22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T504,MEMORANDUM Johnny Earl Evans, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review for an abuse of discretion, Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.2006), and we affirm. In his motion for reconsideration, Evans repeated the arguments raised in his oppositions to the motion to dismiss: that both his grievance and citizen’s complaint satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement or, in the alternative, that he was excused from compliance with the exhaustion requirement. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for reconsideration because Evans failed to establish “manifest injustice” to warrant relief from judgment. Id. at 1103 (explaining that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) “is used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Evans’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T536,

MEMORANDUM

Johnny Earl Evans, a California state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging violations of his First and Eighth Amendment rights. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review for an abuse of discretion, Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham & Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1100 (9th Cir.2006), and we affirm.

In his motion for reconsideration, Evans repeated the arguments raised in his oppositions to the motion to dismiss: that both his grievance and citizen’s complaint satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement or, in the alternative, that he was excused from compliance with the exhaustion requirement. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for reconsideration because Evans failed to establish “manifest injustice” to warrant relief from judgment. Id. at 1103 (explaining that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) “is used sparingly as an equitable remedy to prevent manifest injustice” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Evans’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.