ORDER

This is a diversity suit, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332, whereby the plaintiff a citizen of England, seeks declaratory relief ( 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202) and an injunction.

The plaintiff is the publisher of “THE SUNDAY TIMES OF LONDON,” and the defendants are the lawyers for/and McDonnell Douglas Corporation, a defendant in many suits pending under MDL Docket #172 ( 28 U.S.C. § 1407 ) for the crash of a McDonnell Douglas-made plane near Paris on March 3, 1974, killing all human beings aboard, about 350, and destroying the plane. A faulty product by McDonnell Douglas is alleged as the cause of the crash.

The plaintiffs in the death cases and McDonnell Douglas and other defendants have been diligently engaged in discovery by deposition since shortly after the suits were filed.

The plaintiff seeks by this suit a declaratory judgment that its representatives are entitled to be present at all depositions and to publish their reports of what occurred; and upon such declaratory judgment seek an injunction pendente lite to restrain defendants’ lawyers from preventing the presence of plaintiff’s reporters at the taking of depositions which are being taken with the agreement of the parties and the approval of the court at the office of defendant Packard.

The defendants, in addition to filing a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a claim for relief, have filed copious, but not well organized, briefs, citing many cases, few of which are in point.

The heart of the question is whether or not the provisions in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution providing that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom ... of the press” override the provisions in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically, those in 30 (f) which provide that the deposition shall be “securely sealed” and mailed to or filed with the Court, and of the Local Rule which requires the Clerk to reseal the deposition after the Clerk has checked to see whether or not the original deposition has been signed by the deponent and certified by the notary. If they must be “securely sealed,” then they must be securely kept from the press as well as others, and the taking of them does not permit the public or press to be present except as permitted by F.R. Civ.P. 26(c)(5).

Aside from the main point, there are' other matters raised which should be disposed of before reaching it.

The first one made by the defendants is that the plaintiff being a citizen of another Country has no access to the judicial power of the United States Courts to enforce any rights.

This point is disposed of adversely to the defendants’ position not only by the Constitution itself which provides in Article 3, Section 2, that “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority; . between . . . the Citizens [of a State] and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects”-, as well as by Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 1332 providing for diversity jurisdiction in amounts exceeding $10,000 where the action is between “citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof,” as well as a long line of cases beginning with The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall) 164, 20 L.Ed. 127 (1870). The court states, in that case, on that proposition, the following:

The 9th Circuit in 1972 was just as positive in Sam Andrews’ Sons v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d 745 , at page 749, where it said: “Any person within the United States [whether] citizen or alien, resident or non-resident, is protected by the guarantees of the Constitution.” (italics supplied)

The 11th Amendment of the Constitution which came into being as a result of the Court’s decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall) 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793) modifies Article 3, Section 2, above quoted, only by prohibiting suits “against” one of the United States by citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of foreign states. Thus the plaintiff cannot be barred from bringing this suit because it is an alien.

It is of great significance that the 11th Amendment, adopted shortly after the Constitution, uses the word “against” as contrasted with the word “between” as is used in Article 3, Section 2. “Between” makes no distinction as to whether one is plaintiff or defendant, whereas “against” would apply to and prohibit the judicial power only from being used “against” a state of the United States.

The defendants claim that the First Amendment does not give “free speech” to a foreign newspaper. The reasoning is as obscure as the case they cite in support of it is inapplicable, Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 , 92 S.Ct. 2576 , 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1973). But, as nearly as I can figure, their position is that “freedom of the press” referred to in the Amendment I is only that press which is published in America for American readers, and that inasmuch as plaintiff is published in England for English readers, they have no rights here. The complaint alleges that it is an English corporation: it alleges jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2) which permits suit by “citizens” of foreign states. Thus, the complaint by implication alleges that it is a citizen of England. In any event, it is a “foreign subject” specifically permitted access to our courts by Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution. The point is without foundation.

