.:

* ‘ There is further testimony in the record to the effect that neither the plaintiff nor Louis Gambrel would have signed the release had they known of the resulting injury to the plaintiff’s eyesight. The release signed by the plaintiff and Louis Gambrel is in the words and figures following, to wit:

Defendants next urge that there was no proper tender of the $800 paid on the draft when plaintiff sought to rescind the release, and that such an offer of restoration was vital to plaintiff’s case. By letter to defendants from plaintiff’s attorney on May 12, 1939, notice of rescission was given together with a statement of an offer to restore the $800. In reply to that letter the insurance carrier replied that they were going to investigate the matter and would advise of their decision later.

The court found that at the time of the written offer to restore, “plaintiff had assets convertible to cash in the amount of $200.00 and could have borrowed $600.00 to have completed restoration of $800.00, but did not have the sum of $800.00 in cash to restore if defendants had surrendered their claims under said writings of April 6, 1939”. That finding is supported by the evidence. Section 2074 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an offer in writing to pay a sum of money if not accepted, is equivalent to actual production and tender of the money and section 2076 provides that a person to whom a tender is made must specify any objection he has to it or it is waived. It is true that those sections do not affect sections 1493 and 1495 of the Civil Code which require an offer to be made in good faith and that the offeror must be willing and able to perform according to the offer. (Allen v. Chatfield, 172 Cal. 60 [ 156 Pac. 47 ].) But we cannot say that when plaintiff had assets convertible in cash of the value of $200 and had sufficient credit and was able and willing to borrow $600, he was unable or unwilling to restore the $800 to defendants. It is quite evident that the offer of rescission and to restore was not accepted by defendants. Apparently plaintiff heard nothing further from them after the offer was made; and after he commenced his action defendants claimed in their answer that the release was in full force and effect and a complete bar to plaintiff’s action. In any event rescission and an offer of restoration are not necessary under circumstances such as are here existent. The original release made on April 6, 1939, was absolutely void and no rescission was necessary. There was clearly no meeting of the minds because plaintiff was incompetent at that time. The release contained in the draft considered either as a separate release instrument or as a ratification of only the general release provisions of the original release required no rescission or offer to restore for the simple reason that there was nothing to restore. The release, in the language of section 1542, did not extend to unknown injtmes, that is, the injury to the optic nerve. Putting the matter affirmatively it did extend to all injuries except that to the optic nerve, and therefore the $800 was the settlement figure agreed upon for all other injuries and being such there would be no occasion for restoring it to defendants. They had received for that sum a release for all of such other injuries and they are not in any way prejudiced. The injuries to the optic nerve being unknown were simply not a part of the release contract, or stated another way, no release was made with reference to the optic nerve. It is not dissimilar to a release which specifies on its face that it covers only part of the injuries suffered. In either ease the release stands as the agreement of the parties as to the known injuries. Realizing this the trial court found, as heretofore shown, that the $800, the amount of the draft, was the amount of damages suffered by plaintiff by reason of all injuries, except the optic nerve. This reasoning finds support in Meyer v. Haas, 126 Cal. 560 [ 58 Pac. 1042 ], where it was held that the release extended only to the loss of time item of damages, and the court said, at page 563:

It is said in Wetzstein v. Thomasson, 34 Cal. App. (2d) 554, 560 [ 93 Pac. (2d) 1028 ] :

It follows then that because of the ignorance of the existence of the injury to the optic nerve, the payment of the $800 necessarily covered all damages except those flowing from such injury, and the trial court found plaintiff’s damages for injury to the optic nerve was $3,500 and that “for all other damages are the sum of Eight hundred Dollars ($800.00).”, and also that “the draft for $800.00 was a full release and satisfaction of all plaintiff’s damages known at the time it was negotiated by plaintiff, and these include all damages except injury to optic nerve of his left eye and progressive loss of vision thereof.” Under these circumstances defendants are not in a position to object to the sufficiency of any offer of rescission or restoration.

Finally defendants complain that the finding against contributory negligence is insufficient and that the evidence establishes contributory negligence as a matter of law. From the foregoing discussion of the facts it is apparent that there was adequate evidence from which the trial court could find a lack of negligence on the part of plaintiff contributing proximately to the collision. The mere fact of the speed at which plaintiff was traveling, 25 miles per hour, was not necessarily a proximate cause of the accident. It is true that due to the view being obstructed the prima facie speed limit was 15 miles per hour, but that limit has reference to traffic entering into India Street from Redwood Street rather than traffic turning left from India Street into Redwood Street as was done by defendant Bonnin. The obstruction of view did not affect the parties involved in the collision here involved. The trial court found:

The judgment is affirmed.

Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Traynor, J., Edmonds, J., and Gibson, C. J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied March 17, 1941.