This proceeding was instituted by the petitioners to secure the annulment of an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission fixing the cost of icing for shipments of poultry and dairy products originating in the six western states. The action of the Interstate Commerce Commission was invoked by a petition attacking such rate filed by the Pacific States Butter, Egg, Cheese & Poultry Association- June 17, 1925. After elaborate hearings and presentations by that association, by the railroads, and by other interested parties, the Interstate Commerce Commission January 22, 1929, made the order now under attack to become effective May 9, 1929. In the hearing before the Interstate Commerce Commission, the 135 railroads, the petitioner therein, and other intervening shippers, petitioners herein, and the public utility rate-regulating bodies of the states of Washington and Idaho, were represented. Some of the parties who appeared before the Interstate Commerce Commission upon the hearing now ' appear in this court as plaintiffs, defendants, or as interveners.

Upon the hearing, the pleadings and evidence taken before the Interstate Commerce Commission were by stipulation received in evidence, so that the record presented for our consideration is the same that was presented to the Interstate Commerce Commission, excepting that a transcript of the oral argument was objected to by the defendants; a ruling on that objection was reserved until consideration of the entire ease. This objection will now be overruled.

While the evidence is voluminous and in some respects conflicting, in the main aspects of the ease there is no controversy between the parties, and the issues presented to this court are not only narrowed by the restrictions upon the court in dealing with the findings and conclusions of the Interstate Commerce Commission to which Congress has granted the power and authority to determine the facts involved in rate making, which findings are conclusive upon the courts if based upon substantial evidence, but also by the further fact that the petitioners rely in the main upon the findings of the Interstate Commerce Commission to support the legal conclusions which they press upon the court. These considerations will make unnecessary an elaborate statement of facts or a comprehensive review of the evidence ifi this opinion. For an elaborate and comprehensive statement thereof we refer to the published opinion of the Interstate Commerce Commission in this case, 1511. C. C. 244.

It appears without contradiction that in establishing their freight rates throughout the country upon perishable products requiring refrigeration, the railroads have adopted three different types of refrigerating service for which compensation is charged to the shipper. .The first type of refrigeration is what is called the “stated charge” for standard refrigeration, published in section 2 of the Perishable Protective Tariff. Broadly speaking, this involves filling the ice bunkers, or refrigerating cars, at eaeh icing station established by the carrier at suitable intervals along the railway. The second type of service rendered, published in section 4 of said tariff, is that wherein, after the initial icing, the cars are re-iced only at such points and in such quantities as may be designated by the shipper at a designated cost of ice per ton. The third type of refrigeration is where, after the initial icing, the perishable product is shipped to its destination without any re-icing, the initial ice to be furnished by the shipper, or by the carrier, on the cost per ton basis; a supercharge under rule 240 is added on long hauls.

The second type of refrigeration charge, designated throughout the record as the “cost of ice” basis, is applied by all the petitioning railroads to certain perishable products in their respective tariffs. It is also applied by all of them to poultry and dairy products originating in all the forty-two states east of the sis above-mentioned western states. This method of charging for refrigeration is established by all the petitioners, including those having their termini in the six westernmost states, for all poultry and dairy products which do not originate in those six states on their own lines, as will be hereinafter more particularly pointed out. The purpose of the Pacific States Butter, Egg, Cheese & Poultry Association, as disclosed by its petition to the Interstate Commerce Commission, was to compel the railroads accepting poultry and dairy products for shipment in the six westernmost states to apply to such shipments the same method of charging for refrigeration as is applied by them and by all other railroads in all the other states of the United States; that is to say, railroads having determined in their schedules the cost of ice at their respective icing stations, it is. desired that the shipper be permitted to designate the points at wnich, and the extent to which, such icing should occur, ice to be paid for at the per ton rates thus already fixed by the railroads in their published tariffs as aforesaid. This petition was granted by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the order now under attack.'

It would seem at first blush that an order establishing for the six westernmost states the same system of charging for refrigeration applied by the petitioners herein in the rest of the United States would be just and reasonable, but the attack upon this order herein is based upon the admitted fact that the railroads, in establishing the cost of the ice per ton basis, have not included in that cost all the elements making up the cost of refrigeration. In fixing that cost, there has been included in the cost of ice per ton the cost of the manufacture of the ice, of its transportation to the icing station, and the cost of switching the refrigerating ears to the icing station, and the cost of labor of placing the ice in the bunkers of the refrigerating car. See Perishable Fruit Investigation, 56 I. C. C. 449, 470. It is claimed, and the Interstate Commerce Commission finds it to be a f^et in this ease (151 I. C. C. 264, 265), that the cost of ice basis of charging for refrigeration does not inelude every element which might, could, or should be included in a proper charge for refrigeration in this, that in the cost of ice basis no addition is made to the cost of the ice per ton by reason of the expenditures involved in transporting the ice together with the refrigerated product in the refrigerating car after icing as distinguished from the cost of hauling the refrigerated product; that no charge is included in the cost of ice basis for the repair of the ice bunkers of the refrigerating car as distinguished from the cost of the repair of the other portion of the ear which might, could, or should be included in the proper segregation of the costs of refrigeration as a cost of refrigeration, and that no charge is included in the cost of ice for the expenses of supervision that might be rightly apportioned to the cost of refrigeration. The petitioners rely upon the opinion of the Interstate Commerce Commission in Re Refrigeration Charges from the South, 1511. C. C. 649, 653.

The contention of the petitioners upon that subject may be briefly and concisely stated as follows: The Hepburn Act, § 2, amending Interstate Commerce Act § 6, par. 1 (49 USCA § 6, par. 1), requires the carrier to separately state certain charges, including, among others, “all * * * icing charges.” It is claimed, and is well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court, that, where a railroad rate is under attack before the Interstate Commerce Commission or before the court, that rate must stand or fall in the test as to its reasonableness, upon the proposition that the rate under attack must itself furnish a reasonable and adequate return for tbe service rendered, and that a reasonable and adequate return .must pay the cost of that service, as distinguished from all other service, plus a reasonable profit thereon. Southern Ry. Co. v. St. Louis Hay & Grain Co., 214 U. S. 297 , 29 S. Ct. 678 , 53 L. Ed. 1004 ; Cotting v. Godard, 183 U. S. 79 , 22 S. Ct. 30 , 46 L. Ed. 92 ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pac. R. Co., 222 U. S. 541 , 32 S. Ct. 108 , 56 L. Ed. 308 ; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Stickney, 215 U. S. 98 , 30 S. Ct. 66 , 54 L. Ed. 112 ; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 605 , 35 S. Ct. 429 , 59 L. Ed. 735 , L. R. A. 1917F, 1148, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Dept. Pub. Works, 268 U. S. 39 , 45 S. Ct. 412 , 69 L. Ed. 836 ; Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 274 U. S. 344 , 47 S. Ct. 604 , 71 L. Ed. 1085 .