Other reasons assigned by the defendants as to why the plaintiff should have no relief are because (1) the plaintiff comes into court with “unclean hands,” in that the plaintiff has been found guilty of contempt by Parliament for publication of articles which were unfriendly to those who were defendants in the Thalidomide case, and (2) that the plaintiff’s employees in this case are disclosing information to counsel for the plaintiffs in the crash cases and have obtained copies of depositions even before they have been signed.

It ill becomes the defendant to come in and talk about the plaintiff having unclean hands. The assertion that plaintiff was found guilty of contempt by the House of Lords is not true, and the defendant with the slightest research could have found it to be, or knew, so. The fact is that the plaintiff prepared an article for publication and submitted it to the Attorney General. As required by English law, he took it before the Courts, and one of the Appeals Courts reversed the injunction against the article which had been granted by the lower court. The plaintiff did not, however, publish the article but, instead, voluntarily consented that the matter should be heard by the House of Lords as to whether or not the article should be published. The matter was extensively debated, and the House of Lords found that if the plaintiff published the article it would be contemptous. The article was never published. The Attorney General even waived costs against the Times because he said they had been “fully cooperative.” Furthermore, defendants in their briefs assert that Elaine Potter wrote the article under consideration, which is denied by her affidavit.

As to the accusation that the employees of the plaintiff in this case disclosed information to the plaintiffs' counsel in the death cases, there is nothing unusual about that, except perhaps that their disclosure was limited to counsel for the plaintiffs in the death cases and did not make disclosures to the defendants. It is customary in the preparation of a lawsuit for the lawyer to seek information wherever he can get it. It is particularly necessary in the death cases as the decedents’ next of kin have no information — the defendants have it all, and are securing writs which prevent, in my judgment, the proper procedures to be taken to assure due process to the next of kin of those who were killed in the disaster and who are scattered in 20 countries of the world. Testimony by plaintiff’s witnesses indicated there were approximately a thousand next of kin claimants. They were not cross-examined on that point, nor did defendants produce any evidence thereon. The plaintiffs may be aliens, but they are “persons” and the Constitution of the United States grants the rights of “persons” to due process in this country and access to our courts.

The defendants also claim a possible prejudice to a fair trial because what is sent to plaintiff in England may be relayed back locally under contract with United States publishers and get to the eyes of possible jurors. The testimony at the hearing in this court, which took several days, was to the effect that the circulation of plaintiff’s paper in the United States was about 5,000. With close to 3,000,000 persons living in the vicinity of this court, it is difficult to see how a newspaper of that circulation among the 200,000,000 people of the United States can so greatly influence the minds of enough people in this jurisdiction as to prevent the securing of a wholly unbiased and unprejudiced jury. The point is groundless, and defendants’ claim that plaintiff’s American press contracts might result in articles which might prejudice American jurors is too speculative.

Each party claims the other has the burden of proving irreparable injury to it if the injunction Is granted or not granted. The plaintiff has shown that by -reason of its investment to date in investigative reporting, its commitments to a book, and in and to a film which is made or nearly so, it will or may lose that investment as well as additional moneys which will be spent in salaries and the like. The defendants claim, if the plaintiffs prevail, it will suffer irreparable injury in two respects (a) the publicity will encourage dependents of deceased to make claims against it and they have a “due process (right!)” to settle these claims without court intervention; and (b) it would result in trial by the press. The difficulty with the main claim is that it necessarily implies that defendants have a right to settle 345 death cases with 1000 dependents or next of kin, without them even knowing they can sue in the United States Courts for an impartial adjudication of liability and damages, instead of depending only on the defendants’ idea of a “fair” settlement. The second is merely an unwarranted assumption. None of said points entitle the defendants to the motion to dismiss.

The other contentions of the parties are not necessary for discussion at this time except the controlling issue.

Coming now to the controlling point: it is whether or not the “free press” provisions of the First Amendment override the provisions now incorporated in Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Title V, sections 26 to 37, entitled “Depositions and Discovery.” There are 8 sections in various Rules in Title V, F.R. Civ.P. which are of interest here. They are Rule 26(b)(1) which so broadens the scope of discovery in depositions and other discovery that “it is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought [may] lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” Rule 26(c) provides for protective orders and Rule 28(a) designates persons before whom depositions may be taken. This Rule is modified by Rule 29 which permits parties to stipulate that depositions may be taken by any person. It need not be further considered; Rule 30(e) and (f), which are set forth in the margin on the next page; 32(a), permits any portion of a deposition to be used (i. e., made public) “at the trial" “so far as admissible” and “relevant,” Rule 32(a)(4).

