FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

This matter having come before the court for hearing on May 5, 1986 on the motion by plaintiff for preliminary injunction, and this court having considered the pleadings and other documents filed herein and argument of counsel, the court makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. On March 14, 1985 the United States Attorney General (“USAG”) authorized an investigation under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1997 et seq. (“CRIPA”) into conditions of confinement at the three Los Angeles County Juvenile Halls.

2. On March 28, 1985 the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) notified the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors and Los Angeles County Counsel of the USAG’s intention to investigate conditions at the juvenile halls.

3. On May 2, 1985 DOJ attorneys met with County officials in Los Angeles, described their intended investigation and requested access to the juvenile halls, records and juveniles held therein.

4. From June through August 1985, the DOJ continued to seek Los Angeles County cooperation in providing access and in approving expert consultants the DOJ selected to assist in the investigation.

5. On August 27, 1985 DOJ attorneys, expert consultants and a paralegal arrived at one of the juvenile halls to begin inspection and were directed by County officials to Presiding Judge Gabriel Gutierrez of the Los Angeles County Juvenile Courts. Judge Gutierrez denied access by the DOJ team to the juvenile halls and its records apparently requiring a Juvenile Court order for access pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code § 827.

6. The DOJ, therefore, submitted a letter to Judge Gutierrez on August 27, 1985 requesting immediate access to juvenile hall records and permission to interview juveniles held in the facilities. The letter proposed a comprehensive agreement allowing reasonable access and specifying all steps the DOJ would take to protect the confidentiality of the juveniles involved.

7. On August 18, 1985, Judge Gutierrez met with DOJ attorneys, denied their request for a comprehensive agreement and issued an order allowing limited access and granting some of the requests of the DOJ. The DOJ acceded to the limitations of the order.

8. On September 24, 1985 the DOJ sent two letters, one to Barry Nidorf, Chief Probation Officer for the County, and the other to Judge Gutierrez. The letter to Nidorf informed him that the DOJ scheduled another tour of the juvenile halls for October 7-11, listed the information needed by the DOJ and advised him of an additional expert consultant, Dr. Milton Shore, that would accompany the DOJ team. The letter to Judge Gutierrez stated the DOJ’s position of entitlement to full access to the institutionalized persons and their records and any facility being investigated and reiterated all steps the DOJ would take to protect the confidentiality of the juveniles involved.

9. By letter dated October 2, 1985, Judge Gutierrez responded to the DOJ letter and denied the DOJ’s request for full access to the juveniles and their records. The letter reiterated Judge Gutierrez’s position that under California Law the juvenile court has exclusive authority to control access to juvenile records, that the court’s procedure therefor is applied on a case by case basis and that as a precondition to access, DOJ attorneys and staff would be required to sign the confidentiality conditions. The letter also stated that Judge Gutierrez saw several problems with allowing Dr. Shore to interview juveniles and, therefore, the judge could not acquiesce to his participation without first resolving the issues.

10. On October 17, 1985 DOJ attorneys and Judge Gutierrez met and reached agreement on the confidentiality concerns and mechanics for protecting such confidentiality concerns.

11. Pursuant to the October 17, 1985 meeting and agreement, the DOJ sent a written confidentiality agreement executed by DOJ attorneys, paralegals and expert consultants to Judge Gutierrez for his signature.

12. By letter dated November 13, 1985, the County Counsel informed the DOJ of changes to the confidentiality agreement required by Judge Gutierrez, including a format change to a court order whereby Judge Gutierrez would be granting access to the juvenile halls to the signatories of the confidentiality agreement. The County Counsel’s letter acknowledged the DOJ’s position that state and local authorities may not restrict the DOJ’s access, but stated that unless the DOJ could provide statutory or case law authority supportive of its position, the County was bound to follow the state law discussed in Judge Gutierrez’s October 2, 1985 letter.

13. Because of Judge Gutierrez’s requirement that access would only be granted upon court order rather than by agreement, the DOJ cancelled the scheduled tours.

14. The United States brings this action against the County of Los Angeles, the Board of Supervisors, Judge Gutierrez and several county officials connected with the juvenile hall system seeking an injunction against defendants prohibiting them from denying or obstructing access by the DOJ to the Los Angeles Juvenile Halls, the juveniles held therein and their records.

15. As neither party has provided this court with evidence of the above facts except for copies of letters and other written documents exchanged in their correspondence, the above facts are derived from the statement of facts contained in both parties’ legal briefs and are only those facts to which both parties’ statements of facts substantially agree.