It is claimed that the Interstate Commerce Commission expressly found that the cost of icing directed by them to be applied to the products in question does not so reasonably and adequately compensate the railroad company, and that the order is therefore void. The Commission did find as a fact that the stated charge did include, and that the eost of ice basis did not include, compensation to the carrier for the eost of hauling the ice after it was placed in the bunkers, the eost of bunker repair, and the eost of supervision. The Commission did conclude, however, that the line-haul freight rate was sufficiently high to include compensation for these items. We quote from its opinion herein (151 I. C. C. pages 266, 267) in that regard as follows:

The foundation of this contention is the claim that the eost incident to the refrigeration of freight must be treated as separate and distinct from the charge for the transportation of the freight which is refrigerated as distinguished from all other charges for all other service performed by the railroad company. In the ease at bar, the Interstate Commence Commission, while recognizing and expressly finding that -the icing charge set up by the railroads which they directed be applied to the products in question did not pay the above-mentioned elements properly applicable to refrigeration, nevertheless held that the freight rate upon the product itself established by the tariff was amply sufficient, not only to pay reasonable cost of transpor tation, but also to absorb the elements of cost in the transportation which under the rule above stated might more properly be charged to the expense of icing, that is to say, the cost of hauling the ice 'after its placement in the refrigerating cars, the cost of repairs of ice bunkers, and its supervision.

It is not claimed that the total charge of the railroad company for transporting freight and for the refrigeration thereof under the rule established by the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission is unreasonable or void, but it is claimed that the Interstate Commerce Commission was precluded from consideration of the amount of the freight rate applied to such products in determining the reasonable value of icing under the rule above stated, and that, if it was desired to secure a total rate for freight and refrigeration which would reasonably compensate the carrier for the service of trans-. portation and refrigeration of the freight, the attack in question should have been centered upon the freight rate as too high rather than upon the cost of icing, which is admittedly not high enough to cover the total cost of refrigeration. This question was disposed of by the Commission in its opinion herein (151 I. C. C. pages 263, 264), as follows:

“In arriving at ultimate conclusions it is necessary to consider at the outset a legal question raised by defendants. They point out that section 6 of the interstate commerce act provides that the schedules of rates, fares, and- charges which carriers are required to publish ‘shall also state separately all terminal charges, storage charges, icing charges, and all other charges which the Commission may require, etc.’ The stated charges for refrigeration service, they say, have been published in accordance with this requirement, and they contend that if these charges are reasonable in themselves for the service rendered they can not lawfully be reduced upon a theory that the concurrently effective freight rates are sufficiently high to include the various factors of refrigeration cost other than the actual cost of preservative used. In support of this contention they rely upon Interstate Commerce Commission v. Stickney, 215 U. S. 98 [ 30 S. Ct. 66 , 54 L. Ed. 112 ], and also cite National Live Stock Exchange v. A., T. & Si P. By. Co., 107 I. C. C. 512, where we approved the separate publication of a charge for bedding livestock, found it not unreasonable in itself, and refused to condemn it upon the ground that in connection with the line-haul rates, which were not attacked, it might result in unreasonable aggregate charges.

“A contention quite similar to this was advanced in Perishable Freight Investigation, supra, and considered at length in [56 I. C. C-] pages 461-465 of our report. After- considering the history of section 6 and the former practice of providing refrigeration service, in many cases, through private car-line companies whose charges were not published or filed with us, we said, at page 463 [of 56 I. C. C.]:

The contention now made by the petitioners is not new. Similar argument was offered in Perishable Freight Investigation, 56 I. C. C. 449. We quote at length from the Commission’s report in that ease (pages 463-465 [of 56 I. C. C.]):

“Both from this history and from the subsequent practice, we think it evident that it was not the intent, when these provisions of law were enacted, to prohibit a carrier, if it wished to do so, from regarding the haulage of the freight and any incidental protection against heat or cold as one combined transportation service for which a single charge might lawfully be made, or from treating certain elements of the protection in this way and making a separate charge for others which could more readily be segregated from the haulage service. Manifestly, the intent was merely to require, where a separate charge was in fact levied, that it be published and filed, so that it might be uniformly available and uniformly applied without discrimination. In other words, while all charges must be separately stated, the statute does not make it unlawful to secure compensation for the protective service by regarding it as an integral part of the service of transportation.

“And in our opinion this conclusion is not discordant with such decisions of the United States Supreme Court as bear upon the subject. It is true that there are expressions in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Stickney, 215 U. S. 98 [ 30 S. Ct. 66 , 54 L. Ed. 112 ], which seem, when considered apart from their setting, to furnish foundation for the claim now advanced by the representatives of the Director General. We refer especially to the statement on page 105 [of 215 Ú. S., 30 S. Ct. 66 ]:

Inasmuch as the contention of the petitioners is based upon their interpretation of the Hepburn Act with reference to the setting up of “charges” for “icing,” the correctness of this interpretation will first be considered. Assuming for the moment that Congress intended that a separate eharge for icing should be set up by the railroads, we are to determine what is meant by the word “icing” in connection with transportation. The word is not a technical expression having a technical meaning, but is one of general use. In the Century Dictionary in current use at the time of the adoption of the Hep-bum Act in 1906, it is defined as “to apply ice; refrigerate; preserve in ice, as meat.” In the Standard Dictionary of 1913 it is defined “to freeze or chill with or as with ice; cover with ice; enclose or preserve in ice; refrigerate.”

