This is an appeal from an order dismissing the proceedings instituted by appellant’s petition, brought under section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act, as added June 7, 1934 ( 11 U.S.C.A. § 207 ). The petition was filed October 18, 1934. Thereafter proceedings were had before the referee in bankruptcy acting as special master, and before the trial court, looking toward a reorganization of the appellant. On June 5, 1935, the special master concluded that there was no hope of a reorganization which would be acceptable to the requisite number of bondholders or would secure to the dissenting bondholders, full compensation, as required by the Bankruptcy Act § 77B(b) (5) (d) ( 11 U.S.C.A. § 207 (b) (5), (d). Francisco Bldg. Corporation Limited v. Battson (C.C.A.) 83 F.(2d) 93 . The trial court acted upon the recommendation of the special master and dismissed the proceedings.

The Bankruptcy Act provides (section 77B(c)(8), 11 U.S.C.A. § 207 (c)(8) that reorganization proceedings shall be dismissed “if a plan of reorganization is not proposed or accepted within such reasonable period as the judge may fix, or, if proposed and accepted, is not confirmed,” and that after hearing the judge may dismiss the proceedings. Such an order of dismissal is largely in the sound discretion of fhe trial judge and should not be disturbed on appeal except for a clear abuse of discretion. Here, there was no abuse of discretion. No bondholder had consented to appellant’s proposed plan of reorganization and more than a majority had expressly refused consent. The property involved was the Hotel Oakland, a large hotel in that city, which had been run at so great a loss that the appellant, the owner, declared in 1931 that it could no longer operate the hotel. In order to keep the hotel open, the bondholders caused a foreclosure proceeding to be brought in the state court in January 1932, wherein a receiver was appointed to operate the property. The hotel was operated thereafter by the receiver at á loss. Neither the interest on the bonds nor state and county taxes were paid. The plan of reorganization proposed by the appellant is thus epitomized by the appellee:

The plan was rejected by the bondholders. The plan was not compensatory to the bondholders, and ignored their just claims for payment or foreclosure.

The brief of the appellant contains no specifications of error, although it is claimed that there was no formal hearing of its plan of reorganization and no findings by the special master or by the court in the proposed plan. None were requested. The record shows that there was a hearing, on the proposed plan at which appellant was represented, and that the plan was found to be entirely unreasonable and unacceptable. The special master in his report stated that the plan of reorganization “had not been accepted in writing or otherwise by any stockholders, bondholders or creditors of the corporation”; that bond owners representing $411,000’ face value out of $660,000 bonds outstanding had rejected the proposed plan. He further reported as follows:

The appellant filed exceptions to the master’s report which* after a hearing were overruled on July 17,-1935.

The findings of the special master were sufficient to sustain his recommendation and the action of the court. The Equity Rule 70%, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723, requiring findings does not apply to these proceedings in bankruptcy for reorganization, nor does General Order 37, 11 U.S.C.A. following section 53 apply. In re Cunney (D.C.) 225 F. 426, 428 ; Daniel v. Guaranty Trust Co., 285 U.S. 154, 163 , 52 S.Ct. 326 , 76 L.Ed. 675 .

The appellant appeals from the order of the trial court allowing attorneys’ fees to the attorneys for the bondholders, but does not seriously press the point. As the appellant points out, the Bankruptcy Act provides for such an allowance ( 11 U.S.C.A. § 207 (c)(9). The trial court refused to make an allowance for attorneys’ fees to the appellant, and appellant seeks a reversal of this order, and in addition a further allowance for its attorneys’ fees by this court. The trial court correctly determined that the mortgaged property should not be subjected to the claims of the appellant for attorneys’ fees. The only result of this proceeding was to defer the prosecution of the foreclosure proceeding.

The application of appellant to us in his brief for the allowance of attorneys’ fees on this appeal is denied.

There is no merit in this appeal.

Orders affirmed.