The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to gather information, Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 , 85 S.Ct. 1271 , 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965); nor special access to information not available to the pub- lie generally. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972).

The matter of the privacy of depositions and the sealing of them is not new. It was of concern to the First Congress as seen from that portion of Section 30 of the Judiciary Act, approved September 24, 1789, providing, inter alia, that the deposition after taking “shall be by him the said magistrate sealed up and directed to such court, and remain under his seal until opened in court.”

What are now the first 10 Amendments of the Constitution were the last 10 of 12 amendments submitted by Congress to the States by a resolution passed either September 25 or September 29, 1789. Thus, both the restrictive provisions concerning depositions above quoted and the resolution submitting Amendment I were almost co-temporaneous, and it is hardly logical that Congress would create the right to privacy in depositions September 24, 1789 (the date of approval of the Judiciary Act by the President) and ask the States to destroy that right the next day or so. Actually, the first 10 Amendments were not approved by the required number of States until almost 2 years after the passage of the first Judiciary Act.

In Beale v. Thompson, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 70 , 3 L.Ed. 491 (1814), the Supreme Court with Marshall, Livingston, Todd, Duvall and Story sitting, by Judge Story, made short shrift of the right to open a deposition before the trial. The cryptic opinion is quoted in full:

The provisions of Section 30 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 hereinabove quoted were carried forward in Section 865 of the Revised Statutes; from thence to Section 1474 of the Compiled Statutes of 1901; and from thence to Section 641 of Title 28 of the Judicial Code, the 1934 Edition. In 1937 they were taken out of Section 641 of Title 28 and out of the Judicial Code along with Sections 639 and 640 and incorporated in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 to 37.

The plaintiff makes much of the fact that “trials” are entitled to be public, and that thus the press is entitled to be present at depositions. This was sought by the United States in the United Shoe Machinery case, 198 F. 870, 871 (1912). But as pointed out by Judge Brown [871 to 872]:

The Court further pointed out:

The United Shoe Machinery case led to the adoption in 1913 of 15 U.S.C. § 30 which is applicable only to antitrust suits brought by the United States. It reads:

The fact that Congress limited that section to antitrust suits brought by the United States is clear evidence of their intention that the restrictions contained in Section 1474 of the Compiled Statutes — now in F.R.Civ.P. 26 to 37— remain the law. Furthermore, if the First Amendment gave the right to attendance at depositions, why should there be any such statute as 15 U.S.C. § 30 ?

The fact that F.R.Civ.P. § 26(b) added the provision that “It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence,” is all the more reason for limiting the attendance at depositions to only the principals and not the public. In the crash eases the plaintiffs have the prodigious task of actually proving their case “out of the defendants’ mouths.” In doing so, hearsay, both written and oral, shop memos, designs of structural features and much other material are sought, and subject to discovery. Yet a court cannot tell until the deposition is opened at the trial [and it may never be opened —thus never public] whether such matters are admissible and may thus be made public or not.

Attached as Appendix A is a complete list of all cases and authorities cited by both parties together with a brief statement concerning each. Most of the cases cited are far from the points involved, but a reference to a few other than those above cited will bear out the conclusion that a deposition is not a trial, and the rights of the press are not restrained or even involved.

In Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, at 374 , 67 S.Ct. 1249, at 1254 , 91 L. Ed. 1546 , one word emphasizes what is public when the court said, “What transpires in the court room is public property.”

In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 , at page 684, 92 S.Ct. 2646 at page 2658, 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972), the court said: “It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public.”

Enforcement of the principles of sealing and privacy of depositions, until they were ordered opened by the court, which were adopted by the First Congress, and carried through with no alteration of principle for 185 years, demonstrates not only the wisdom but also the necessity of abiding by those principles.