• Certainly, in the ordinary acceptation of the term as applied to the application of ice to products transported in refrigerating cars, the eharge for placing the ice in the bunkers of the refrigerating ear is a eharge for icing. It would not occur to the layman, we think, that in fixing a charge for icing it was necessary or even proper to include in that eharge the transportation of the ice with the product after the icing was completed. Certainly it requires a stretch of the ordinary meaning of language to say that the cost of hauling ice after it is placed in the refrigerating ear to chill the contents of the car is a cost of icing. Throughout the case the petitioners have referred to the cost of icing, or the eharge for icing, as the equivalent of a charge for refrigeration. The two words are not synonymous. Apparently the word “icing,” properly construed, may or may not include refrigeration. The petitioners themselves have recognized this fact in the charges that they have established in connection with the refrigeration of perishable products. In the charge for standard refrigeration or “stated eharge” icing, they have uniformly included the cost of hauling the ice after the ears have been iced, while in the eharge for icing on the “cost of ice” basis they have not included the cost of hauling the ice in the ear after it has been placed therein for purposes of refrigeration. In considering the effect of this conduct on the part of the railroads, it has to be borne in mind that the primary duty is placed upon them of fixing freight charges and of establishing and promulgating “icing charges.” In asking the court to hold that a proper icing eharge necessarily includes the cost of hauling the ice after it is placed in the ear for purposes of refrigeration, the petitioners are asking the court to hold that they have consistently violated the act of Congress for more than a quarter of a century by ignoring the duty which they now claim is upon them and upon the Interstate Commerce Commission and upon the court to establish icing charges which would include every element of the cost of refrigeration. It might be seriously questioned whether petitioners are in position to invoke the jurisdiction of .a court of equity under the circumstances. The question is, Do they come into a court of equity with clean hands when they claim that the Interstate Commerce Commission is violating the law by doing the very thing that the petitioners have done for twenty-five years, and which they are still-doing in violation of law? In this connection it may be observed that the Interstate Commerce Commission did not set up a new scheme for determining “icing charges,” but merely permitted the shippers to take advantage of rates already established by the railroads for comparable, or for the same, products.

We will not, however, base our determinajfcion in that regard upon the principle of equity we have suggested, but consider the conduct of the railroads contemporaneous with, and immediately, subsequent to, the passage of the act, as interpretative of its meaning. In this interpretation the Interstate Commerce Commission has consistently acquiesced, if not directly participated, so that we have the parties to this litigation concurring over a long period of years in the interpretation of the statute which both now ask us to interpret, the respondent in accordance with the constant practice and the petitioners in conflict with that practice. Aside from all other considerations than the proper interpretation of the word “icing” in the law, we would he inclined to hold that the standard or “stated charge” for refrigeration, which it is admitted includes the cost of ice haulage after icing, and the charge for ieing on “cost of ice basis,” are both permissible so far as the act of Congress requiring a separation of all ieing charges is concerned, but there are other and even more persuasive reasons for this conclusion. The purpose of Congress in the enactment of section 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by Hepburn Act, § 2, is obviously to provide for a system of tariff schedules, rates, fares, and charges which would be uniform and consistent and apply without discrimination or favoritism to all shippers similarly situated. It is obviously intended thereby that the total charge to be paid by the shipper should be clearly ascertainable from the tariff schedules, so that one shipper should not have imposed on him auxiliary charges which might not be imposed upon others. United States v. Chicago & A. Ry. Co. (D. C.) 148 F. 646 ; Chicago & A. Ry. Co. v. United States, 212 U. S. 563 , 29 S. Ct. 689 , 53 L. Ed. 653 ; United States v. Hanley (D. C.) 71 F. 672 ; United States v. 111. Term. R. Co. (D. C.) 168 F. 546 ; Standard Oil Co. of N. Y. v. United States (C. C. A.) 179 F. 614 ; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Dickerson (C. C. A.) 191 F. 705 ; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hirsch (C. C. A.) 204 F. 849 . This is in accord with the uniform holding of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Rice v. L. & N. R. Co., 1 I. C. C. 503; In re Tariffs of Transcontinental Lines, 2 I. C. C. 324; American Warehousemen’s Ass’n v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 7 I. C. C. 556; H. B. Pitts & Son v. St. L. & S. F. R. Co., 10 I. C. C. 684; Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. Hamburg-American Packet Co., 13 I. C. C. 266; Voorhees v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 16 I. C. C. 42; Schultz-Hansen Co. v. So. Pac. Co., 18 I. C. C. 234.

It is certainly clear from the statute that there is no intention of setting up a system of bookkeeping for common carriers, for this function was, by the same act, delegated, so far as was necessary for the purpose of supervising interstate commerce carriers, to the Interstate Commerce Commission (49 USCA § 20, particularly subdivision 5). It is obvious that the immediate concern of the shipper is with the total charge to him for transporting his freight safely and in good condition from the shipping point to the point of delivery. It is entirely immaterial to the shipper whether the extra cost due to the increased weight of ice carried for refrigeration is carried by the railroad company as a part of the rate of the line freight haul or as a part of the cost of refrigeration, and the same is true of all other itemization in connection with the making of the rate or the system of accounting required of or permitted by the Interstate Commerce Commission. These details of rate making and rate fixing were undoubtedly intended by Congress to be delegated to-, and determined by, the Interstate Commerce Commission where its powers were invoked, and the courts have not only consistently recognized their inability to properly fix rates, but also have exercised supervision thereover only as required to protect the fundamental rights of the carrier, and of the puhlie. These views in reference to the purpose of section 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by Hep-bum Act, § 2, have been consistently adhered to by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and we think rightly so. (See above quotation from its opinion in this ease.) The petitioners have not attempted to justify their interpretation of section 6 with reference to what Congress intended by the words “all * * * icing charges,” hut, as we have said, have assumed that ieing charges are synonymous with refrigerating charges, and have assumed that the only proper way that such charges can be separately stated is by including therein all the costs of refrigera^ tion, whereas it seems apparent that' Congress merely intended to require that such charges as the railroad company set up as icing charges should be stated separately and published as such. These considerations thus far advanced lead us to the conclusion that Congress did not require, and did not intend to require, that the icing eharge made by the railroad company should of necessity include every element in the cost of refrigeration which could be properly assigned by competent experts and accountants to the cost of refrigeration, but only to require that, when a eharge was made therefor in addition to the line-haul freight rate, such eharge should be published in the tariff schedules of the carrier. If this conclusion is correct, the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission in requiring the carrier to conform to its own icing charges as applied to other perishable commodities is not incorrect, because the icing charge per se does not include elements of cost which expert bookkeepers might determine and have determined to be a part of the refrigerating cost.

