From a judgment in favor of defendant, Odeal M. Johnson, predicated upon the granting of defendant’s motion for a nonsuit, in an action for the reformation of a deed on the ground of mistake, plaintiff appeals.

Viewing the evidence most favorable to plaintiff, as we must in reviewing a judgment predicated upon the granting of a motion for a nonsuit {Burt v. Baker, 22 Cal.App.2d 501 [ 71 P.2d 335 ], the material facts are:

Plaintiff relies for reversal of the judgment on three propositions which will be stated and answered hereunder seriatim.

First: Since the terms of the contract, by which the property was purchased, provided that the purchase was made by “Elliott I. Johnson and Cornelius A. Johnson, as joint tenants,” the title vested as thus limited rather than under the deed which granted the property to “Elliott I. Johnson and Cornelius A. Johnson” without restriction.

This proposition is untenable. The law is established that when a provision in a deed is certain and unambiguous it prevails over an inconsistent provision in a contract of purchase pursuant to which the deed was given. (Riley v. North Star Mining Co., 152 Cal. 549, 556 [ 93 P. 194 ]; Sisk v. Caswell, 14 Cal.App. 377, 387 [ 112 P. 185 ].) In view of the foregoing rule, in the absence of a reformation of the deed, the nature of the title which plaintiff and his brother each acquired in the property they purchased, was determined by the language in the deed and not by the statements in the agreement of purchase.

Second: Defendant, Odeal M. Johnson, is barred from asserting the defense of the statute of limitations, since sxich defense, being a personal privilege, was available only to her predecessor in interest.

This proposition is likewise untenable. It is the general rule that the plea of the statute of limitations is a personal privilege. However, the rule does not extend to subsequent property rights over which the prior owner has no control. (Brandenstein v. Johnson, 140 Cal. 29, 32 [ 73 P. 744 ] ; see also McCarthy v. White, 21 Cal. 495, 502 [82 Am.Dec. 754].) It is obvious that in the present case defendant Johnson’s predecessor in interest has no control over the property which is the subject of the present litigation. Therefore, defendant Johnson was not barred from asserting the defense of the statute of limitations.

Third: That plaintiff’s cause of action was not barred by the statute of limitations, section 338, subdivision d, of the Code of Civil Procedure, since plaintiff did not know of the mistake until less than three years prior to the filing of the present action.

This proposition is also untenable, and is governed by the following pertinent rules of law:

In the present case the only allegation in the complaint, touching upon plaintiff’s failure to sooner discover the alleged mistake, is as follows:

The evidence introduced by plaintiff, prior to the granting of the motion for a nonsuit, failed to disclose any other facts which would excuse plaintiff for failing to sooner discover the alleged mistake. Therefore, since more than thirteen years elapsed between the recording of the deed and the filing of the complaint in the present action, and facts were not alleged or proved which would have justified the trial court in finding that plaintiff was excused for not having sooner' learned of the alleged mistake, plaintiff’s alleged cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations, section 338, subdivision 4, of the Code of Civil Procedure.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment is affirmed.

Moore, P. J., and Wood (W. J.), J., concurred,