History teaches us that slight departures from clear principles lead to more and more “minimal” departures, many of which for the moment may seem in the highest public interest, but, when that happens, there comes, too soon, the day when personal preferences of judges, press, and lawyers overcome long established principles, and law instead of being a rule of action becomes a cabal, with publicity in the media being the goal, instead of justice.

In sum, this court holds: That depositions before a qualified officer in an equity or law case are not a judicial trial, nor a part of a trial, but a proceeding preliminary to a trial, and neither the public nor representatives of the press have a right to be present at such taking. Until a deposition has been presented to the court [not the Clerk], and ordered opened, it does not become evidence in the case, nor has either party until then an opportunity to be heard upon the question of the competency, materiality, or relevancy of the statements made by the witness, and the public can have no right to know what the testimony is until the court knows what it is.

It follows that as a matter of law the plaintiff is not entitled to a declaratory judgment that it or its agents and employees may be present at the taking of depositions in the damage cases. And, not being entitled to such judgment, it also follows that the plaintiff is not entitled to an injunction against the defendants from refusing them admission to the depositions.

Moreover, the evidence needed to support an injunction is not persusive: The damage must be great, it must be immediate and it must be irreparable. Howsoever much plaintiff has expended, the damage is not immediate in that plaintiff relies on the possible cancellation of a book contract, which, if it occurs and the plaintiff is entitled to recover, the same can be had in a suit for money. It must not be overlooked that the contract was not put in evidence, nor was there any evidence that the contract required the plaintiff’s employees or representatives to be present at the depositions.

While this was only a hearing on an injunction pendente lite, it would appear there is nothing to add or to be added by any party at a trial, and thus this may be treated as a final judgment. It the parties think otherwise, a stipulation or a noticed hearing to that effect will suffice.

While I have no alternative but to deny the plaintiff the relief it seeks and to grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss, I nevertheless commend the plaintiff for the dignified and legal way it has raised this question. . It is a refreshing contrast to the conduct of the leading (and now most) United States papers of handling sensations founded upon what they refer to as “an informed source,” or “a reliable source.”

The defendants’ motion to dismiss is granted.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF CASES CITED BY PARTIES WITH BRIEF STATEMENT ON EACH

1. Aetna Life Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 , 57 S.Ct. 461 , 81 L.Ed. 617 (1937)

2. Amalgamated Food Employees’ Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 , 88 S.Ct. 1601 , 20 L.Ed.2d 603 (1968)

3. Julius M. Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 235 F.Supp. 856 (S.D.N.Y. 1964)

4. Apco Oil Corp. v. Certified Transp. Inc., 46 F.R.D. 428 (D.C.Mo.1969)

5. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 , 65 S.Ct. 1416 , 89 L.Ed. 2013 (1945)

6. Azbill v. Fisher, 84 Nev. 414 , 442 P.2d 916 (1968)

7. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 , 73 S.Ct. 1031 , 97 L.Ed. 1586 (1953)

8. Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1949)

9. Bolchos v. Darrel, D.C.S.C.1795, 3 Fed.Cas. No.1,607, P. 810 — cited in Khedivial, infra.

10. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 , 92 S.Ct. 2646 , 33 L.Ed.2d 626 (1972)

11. Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 , 62 S.Ct. 190 , 86 L.Ed. 192 (1941)

12. Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Association, Inc., 4 Cal.3d 529, 535 , 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 870 , 483 P.2d 34, 38 (1971)

13. Burnham Chemical Co. v. Borax Consolidated, Ltd., 7 F.R.D. 341 (N. D.Cal.1947)

14. Cembrook v. Sterling Drug Company, Inc., 231 Cal.App.2d 52 , 41 Cal. Rptr. 492, 495 (1964), hearing denied Feb. 3,1965

15. Central Hardware Company v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539 , 92 S.Ct. 2238 , 33 L.Ed.2d 122 (1972).

