From a judgment in favor of plaintiff after trial before the court without a jury in an action to recover the purchase price of certain fixtures and equipment sold to defendant pursuant to a written ágreement, defendant appeals.

Viewing the evidence most favorably to plaintiff (respondent) , the essential facts are:

September 15, 1938, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement reading in part as follows:

Thereafter plaintiff went into possession of the leased premises and equipped a portion thereof as a liquor store, stocked it with alcoholic beverages, beers, wines, sundry drugs, etc., and opened the store for business and operated the same for a period.

The first part of November, 1938, plaintiff through its president asked the president of defendant corporation what he intended to do about the merchandise and fixtures in the store, to which defendant’s president replied that he did not care what plaintiff did with them; that defendant had nothing to do with the business. At this time the store was fully stocked with merchandise, but defendant refused to receive an inventory of the stock or to discuss the matter further with plaintiff.

Thereafter plaintiff removed all of the merchandise and stock from the store but left the fixtures and equipment on the premises. It is for the value of the fixtures and equipment that the present action was instituted.

Defendant urges for reversal of the judgment the following propositions:

Defendant’s first and second propositions are untenable. Under the terms of the agreement between the parties plaintiff was required to open and equip on the leased premises a liquor and drug sundries store and to conduct the same for a period “not to exceed sixty days”. There is ample evidence to sustain the court’s finding that the plaintiff performed this obligation. Defendant’s contention that, because plaintiff failed to operate the business for a full sixty days, plaintiff breached the contract, is devoid of merit, for there was no requirement in the contract that plaintiff operate the business for sixty days.

There is no merit in defendant’s third proposition. After the president of defendant stated to the president of plaintiff that plaintiff could do what it wanted to with the merchandise and stock in trade which had been placed in the store on the leased premises, plaintiff disposed of the entire stock in trade. This was strictly within the rights of plaintiff under the contract, which provided in paragraph IV thereof that “Lessee may remove stock in trade or miscellaneous supplies at will prior” to the sale of the property to the defendant.

Defendant’s fourth proposition is likewise untenable. The trial court excluded evidence offered by the defendant consisting of a letter and statements made by the parties prior to the execution of the written agreement, the material parts of which are set forth above. This ruling was correct. Where the language in an agreement is clear and explicit, as in the instant case, the intention of the parties is to be ascertained from the writing alone and extraneous evidence is inadmissible for the purpose of determining what the writing means (First Bond & Mtg. Co. v. Malouf, 37 Cal. App. (2d) 74, 80 [ 98 Pac. (2d) 824 ]).

Defendant’s final proposition is also untenable. Where a contract to deliver property and render services has been performed and the purchaser fails to comply with the terms of the contract, the contract price is the measure of damages, as it accurately represents the extent of the vendor’s loss (Connell v. Higgins, 170 Cal. 541, 549 [ 150 Pac. 769 ]; 8 Cal. Jur. (1922) 825, sec. 81). In the present ease the contract required plaintiff to perform certain services, such as opening and equipping the store on the leased premises and operating it for a period. This plaintiff did, and also delivered the fixtures and equipment to defendant when they were placed on the leased premises, in conformity with the provisions of the contract. By the terms of the contract defendant was to pay the price of the fixtures and equipment. Plaintiff having furnished the fixtures and equipment, the extent of plaintiff’s loss was, according to the contract, the value of the fixtures and equipment, and section 3302 of the Civil Code was applicable to the facts of the instant case and not section 1784 of the same code.

Por the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.

Moore, P. J., and Wood, J., concurred.