As has been stated, the petitioners do not alone devote themselves to a question of the proper interpretation of section 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by section 2 of the Hepburn Act, supra, as a basis for their claims, but rely upon certain decisions of the Supreme Court which they hold are applicable to the situation herein. In the first place, relianee is placed upon the admitted rule of constitutional law developed by the Supreme Court to the effect that, in proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission, or other regulatory bodies throughout the United States involving rates charged for service, in determining a reasonable amount thereof such regulatory bodies must fix a charge commensurate with the service rendered. Second, it is claimed that the Supreme Court of the United States in the Stickney Case, 215 U. S. 98 , 30 S. Ct. 66, 69 , 54 L. Ed. 112 , has expressly held in the case of “terminal charges,” which are also required by the same section of the Hepburn Act (section 6, par. 1, 49 USCA, supra) to be separately stated, that the Interstate Commerce Commission could not require the diminution or abandonment of that rate where it expressly found that the rate in and of itself was reasonable, notwithstanding the fact that the Commission found as a fact that the line-haul freight rate was sufficient to include such terminal charge. In view of the fact that the petitioners mainly base their case on this decision of the Supreme Court, we will consider it more in detail.

The question there involved had been a matter of contention over a period of many years. The Interstate Commerce Commission found that the railroads entering Chicago had established a separate railroad corporation for the transportation of live stock from the railroads in question to the Chicago stockyards. The stock of this Belt Line Railroad was owned by the various railroads transporting live stock to Chicago.. It is found as a fact by the Interstate Commerce Commission that the cost Of delivery of freight in Chicago by the common carriers was $5.40 per ear. It was therefore concluded by the Commission that, inasmuch as the line-haul freight rate necessarily included these terminal expenses amounting to $5.40, where the railroad company was spared that expense by reason of delivering its ears loaded with live stock to the terminal road, it could not properly eharge an additional $2 terminal charge where it had already charged a line-haul freight rate more than double that amount for the same service. In passing upon this contention, the Supreme Court declared immaterial the fact that the Belt Line Railway was owned by the common carriers whose roads were in question. It therefore held that to eliminate or reduce terminal charge for the use of the Belt Line Railway would be to reduce a eharge found to be reasonable for such service while at the same time allowing them to charge a line-haul freight rate which under the circumstances the Interstate Commerce Commission had virtually held to be unreasonable; that is, the Commission fixed a eharge unreasonably low to compensate for one it found to be unreasonably high. The court, therefore, held that, notwithstanding it might be true, as found by the Interstate Commerce -Commission, that it cost the railroad company twice as much to deliver the stock at its own terminal for terminal charges as it did to deliver the stock over the Belt Line Railway, the action of the Interstate Commerce Commission was erroneous and void. It is clear, however, that in reaching this conclusion the court was largely influenced by the consideration that ihe terminal charge collected by the carrier was for service rendered by an independent carrier, and that for such service so rendered by such independent carrier the charge actually made was reasonable. In order to make this more clear, we quote from the decision as follows: “Under those circumstances it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that, considered of and by itself, tbe terminal charge of $2 a ear was reasonable. If any shipper is wronged by the aggregate charge from the place of shipment to the Union Stock Yards, it would seem necessarily to follow that the wrong was done in the prior charges for transportation, and, as we have already stated, should be corrected by proper proceedings against the companies guilty of that wrong, otherwise injustice will be done. If this charge, reasonable in itself, be reduced, the Union Stoek Yards Company will suffer loss while the real wrongdoers will escape. It may be that it is more convenient for the Commission to strike at the terminal charge, but the convenience of Commission or court is not the measure of justice.”

The more general language of the opinion relied upon by the petitioners and quoted from page 105 of 215 U. S., 30 S. Ct. 66, 67, must be construed in the light of the conclusion above stated. This excerpt is as follows: “By section 15, the Commission is authorized and required, upon a complaint, to inquire and determine what would be a just and reasonable rate or rates, charge or charges. This, of course, includes all charges, and the carrier is entitled to have a finding that any particular charge is unreasonable and unjust before it is required to change such charge. Bor services that it may render or procure to be rendered off its own line, or outside the mere matter of transportation over its line, it may charge and receive compensation. Southern Railway Co. v. St. Louis Hay Co., 214 U. S. 297 , 29 S. Ct. 678 , 53 L. Ed. 1004 . If the terminal charge be, in and of itself, just and reasonable, it cannot be condemned or the carrier required to change it on the ground that it, taken with prior charges of transportation over the lines of the carrier or of connecting carriers, makes the total charge to the shipper unreasonable. That which must be corrected and condemned is not the just and reasonable terminal charge, but thosé prior charges which must of themselves be unreasonable in order to make the aggregate of the charge from the point of shipment to that of delivery unreasonable and unjust. In order to avail itself of the benefit of this rule, the carrier must separately state its terminal or other special charge complained of; for, if many matters are lumped in a single charge, it is impossible for either shipper or Commission to determine how much of the lump charge is for the terminal or special services. The carrier is under no obligations to charge for terminal services. Business interests may justify it in waiving any such charge, and it will be considered to have waived it unless it makes plain to both shipper and Commission that it is insisting upon it.”

It must be conceded that this portion of the opinion, taken alone, and without recognizing that the court was there dealing with a charge made for services performed by another carrier, strongly supports the contention advanced by petitioners in this case. But the petitioners are seeking to apply the reasoning in that ease to a situation entirely different and distinct therefrom, as may be indicated by a situation more nearly analogous to the ease at bar. Suppose that the receivers of the Great, Western Railroad in that case had been delivering live stoek to the Union Stock Yards in Chicago over its own lines for the established line haul freight rate; that thereafter, in pursuance of the Hepburn Act, it had set up a separate terminal charge of $5.40 for the delivery of freight at the stoek yards; that this new and additional rate was attacked by the shippers on the ground that it was unreasonable, not because it was an excessive amount for a terminal charge, but because the line-haul freight rate theretofore established had absorbed that charge, and that the shipper paid therefor when it paid the line-haul freight rate, would the Supreme Court under these circumstances say to the shipper, “You have made your attack upon a reasonable terminal rate and you should have made it upon the line haul freight rate?” We think not. The consideration which moved the court to treat the terminal charge in the Stiekney Case as one which could not be reduced where reasonable could not be applicable to this new charge by the same carrier for the same service which he had theretofore rendered for the compensation theretofore paid in the long-haul freight rate. The above-quoted language carries with it a clue to the proper decision of this question. It is apparent that the decision is not based upon the mandatory requirement that terminal charges be separately stated, for it is said: “In order to avail itself of the benefit of this rule, the carrier must separately state its terminal or other special charge complained of; for, if many matters are lumped in a single charge, it is .impossible for either shipper or commission to determine how much of the lump charge is for the terminal or special services. The carrier is under no obligations to charge for terminal services. Business interests may justify it in waiving any such charge, and it will be considered to have waived it unless it makes plain to both shipper and Commission that it is insisting upon it.”

