We granted a rehearing in this case to give further consideration to the question of appellants’ contributory negligence. Since respondents in their petition for rehearing did not question the accuracy of the recital of the basic facts in our opinion previously filed nor our conclusion that their negligence was clearly established we copy that portion of our previous opinion:

“It thus appears without conflict that with knowledge that water started to seep onto plaintiffs’ property from the time defendants started to pump they continued to pump water into the area enclosed by the dikes until plaintiffs’ airfield was entirely flooded by the seepage and even afterwards. In view of this admission the finding that defendants were not guilty of negligence is without support in the evidence. ’ ’

The trial court found “that the negligence of the plaintiffs in blocking a natural drainage ditch across their property was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ damage.” The evidence in this respect showed that a drainage ditch had been carried under plaintiffs’ runway through a wooden and metal culvert, that much of the water seeping onto plaintiffs’ property from defendants’ pumping operations drained into this ditch and that it developed that there must be an obstruction in the culvert because this water accumulated on the upper side of the culvert and only seeped through slowly to the other side. After a lapse of several weeks plaintiffs brought a clam shell dredge onto the property and tore out the culvert, after which the accumulated water passed through. Plaintiffs testified that the delay in this operation was caused by their inability to procure the necessary equipment earlier.

Upon a reexamination of the question we are satisfied with the correctness of our previous conclusion that plaintiffs were under no duty to. anticipate defendants’ negligent invasion of their land or to have any drainage facilities on their land to carry off water negligently cast thereon by defendants. In LeRoy Fibre Co. v. Chicago. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 232 U.S. 340, 349-350 [ 34 S.Ct. 415 , 58 L.Ed. 631 ], a case dealing with the negligent setting of a fire on plaintiff’s property by an adjoining railroad, the United States Supreme Court stated the principles involved so clearly as to justify the following extended quotation:

The California cases are to the same effect. (Yik Hon v. Spring V. W. W., 65 Cal. 619 [ 4 P. 666 ]; Steele v. Pacific Coast Ry. Co., 74 Cal. 323, 329-330 [ 15 P. 851 ]; Flynn v. San Francisco & S. J. R. R. ., 40 Cal. 14, 19 [ 6 Am.Rep. 695 ]; cf. Tormey v. Anderson-Cottonwood I. Dist., 53 Cal.App. 559, 565-566 [ 200 P. 814 ].) In Yik Hon v. Spring V. W. W., supra, at page 620 the court said:

The following eases and texts announce the same rule: North Bend Lumber Co. v. City of Seattle, 116 Wash. 500 [ 199 P. 988 989-990 , 19 A.L.R. 415 ] ; McCarty v. Boise City Canal Co., 2 Idaho (Hasb.) 245 [ 10 P. 623 ]; Shields v. Orr Extension Ditch Co., 23 Nev. 349 [ 47 P. 194 ] ; 45 C.J. 945; 56 Am.Jur. 854; 4 Shearman & Redfield on Negligence (rev.ed.), Zipp § 755, pp. 1731-1734; cases collected in note, 19 A.L.R. 423 .

The tenor of the vast majority of the decisions is that a landowner may make any lawful use of his land and that it is not contributory negligence to neglect to take precautions to avoid future injury which can only occur as the result of another’s negligence. As so tersely expressed by the United States Supreme Court in the passage above quoted from the LeRoy Fibre Company case: “The tangibility of property is in its uses and that the uses by one owner of his property may be limited by the wrongful use of another owner of his, is a contradiction, ’ ’

There is little case law to support the complacent assumption of a right arising from a wrong in the statement of respondent Rich above quoted: 1 ‘ Because the ditch was blocked off was not our responsibility. We notified the people that blocked the ditch they had to open it. ’ ’ This bold assertion of the right to flood another’s land and put on him the burden of disposing of the water suggests wilfulness and if the case had been tried on that theory might have justified a finding of deliberate trespass.

Woolworth Co. v. Seattle, 104 Wash. 629 [ 177 P. 664 ], relied upon by respondents, involved the violation of an ordinance by the plaintiff, and has twice been expressly distinguished by the Supreme Court of Washington on that ground. (North Bend Lumber Co. v. City of Seattle, supra, 199 P. 988, 990 ; Tombari v. City of Spokane, 197 Wash. 207 [ 84 P.2d 678, 681 ].) Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Nants, 167 Tenn. 1 [ 65 S.W.2d 189 ] is out of harmony with the general rule and the California cases above cited.

We are satisfied to hold that plaintiffs were not obliged to anticipate the negligent flooding of their land by defendants and that their permitting the drainage ditch to become clogged before the flooding started cannot constitute contributory negligence. If they had chosen to fill up the drainage ditch deliberately before the danger from flooding by defendants’ negligence occurred they would only have been exercising the rights of an owner to use his land in any lawful fashion. The evidence is clear that the culvert was already clogged when the water first began to accumulate in the ditch.

The most that can be said is that when plaintiffs discovered that the culvert was clogged they may have been under a duty to clear it out to mitigate their damages. Their land was then already invaded by the water negligently cast upon it by defendants, but the duty to mitigate damages exists alike in cases of breach of contract and tort, wilful as well as negligent. (8 Cal.Jur., Damages, §43, pp. 782-783.) The negligent failure to mitigate damages involves other questions than those involved in contributory negligence and on those the court made no findings. The plaintiff is not bound to incur a relatively large expense in the attempt to mitigate damages. (Schultz v. Town of Lakeport, 5 Cal.2d 377, 384-385 [ 54 P.2d 1110 ] and cases there cited.) Here the evidence is that it cost $600 to clear the obstruction. The trial court, in considering the question of mitigation of damages, should weigh this cost against the total damages incurred. Also the trial court obviously did not consider the evidence that the delay in getting the clam shell was unavoidable since it found the “blocking” of the ditch to constitute contributory negligence and did not consider the question of delay in clearing it out, nor whether that delay was excusable. At the very least plaintiffs would be entitled to the reasonable cost of clearing out the culvert.

The reasonable cost involved in mitigating damages is always recoverable, provided it does not exceed the damages prevented or reasonably anticipated. (4 Rest. Torts, § 919; 15 Am.Jur., Damages, § 27, p. 423, § 147, pp. 554-555; 8 Cal.Jur., Damages, § 43, p. 783.) It is obvious that one by his wrongful act cannot cast on another the necessity of expending money to prevent or mitigate damages and escape liability for the reasonable cost thereof.

Judgment reversed, with directions to permit the parties to amend their pleadings as they may be advised in view of this opinion.

Goodell, Acting P. J., concurred.

Respondents’ petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied January 19,1950.