22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T49f,MEMORANDUM Vladik Bykov appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his action pursuant to a settlement agreement. By-kov challenges only certain orders entered prior to dismissal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decisions regarding protective orders, Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206 , 1210 (9th Cir.2002), and we affirm. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bykov’s motions to seal or redact financial information and allegedly defamatory statements because the motions did not demonstrate good cause. See id. at 1210-11 (“For good cause to exist, the party seeking the protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.”). Contrary to Bykov’s contention, the district court properly reviewed whether the magistrate judge’s orders were “clearly erroneous or ... contrary to law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(a). Bykov’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T4d6,

MEMORANDUM

Vladik Bykov appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing his action pursuant to a settlement agreement. By-kov challenges only certain orders entered prior to dismissal. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decisions regarding protective orders, Phillips v. Gen. Motors Corp., 307 F.3d 1206 , 1210 (9th Cir.2002), and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bykov’s motions to seal or redact financial information and allegedly defamatory statements because the motions did not demonstrate good cause. See id. at 1210-11 (“For good cause to exist, the party seeking the protection bears the burden of showing specific prejudice or harm will result if no protective order is granted.”).

Contrary to Bykov’s contention, the district court properly reviewed whether the magistrate judge’s orders were “clearly erroneous or ... contrary to law.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 72(a).

Bykov’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9 th Cir. R. 36-3.