In view of this language, it is fairly apparent that the answer to the carrier under such circumstances would be this: “You have, by including in your line haul freight rate, the expenses of terminal delivery, waived a separate charge therefor, and you cannot now set up a separate and additional charge therefor, because to do so would be unreasonable in view of the fact that you have already been compensated for that service in the line haul freight rate.” See Los Angeles Switching Case, 234 U. S. 294 , 34 S. Ct. 814 , 58 L. Ed. 1319 . We are not, however, left to mere inference from the general language of the opinion in the Stiekney Case, but subsequent decisions clarify the situation. In the case of the Atchison, T. & S. F. R, Co. v. U. S., 232 U. S. 199 , 34 S. Ct. 291, 296 , 58 L. Ed. 568 , the Supreme Court had under consideration a ruling of the Interstate Commerce Commission with reference to the charges for transportation of oranges in carload lots, and was dealing primarily with the difficulties arising from a new; system of refrigeration involving a pre-cooling of the fruit. Two systems of pre-cooling were used, that inaugurated by the common carrier of placing the entire ear with its contents in a refrigerating plant and cooling the fruit while in the car by blowing chilled air through the ventilators of the car into the space containing the packed fruit. This system required ample space between the packed boxes for the circulation of cool air. The packers had inaugurated a system of pre-cooling by which the packed boxes of oranges were cooled to a temperature of 33° Eahrenheit in the refrigerating plant of the packing house. These boxes were then packed solidly in the ear without any space for ventilation between the boxes. In view of the temperature of the oranges, the circulation of air would tend to raise rather than decrease the initial temperature of the fruit, the car itself was cooled by the air of the refrigerating plant of the packing house circulating during the process of loading the car, and also by the oranges themselves. In addition, the car was iced at the packing plant in order that the temperature might not be increased during the process of transporting the ear from the packing house to the main line of the railway or to the icing or cooling plant of the railroad company.

The significant thing, from the standpoint of rate making about the cooling system inaugurated by the packers as distinguished from that inaugurated by the earners, was that a greater weight of oranges could be packed in the same refrigerating ear where ventilating spaces were not left, and consequently the pay load of the car was increased. Thus the revenue provided by the railroad company from the line-haul freight rate was increased from 27,200 pounds to 33,000 pounds. This freight rate, $1.15 per 100 pounds, had been fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission preliminarily in a hearing involving both the line-haul freight rate charge and the refrigerating charge. The refrigerating charge, however, was postponed, and, upon the final determination of that matter, was reduced on pre-cooled oranges from $30 to $7.50 per car. The carriers contended that this $7.50 did not pay the actual cost of transporting the ice placed in the bunkers of the refrigerating ear. It was conceded that the reasonable cost of transporting that ice was $5 more than the total amount allowed by the Interstate Commerce Commission as an icing charge for hauling pre-cooled fruit. The situation may best be stated in the language of the Supreme Court:

This case holds it proper under the circumstances stated therein to consider the line-haul freight rate in determining the reasonableness of the icing charge or refrigerating charge incidental to the transportation of the perishable freight, and that an icing charge whieh ignored admitted elements of the refrigerating charge might be established by the Commission as a reasonable charge for icing or refrigeration, notwithstanding the fact that in doing so the line-haul freight rate must be looked to to augment the icing charge in order to compensate the carrier for the cost of refrigeration. The situation in that ease was unique, in that the very system of pre-cooling under consideration increased ’the carrying capacity of the individual ear involved, and added to the car revenue of that particular ear without commensurate increase of cost. The case is direct authority for the proposition already advanced in this opinion that all the refrigeration charges need not be stated separately from the line-haul freight rate, but it is far from a holding that in all eases a line-haul freight rate that applies to the product, whether refrigerated or not, can be looked to in eking out a refrigeration charge whieh in and of itself is not compensatory. At the very least, then, the decision necessarily implies a holding that there is no legislative mandate binding upon the railroad and upon the Interstate Commerce Commission to incorporate into the icing or refrigerating charge every element which expert and proper bookkeeping might assign to the cost of refrigeration. This we think manifest from the excerpt of the opinion above quoted, and particularly from the phrase therein, “ * * * it was immaterial to the carriers whether they were permitted to charge $1.11.2 on the fruit and $12.50 for the iee, or $1.15 on the fruit alone without any distinct charge for transporting the ice.” It also will he observed that in the Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. U. S., supra, the court was dealing with a freight rate and an icing charge both fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission as a result of a continuing investigation and not by the carrier, whereas in the case at bar the freight rate and the icing charge were each fixed by the carrier, and the Interstate Commerce Commission has merely required the carrier to extend to this type of perishable freight the same facilities at the same rate which are already charged by the carrier for service for comparable perishable freight, and in effect said to the carrier, “You have established what you consider reasonable rates for the transportation of certain classes of perishable freight comparable to the poultry and dairy products, and we have required you to modify your rules so as to extend to this character of freight the same privileges accorded to similar perishable freight, and also extended by you upon this particular class of freight in all sections of the country other than the six western states.”