16. Coffee Dan’s, Inc. v. Coffee Don’s Charcoal Broiler, 305 F.Supp. 1210 (N.D.Cal.1969)

17. Covey Oil Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 340 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1965)

18. Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 374 , 67 S.Ct. 1249, 1254 , 91 L.Ed. 1546 (1947)

19. Davies Warehouse Company v. Brown, 137 F.2d 201 (U.S.Emerg. Ct.App.1943), reversed sub nom., Davies Warehouse Company v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144 , 64 S.Ct. 474 , 88 L.Ed. 635 (1944)

20. Davis v. Romney, 55 F.R.D. 337 (E.D.Pa.1972)

21. D’Ippolito v. American Oil Company, 272 F.Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y.1967)

22. Dymo Industries, Inc. v. Tapeprinter, Inc. 326 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1964)

23. Elder v. Whitesides, 72 F. 724 (Cir. Ct.E.D.La.1895)

24. Eldorado Coal and Mining Company v. Marriotti, 215 F. 51 (7th Cir. 1914)

25. Essex Wire Corp. v. Eastern Electric Sales Co., 48 F.R.D. 308 (D.C.Pa.1969)

26. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 , 85 S.Ct. 1628 , 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965)

27. Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S. 435 , 90 S.Ct. 628 , 24 L.Ed.2d 634 (1970)

28. E. W. Scripps Co. v. Fulton, 100 Ohio App. 157 , 125 N.E.2d 896 (1955)

29. Fowler v. United States, 258 F.Supp. 638, 644 (C.D.Cal.1966)

30. Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1959)

31. General Dynamics Corporation v. Selb Manufacturing Co., 481 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1973)

32. Grosjean v. American Press Company, 297 U.S. 233, 250 , 56 S.Ct. 444 , 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936)

33. Harlem River Consumers Cooperative, Inc. v. Associated Grocers of Harlem, Inc., 54 F.R.D. 551 (S.D.N.Y.1972)

34. Hovey v. Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 , 17 S.Ct. 841 , 42 L.Ed. 215 (1897)

35. Hower v. Weiss Malting & Elevator Co., 55 F. 356, 358 (2 Cir. 1893)

36. Hunkin-Conkey Construction Co. v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 34 F.Supp. 26 (M.D.Pa.1940)

37. International Products Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403 (2nd Cir. 1963)

38. Jackson v. Heiser, 111 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1940)

39. Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 321 F. Supp. 923, 930 (N.D.Cal.1970), appeal dismissed, 443 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1971) [Court based ruling on lower court’s decision, finding no abuse of discretion.]

40. Katalla Company v. Rones, 186 F. 30 (9th Cir. 1911.)

41. Khedivial Line, S. A. E. v. Seafarers’ International Union, 278 F.2d 49 (2nd Cir. 1960)

42. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 , 92 S.Ct. 2576 , 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972)

43. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 , 85 S.Ct. 1493 , 14 L.Ed.2d 398 (1965)

44. Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F.2d 791, 792 (4th Cir. 1965)

45. Lloyd Corporation Ltd. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 , 92 S.Ct. 2219 , 33 L.Ed.2d 131 (1972)

46. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 , 66 S.Ct. 276 , 90 L.Ed. 265 (1947)

47. Metal Foil Products Mfg. Co. v. Reynolds Metal Co., 55 F.R.D. 491 (E.D.Va.1970)

48. Milsen Co. v. Southland Corp., 16 F.R.Serv.2d 110 (N.D.Ill.1972)

49. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 , 24 L.Ed. 77 (1876)

50. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 , 51 S.Ct. 625 , 75 L.Ed. 1357 (1931)

51. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 533 , 54 S.Ct. 505, 514 , 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934)

52. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 , 84 S.Ct. 710 , 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)

53. NLRB v. Babock and Wilcox Company, 351 U.S. 105 , 76 S.Ct. 679 , 100 L.Ed. 975 (1956)

54. Olympic Refining Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1964)

55. Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 , 91 S.Ct. 1575 , 29 L.Ed.2d 1

56. Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Holden, 166 F.Supp. 684 (S.D.Cal. 1958)

57. Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 , 66 S.Ct. 1029 , 90 L.Ed. 1295 (1946)