16. At the commencement of the hearing held on May 5, 1986, the court asked counsel if there were any objections to the trial of the action on the merits being advanced and consolidated with the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction.

17. Plaintiff stated it had no objection. Defendants objected. Whereupon the court inquired as to what intended discovery or other reasons defendants had as their basis for objection. Defendants responded that they intended to discover plaintiff’s policy manuals, procedures and rules regarding confidentiality and CRIPA.

18. Having found defendants’ intended discovery to be irrelevant to the issues raised by this action, the court, at the May 5, 1986 hearing, ordered that the trial of the action on the merits be advanced and consolidated with the hearing on the application for preliminary injunction.

Any finding of fact which may be deemed a conclusion of law is incorporated into the Conclusions of Law section below, and any conclusion of law which may be deemed a finding of fact is incorporated into the Findings of Fact section above.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. This court has subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1345 .

2. Judge Gutierrez, as Presiding Judge of the Los Angeles Juvenile Court, asserts the exclusive authority of the juvenile court, pursuant to the California Welfare and Institutions Code, to control access to juvenile records and specifically cites § 827 as the legal authority for requiring permission from the juvenile court before access can be gained.

3. California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 827 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

4. Referring to the statutory scheme to protect confidentiality of juvenile court records provided in the California Welfare and Institutions Code, the California Supreme Court in T.N.G. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 767, 776-77 , 94 Cal.Rptr. 813 , 484 P.2d 981 (1971), stated as follows:

(Footnotes omitted.)

5. Pursuant to CRIPA:

42 U.S.C. § 1997a(a).

6. CRIPA also provides as follows:

42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a).

7. CRIPA not only recognizes the need for a DOJ investigation prior to commencing a CRIPA action, it also requires that the County be given a seven-day prior written notice of intention to commence investigation. 42 U.S.C. § 1997b(a)(2).

8. The issue raised is whether the DOJ, in seeking to conduct its CRIPA investigation, is subject to the juvenile court’s authority to control access to juvenile records pursuant to California Welfare and Institutions Code § 827 or said state law is preempted by CRIPA.

9. Because CRIPA contains no explicit preemptive language, any Congressional intent to supersede state law must be inferred by either federal occupation of the field or a federal/state statutory conflict. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. DeLaCuesta, 458 U.S. 141 , 102 S.Ct. 3014 , 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982).

10. The applicable preemption analysis here concerns the statutory conflict insofar as the state law “ ‘either frustrates the purpose of the national legislation or impairs the efficiency of those agencies of the Federal government to discharge the duties, for the performance of which they were created.’ ” Nash v. Florida Industrial Commission, 389 U.S. 235, 240 , 88 S.Ct. 362, 366 , 19 L.Ed.2d 438 (1967) (quoting Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 , 16 S.Ct. 502, 503 , 40 L.Ed. 700 (1896)).

11. The premption question posed is, given that the congressional intent and purpose of CRIPA is to investigate and correct institutional civil rights violations, is the purpose frustrated or obstructed by the application of the state law.

12. To determine whether an obstacle exists, it is necessary to evaluate two considerations: (1) the scope or type of investigation contemplated by Congress, and (2) whether California Welfare and Institutions Code § 827, as applied, frustrates this contemplated investigation and spirit of cooperative improvement.

H.R.Con.Rep. No. 897, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 787, 836.

14. The Senate Report definitely contemplates access in conjunction with other comprehensive investigative measures in explaining the value of the DOJ’s involvement:

S.Rep. No. 416, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess. 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 787, 803, 804 (footnotes omitted).

15. The facts herein indicate that the DOJ attempted to resolve and accommodate the County’s legitimate interest in protecting the confidentiality interests of the juveniles.

16. A significant delay in the DOJ investigation has occurred, caused by ineffective negotiation and consequent failure to satisfy the County and Juvenile Court.

17. Conditioning access to the juvenile halls on the DOJ’s acquiescence to the Juvenile Court’s authority to control such access under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 827, constituted, under the facts herein, a complete restriction.

18. The Juvenile Court’s stated intentions to restrict records access to a case by case determination and to restrict the DOJ’s choice and use of expert consultants obstructs and frustrates the DOJ investigation.

19. Although the Juvenile Court’s concern with protecting the confidentiality interests of the juveniles is commendable, its authority, under California Welfare and Institutions Code § 827, to restrict or deny the DOJ access to the juvenile hall, the juveniles held therein and their records, is preempted by CRIP A.

20. Plaintiff is entitled to an injunction prohibiting defendants from using California Welfare and Institutions Code § 827 as authority to restrict or deny plaintiff access to the juvenile halls, the juveniles held therein and their records.