The rather obvious anomaly of the petitioners contending that an icing charge established by them is unreasonable because in the establishment thereof they ignored a requirement of the law, as they contend, that such eharge should include elements which they have excluded and the contention that the Interstate Commerce Commission could not adopt the system which they themselves had adopted in establishing such rates, is met by the petitioners’ claim that the icing charges established by them were voluntarily established, and for that reason were permissible, but that, when the Interstate Commerce Commission seeks to force them to accept an inadequate rate, as they claim it to be, it cannot do so without increasing the icing eharge to cover expenditures which they themselves had excluded in that charge in applying it to the same perishable freight in other portions of the United States. This argument is based upon the implied assumption that the carrier may disregard the express requirements of the law in establishing such charges, but that the Interstate Commerce Commission is rigidly bound by the saíne provisions of law which they have disregarded. We can see no merit in this contention. The requirements of section 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by section 2 of the Hepburn Act, with reference to separate statement of icing charges, is binding upon the carrier in the establishment of its rates in the first instance. The function of the Interstate Commerce Commission in this regard is to determine whether the rates of a carrier are reasonable. 'Having selected a system of rates under which the line-haul freight rate must necessarily take care of certain elements of the cost of transportation, they are hardly in a position to now contend that these line-haul freight rates do not cover the cost which they themselves have assigned to it for compensation.

We believe that the icing charge set up by the railroad company on the cost of ice basis was a proper eharge under the law, and that the Interstate Commerce Commission, in determining the reasonableness of this eharge, had a right to consider the elements of cost which the carriers themselves had assigned to this eharge and to ignore other items which the railroads had assigned to the line-haul freight rate. In this statement we do not wish to be understood as holding ihat the icing eharge specified in section 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by section 2 of the Hepburn Act necessarily includes the entire cost of refrigeration. As we have said, it may or may not. While the general nature of the eharge is indicated by the statute, the details of accounting with reference thereto are left to be determined by the carrier in the first instance, in the absence of rules and regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and in the second instance by the Interstate Commerce Commission as the question arises from time to time. It is our view, therefore, that neither section 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by section 2 of the Hepburn Act, nor the decision of the Supreme Court interpretative thereof, or those dealing with' the subject-matter, necessarily require that, in the establishment or alteration of rates, the icing charges therein set up must necessarily include all items of refrigerating cost, nor that in considering such an incidental cost the Interstate Commerce Commission is necessarily inhibited from considering the rate to Which the eharge is ancillary. We arrived at this conclusion by a consideration of the language of the law itself and by an analysis of the decisions relied upon as establishing the rule contended for by the petitioners.

There is, however, an even more persuasive consideration against the adoption of the interpretation of section 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by section 2 of the .Hepburn Act contended for by the petitioners. To attribute to Congress, in the enactment of section 6 of the Interstate Commerce Act, as amended by section 2 of the Hepburn Act, an intention to establish a system of accounting so rigid that any failure to apply to each tariff charge every element of cost and profit which in strict and scientific accounting could reasonably be assigned to that charge, would not only completely ignore the fundamental purpose of Congress in the adoption of section 6, that of advising the shipper of the amount he must pay for the transportation of his freight, but would incorporate into the system of rate making a rigidity entirely inconsistent with the powers conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission, and would thus introduce into the system rules which would make difficult, if not impossible, the ascertainment of the proper charges to be assigned to the main line freight rate and to each ancillary charge. Instead of clearing a channel for reasonably intelligent rate making, such construction would introduce artificial obstructions in a channel already sufficiently difficult and tortuous. The ease at bar illustrates the point in question. It is and must be a matter of opinion as to what portion of the general expense of the common carrier in connection with the moving of perishable freight shall be assigned to the cost of moving the freight and to the cost of refrigeration applicable thereto. It is immaterial in its final results to both the carrier and the shipper as io whether in the gross amount paid by the shipper items of cost are included under one head or another of the charge. The substantial question is the gross amount received and paid. To hold that a rate-making body, in considering the rates upon perishable fruit, cannot look across the boundary line between the main and the ancillary charges to ascertain what the sum of these two shall be, but must examine each separately, would introduce into the rate-making system a complexity wholly unnecessary, and, we believe, a complication incapable of exact solution. This was not contemplated by Congress in requiring a separate charge. It would convert what is intended by Congress for the benefit of the shipper into an obstruction to his efforts to obtain redress before the body established for the very purpose of granting such redress.

In so far as this question involves the constitutional power of the rate-making body, decisions holding that, in determining the reasonable rate of return for a service rendered, the Interstate Commerce Commission cannot look to other rates on other freight shipped by other people to compensate for the ascertained loss or lack of profit upon the particular transaction involved in the controversy, have no application to the separate charges included in the gross charge required by the carrier from the shipper. If that gross charge provides a compensation for the service rendered, it is immaterial whether the itemization thereof is accurate or inaccurate so far as the constitutional requirement is concerned. We think this conclusion obvious; certainly the decision of the Supreme Court in Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. U. S., 232 U. S. 199, 34 .S. Ct. 291, 58 L. Ed. 568 , compels such a conclusion; and the decisions of the Supreme Court in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, 598 , 35 S. Ct. 429 , 59 L. Ed. 735 , L. R. A. 1917F, 1148, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Conley, 236 U. S. 605 , 35 S. Ct. 437 , 59 L. Ed. 745 , and Western & A. R. R. v. Pub. Service Comm., 267 U. S. 493, 496 , 45 S. Ct. 409 , 69 L. Ed. 753 , point to that conclusion.

We are therefore concerned here only with the proper interpretation of the statutory regulations of rates and of the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission.

The petitioner advances an independent contention with reference to the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, which may be stated as follows:

Assuming that the Interstate Commerce Commission would have the power upon a petition challenging both the line-haul freight rate and the initial icing charge to consider both in determining whether or not the aggregate afforded reasonable compensation for the service rendered, and that the improper itemization thereof may be ignored where the total rate was sufficient, as was done by the Interstate Commerce Commission in the case considered by the Supreme Court in Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. U. S., 232 U. S. 199 , 34 S. Ct. 291 , 58 L. Ed. 568 , it is claimed that the pleadings and proceedings before the .Interstate Commerce Commission in this instance were insufficient to give jurisdiction to the Interstate Commerce Commission to consider a gross charge, but that, by the limitation of the shipper’s petition and the evidence in pursuance thereof, the scope of the investigation was limited to the “icing charge” alone; and that thus limited, although the Interstate Commerce Commission found it to be a fact that the stated charge exacted by the carriers was unreasonable, because wasteful and excessive, it could not establish in lieu thereof a new charge which was inadequate for complete refrigeration, although it adopted a charge already fixed by the railroads for such service. This conten-.' tion, it seems to us, takes too narrow a view of the allegations of the petition inaugurating the proceedings in question, of the range and scope of the evidence adduced before the’ Interstate Commerce Commission, and of the powers of the Commission itself and of the procedure in matters pending before the Interstate Commerce Commission. It has been recognized from the first that to require of parties a rigid adherence to the principles of pleading and evidence adopted by the courts would be unreasonable, unnecessary, and unwise, particularly in view of the fact that the Interstate Commerce Commission does not act in judicial, but in a legislative, capacity, and has powers of investigation and supervision inconsistent with the functions of a court. The true rule is that, where an issue is in fact raised and considered by the Commission, and where the parties have had an opportunity to present evidence in support of their contentions with reference to such issues, or are advised of the evidence presented on such issue by their opponent, and advisedly refrained from meeting such evidence, the courts will not inquire into the details of the procedure before the Commission.

