This action was brought by respondent to enjoin appellants from proceeding in any manner to enforce the installation of a fish screen without first paying respondent one-half of the estimated cost thereof. A decree was entered granting the injunction, and defendants have appealed.

The respondent is a private domestic corporation engaged in producing, generating, transmitting, delivering, or furnishing electricity for light, heat or power. For this purpose it owns a reservoir known as Fuller Lake used for the temporary storage of waters which are thereafter released into a canal or conduit extending from Fuller Lake to the forebay and penstock of respondent’s Spaulding No. 3 Power House. These waters are then used in this and other power houses for the generation of electricity for light, heat or power purposes.

On or about October 22, 1936, the appellants ordered the respondent to construct and install a fish screen in Fuller Lake in front of the outlet or gate through which the water flows from Fuller Lake to the forebay and penstock of Spaulding No. 3 Power House.

The appellants furnished the respondent with drawings and specifications showing the kind and nature of the fish screen ordered to be installed, and the estimated cost of constructing the same. The respondent was ordered to construct and install this fish screen completely at its own expense and the appellants did not tender nor pay to the respondent one-half of the estimated cost thereof.

The action and conduct of the appellants as aforesaid was governed by, pursuant to, and in compliance with the statutory provisions of this State as set forth in the following sections of the Fish and Game Code of the State of California, to wit:

The trial court held that the foregoing section (536.9) of the Fish and Game Code was unconstitutional. Appellants seek to uphold the foregoing enactment upon the following grounds: (1) It operates uniformly upon all persons, firms and corporations engaged in the business of generating, transmitting and delivering electricity for light, heat and power; and (2) That the legislature has the right to make classifications and apply different rules to different classifications. The constitutional provisions alleged to have been violated by such enactment are as follows:

The whole matter revolves around the right of the legislature to place “any person, firm or private corporation engaged in producing, generating, transmitting, delivering or furnishing electricity for light, heat or power” in a class where they must bear the entire cost of installing fish screens, while all others are placed in a class where they must pay only one-half of such cost.

The general rule governing the interpretation of statutes is thus expressed in 11 American Jurisprudence, page 725, section 97:

The right of the legislature to classify and the approach which the courts should take in considering an attack upon the constitutionality of a statute, is well stated in the case of Martin v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 93 -100, 101 [ 227 Pac. 762 ]:

The power of the state to generally enact such legislation is set forth in 11 Ruling Case Law, page 1041, section 28:

Is the classification thus made “based upon some distinction, natural or intrinsic, or constitutional, which suggests a reason for, and justifies this legislation”, bearing in mind that “unless such classification is palpably arbitrary in its nature, and neither founded upon nor supported by reason” it must be upheld? We believe that the enactment is not vulnerable to the attack made. The legislature was justified in placing a greater burden upon respondent than upon other water-diverters. It is a matter of common knowledge that when fish once enter the penstock to a powerhouse it is absolutely impossible for such fish to ever thereafter return to the water from which they were originally diverted. Furthermore, after entering the penstock the fish are either immediately killed by the pressure or they are killed by the machinery through which the water flows in the power-plant itself; whereas, on the other hand, when fish once enter the conduit diverting water for natural uses it is possible for such fish to thereafter return to the water from which they were originally diverted. Furthermore, after entering such a conduit the fish are neither killed by any pressure nor are they affected in any way by the natural purposes for which the water is thereafter used.

It appears from the reports of the State Fish and Game Commission that this state annually expends many thousands of dollars in the propagation of fish and the planting of such fish in its waters. We can take judicial knowledge of the fact that the sole source of funds expended by the commission is money received from the sale of licenses to take fish and game. The funds, if the commission were required to meet one-half of the costs of the proposed screen, would not be paid out of the general fund of the state, but would be paid from the funds of the commission. A screen of this character would prevent fish, which were planted by the state, from being destroyed.

It is not unreasonable to require those diverters who destroy the greater amount of fish (including many planted by the state), to contribute more than others to the installation of a device which will eliminate such destruction. Neither is it unreasonable to assume that the legislature was motivated by such considerations when it passed this statute. Recognizing the wide discretion entrusted to the legislature in such matters, we cannot say that the classification made bears no relation to the inherent purpose of the law&emdash;to conserve and protect the fish life of this state for the common good of its citizens. It was a proper exercise of police power, directed toward the preservation not only of fish naturally in the streams and lakes, but also of fish propagated and planted by the state.

We have examined the authorities cited by both parties, but do not deem it necessary to discuss them in detail. The legal principles involved are not in dispute. They are fairly stated in the Martin case, supra. Other decisions mentioned in the briefs present various classifications made by the legislature of this and other states, and of the Congress of the United States. None of them deals with the particular classification here made. The question as to whether a classification of this character is arbitrary, or whether it is reasonably related to the inherent purpose of the law, must be determined from the facts and circumstances surrounding the enactment and its subject matter, always bearing in mind “that the constitutionality of a legislative enactment will be presumed, and any doubt respecting its constitutionality will be resolved in its favor.” (Rainey v. Michel, 6 Cal. (2d) 259-272 [ 57 Pac. (2d) 932 , 105 A. L. R. 148].)

The decree is reversed, and the trial court directed to enter findings and judgment in accordance with this opinion.

A petition for a rehearing of this cause was denied by the District Court of Appeal on February 29, 1940, and an application by respondent to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on March 30, 1940.