The courts are primarily concerned with the question as to whether or not the Commission has constitutional and statutory authority to make the order it had in fact made, and whether in pursuing its authority the interested parties have had their day in court. In examining the proceedings before the'Interstate Commerce Commission in view of these principles, it should be observed at the outset that the petitioners therein alleged affirmatively and definitely that the standard refrigerating charge exacted by the shippers of poultry and dairy products in the six western states were wasteful and unreasonable as applied to such products. This charge was amply supported by the evidence. It was found by the Interstate Commerce Commission that the amount of icing required by the standard refrigerating charge was entirely unnecessary, and therefore wasteful, and imposed upon the shipper the burden of paying for a service that he did not need and upon the carrier the performance of services that were wasteful and unnecessary.

We think it unnecessary to state in detail the basis of these conclusions shown by the opinion of the Interstate Commerce Commission in this matter to which we have referred above,’ except to say that, by reason of the fact that dairy products and poultry are airways pre-cooled by the shipper and delivered to the refrigerating ear in that condition, the initial icing was in many eases sufficient to take the product to its destination, and in certain months and under certain conditions even that initial icing was unnecessary, if before reaching the warmer climate of Southern California the ears were iced. The shipper, under the cost of ice basis, assumes the responsibility of determining the proper amount of refrigeration, and any loss derived from his incorrect decision in this regard would fall upon the shipper and not upon the carrier, whereas in the stated refrigerating charge loss for laek of refrigeration falls upon the carrier.

We hold, therefore, that the allegations of the petitioner before the Interstate Commerce Commission, attacking as unreasonable the charge for standard refrigeration, and the prayer that in lieu thereof the cosí of ice basis already fixed by the carrier should be applied, was fair notice to the carrier that the main-line freight rate, whieh on a cost of ice basis necessarily carries a portion of the refrigerating charge, was involved in the controversy. In the presentation of the matter before the Interstate Commerce Commission, both parties introduced voluminous testimony with reference to the question of whether or not the line-haul freight rate in the case of the cost of ice basis refrigeration contained a reasonable or sufficient charge to cover the elements of refrigerating cost not covered by the cost of ice basis. In determining that this matter was involved in the proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission, we do not overlook the statement of counsel in the argument of, the ease before the Commission, whieh is relied upon by the petitioners herein as an admission by the shippers that the line-haul freight rate basis was not involved. We will not attempt to set out the matter in detail, as we would unduly lengthen this opinion. It is sufficient to say that no admission by counsel made at the conclusion of a trial as to the scope of the inquiry, whieh had been undertaken by the Interstate Commerce Commission and had been in progress for a number of years, could modify the facts that such rates were involved, and were so considered by the parties in the presentation of their evidence. The fact is that the line-haul freight rate was involved to the extent it was necessary that it should be, in a determination of the question of the sufficiency of the gross transportation charge for poultry and dairy products. An admission by counsel to the contrary would not change the fact nor prevent the Interstate Commerce Commission from passing upon the issues before them. We hold, therefore, that the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission, if otherwise proper, was a legitimate conclusion of the controversy presented to them by the parties thereto. What we have said, however, does not dispose of the compiieated situation involved in this controversy.

We have to consider further whether the Commission had the power to render the decision it made. It has two distinct functions with reference to rate making. The first authorized by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 (February 4,1887), namely, that of declaring a rate established by the carrier to be unreasonable, and for that reason nonenforceable, and, second, the power to fix a reasonable rate to supplant the charge or rate held unreasonable. The latter power, so far as applicable here, is stated in section 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 TJSCA § 15, 41 Stat. 484 ), as follows:

The question is, Did the Commission, after holding unreasonable a charge imposed by the carriers, fix in lieu thereof a reasonable and just charge, in view of the fact that it is conceded by the Commission that the cha-rge set aside included a proper element of the cost of refrigeration, and the new charge fixed by the Commission, or, rather, directed to be fixed, omitted that item, because the general line-haul freight rate was sufficient to cover that item. As to that portion of the haul in which the carriers had themselves established a cost of ice basis looking to the line-haul freight rate for compensation for haulage of ice, etc., there certainly could be Ho impropriety in the Commission’s fixing a new icing rate which raised or lowered the cost of ice per ton as fixed by the carriers,, regardless of the elements of cost of refrigeration theretofore omitted by the carriers when they fixed the cost per ton. The rate fixed by the carrier was for the service rendered, that is, putting the ice in the bunkers, and the charge fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission, in lieu thereof, must, or should, be for that same service. On the other hand, where the stated charge basis for refrigeration is the charge under review, can the Commission fix a substituted charge therefor whieh does not cover an admitted item of the cost of that service theretofore included therein by the carrier because of the fact that the freight rate imposed upon the product -is unreasonably high or sufficiently high to cover these items adequately? There is a primary difficulty in this matter. The line-haul freight rate on poultry and dairy products is imposed, regardless of whether or not the shipment is refrigerated, or the nature or extent of that refrigeration. During certain seasons of the year, some or all of these products are shipped without refrigeration. One of the witnesses, Mr. Ford, testifies on that subject as follows:

It therefore appears that, if the line-haul freight rate is sufficiently high to absorb the ice haulage charge and other refrigerating charges not covered by the cost of ice basis over-and above a reasonable rate for the haulage of the freight, it is too high, and should be reduced accordingly, and all the shippers of these products, whether refrigerated or not, will share in the benefit. In this regard the situation is analogous to that discussed in the Stiekney Case, supra, and wholly distinct from that in the Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. U. S., 232 U. S. 199 , 34 S. Ct. 291 , 58 L. Ed. 568 , supra. The Interstate Commerce Commission answers this proposition by the contention that the carrier cannot be heard to assert that, under the findings, the rate upon shippers of nonrefrigerated poultry and dairy products is excessive. But that does not meet the situation, because the essence of the petitioners’ claim is that the Interstate Commerce Commission has not regularly pursued its statutory authority in fixing the rates that it did fix, and its argument, based upon the failure to reduce such charges on unrefrigerated products, is merely to enforce its contention that it is essentially wrong to look to a line-haul freight rate to supplement an auxiliary charge when that auxiliary service is not uniformly utilized. In other words, that the line-haul rate under consideration by the Interstate Commerce Commission is not a charge on refrigerated products alone, as in the preeooling ease, Atchison T. & S. F. R. Co. v. U. S., 232 U. S. 199 , 34 S. Ct. 291 , 58 L. Ed. 568 , supra, but a charge also applicable to unrefrigerated freight. The statute applicable (section 15 of Interstate Commerce Act, supra) seems to be perfectly clear and definite. The Interstate Commerce Commission has power to prohibit an unreasonable rate and to substitute a reasonable rate for the same service. The rate set aside included ice haulage, etc., and the substituted service did not compensate for these costs, as every reasonable rate must.

This brings us to a more detailed consideration of the charge in question. In that regard we quote from the brief filed on behalf of the Interstate Commerce Commission as follows:

“The evidence of record before the Com- , mission shows that the initial lines retain all of the stated charge, and pay their connections only upon the cost-of-ice basis, the basis which exists on identical traffic originating east of the Rocky Mountains and which the Commission has here prescribed on shipments originating in the six westernmost states.

“In this connection we first call attention to rule No. 238 of Supplement No. 64 to National Perishable Freight Committee Tariff I. C. C. No. 1, effective July 23,1926 (at the time of the hearing before the Commission), and which has been continued in force in later tariffs up to the present time. The rule reads as follows:

This statement of the facts is sufficiently accurate to present the question we will now consider. The fixing of the icing charge on a’ cost of ice basis on refrigerated poultry and dairy products, as directed by the Interstate Commerce Commission in its order, is in strict conformity with the present practice of all the railroads involved except as to shipments originating on their own lines within the six western states, to the end of their own lines at the point of delivery to a connecting carrier. The connecting carrier charges on the cost of ice basis even if a part of the haul is in these states, consequently the only costs that are included in the stated charge and excluded from the cost of ice basis are the items of ice haulage, ’ supervision, bunker repair, and profit of the initial carrier over his own lines to the point of delivery to the connecting carrier. In this state-' ment we assume, as the Commission found to be the fact and is obviously true, that in setting up the cost of ice basis the carriers look to the line-haul freight rate for compensation for all other charges involved in refrigeration. This was proper, and, as we hold, the Interstate Commerce Commission could follow the same distribution of costs of refrigeration. But, where a stated charge is set up and replaced by a cost of ice basis, the Interstate Commerce Commission must absorb the cost theretofore properly absorbed by the stated charge, and in this connection it may be well to repeat what has already been implied, namely, that at present the stated charge involves a double payment by the shipper for the items included in the stated charge and excluded in the cost of ice basis, so far as the freight is carried on connecting carriers.

This leads us to this conclusion: That the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission is valid in so far as it prohibits the carriers from collecting the stated icing charge, because such charge is unreasonable and unjust; that the ordei is valid .in so far as it requires an icing charge to be set up and published and charged that will be on the cost of ice basis at present rates per ton for ice on all connecting carriers; that the order is invalid only in so far as it directs the initial carrier in the six western states to publish a tariff on a cost of ice basis for refrigeration at the present rate per ton for ice, which rate thus established excludes from the cost of refrigeration the hereinbefore mentioned cost of ice haulage, etc., over its own lines to the point where the ear is delivered to its connecting carrier or to the point of delivery on its own lines if within said six westernmost states, for the reason that the rate fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission for that portion of the service rendered by the carrier is not a just and reasonable rate within the meaning of that term as used in section 15 of the Interstate Commerce Act, supra, in that the rate displaced covers the cost of ice haulage, etc., as aforesaid, over its own lines as aforesaid, and the new rate, although it requires ice haulage, etc., to be furnished over its own lines as aforesaid, does hot provide compensation therefor. The per ton rate for ice for the initial carrier, if icing rates are fixed on the cost of ice at a per ton rate basis, should absorb these items over its own lines only to the point of delivery within the six western states or to the connecting carrier, or an additional charge should be set up to provide such compensation. In the new rate upon the cost of ice basis, the initial railroads should be permitted to absorb these omitted items in its icing charge over its own lines in, the rate to be fixed by it either under the-direction of the Interstate Commerce Commission in the proceedings already instituted or the rate should be fixed therein by the Interstate Commerce Commission so as to absorb the aforementioned omitted items. Our injunction will merely go to the point that the Interstate Commerce Commission is enjoined from enforcing the present ice per ton rates now fixed for icing by the published railroad tariffs, in so far as such rate applies to the initial shipper for refrigeration over its own lines to the point at whieh it delivers freight to the connecting carrier, or to a point of delivery within the six westernmost states. This order is without prejudice to any further proceedings for the fixing of the icing charge or the reduction of the line-haul freight rate on poultry and dairy products ■either in the present or in newly inaugurated proceedings before the Interstate Commerce Commission. We find that the rates fixed by the Interstate Commerce Commission are not confiscatory; that such rates do not violate the Constitution of the United States, and are just and reasonable in all respects, with the •exception hereinbefore mentioned, namely, that the Interstate Commerce Commission has failed to regularly pursue its statutory authority in the fixing of the new rate, for the reason that the new rate does not include the cost of the service rendered by the initial carrier and reasonable profit thereon, as aforesaid, as does the displaced rate, and for that reason only, and to that extent only, the or•der is invalid, because the Interstate Commerce Commission has not complied with the statute giving them authority to fix rates that are just and reasonable in lieu of rates declared by them to be unreasonable and unjust.

Findings will be prepared in accordance -with this opinion.