58. People of the State of California v. Bozarth, 356 F.Supp. 667 (N.D. Cal.1973)

59. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 107 Ariz. 557 , 490 P.2d 563 (1971)

60. Porto Rico Telephone Co. v. Puerto Rico Communications Authority, 189 F.2d 39 (1st Cir. 1951)

61. [The] Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 , 89 S.Ct. 1794 , 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969)

62. Roberto v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 177 F.2d 811 (7th Cir. 1949)

63. Sam Andrews’ Sons v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d 745, 749 (9th Cir. 1972)

64. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 , 86 S.Ct. 1507 , 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966)

65. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S.Ct. 836 , 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948)

66. Sierra Club v. Hickel, 433 F.2d 24, 33 (9th Cir. 1970)

67. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 , 92 S.Ct. 1361 , 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972)

68. State of Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 , 70 S.Ct. 252 , 94 L.Ed. 562 (1950)

69. Suravitz v. Pristasz, 201 F. 335 (3rd Cir. 1912)

70. Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 153 F.Supp. 486 (D.C. Pa.1957), aff., 254 F.2d 883 (3rd Cir. 1958)

71. United States ex rel. Bennett v. Rundle, 419 F.2d 599 (3rd Cir. 1969)

72. United States v. 18 Packages of Magazines, 238 F.Supp. 846 (N.D. Cal.1964)

73. United States v. General Motors Corp., 352 F.Supp. 107 (E.D.Mich. 1973)

74. United States v. Kline, 221 F.Supp. 776 (D.C.Minn.1963)

75. United States v. Kobli, 172 F.2d 919 (3rd Cir. 1949)

76. United States v. Lopez, D.C., 328 F.Supp. 1077 , 1087

77. United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967 (2nd Cir. 1965)

78. United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721 (3rd Cir. 1949)

79. United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 198 F. 870 (D.C.Mass. 1912)

80. Valanga v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 259 F.Supp. 324 (E.D.Pa.1966)

81. Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274 , 23 L.Ed. 914 (1876)

82. Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 , 85 S. Ct. 1271, 1281 , 14 L.Ed.2d 179 (1965)

ALSO CITED:

“Fair Trial and Freedom of the Press,” 19 F.R.D. 16 (Panel Discussion 1955)

Problem is how to guarantee a fair trial. On 18, “One solution is that which has been adopted in England. There the right to a fair trial has triumphed over the right to freedom of the press, wherever the two come in conflict. Prior to the final disposition of a case, newspapers are not permitted to publish anything but an unvarnished, uncolored account of the proceedings in open court, and summaries of the text of documents filed in court and open to the public. To write anything else concerning a pending case constitutes contempt of court punishable by a heavy fine.”

STANDARDS RELATING TO FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, approved by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, February, 1968.

Standard 3.1 recommends exclusion of the public from preliminary or other pretrial hearings in criminal cases where dissemination of evidence or arguments at the hearing may disclose matters which will be inadmissible in evidence at the trial and is, therefore, likely to interfere with the right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.

. See discussion by John Randolph as one of counsel in Chisholm v. Georgia, supra, as to the use of the word “between.” . The latter are not alleged to have been used by the plaintiff in any publicity or newspaper article. . The court can take judicial notice that the defendants and their insurance carriers search out such next of kin for settlement purposes, but one is led to wonder if defendants tell, or told, any of them the provisions of Article 111, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States and of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a) (2) permitting non-citizens to sue in the United States Courts for any claim “arising under this Constitution [and] the latos of the United States.’’ It must bo kept in mind that these are product liability cases and that the law on that subject in California is well defined, and that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as amended, and the rules and regulations made thereunder, cover every conceivable phase of airplane construction. Whether such rules cover flight by an American j)lane in a foreign country is not presently material in this case. . A protective order was sought by defendants but was denied except as to clause (6) of F.R.Civ.P. 26(c). Clause (5) of Rule 26(c) permits a protective order by the court “that discovery be conducted with no one present except persons designated by the court.” In denying this clause in the order, the court felt that it had to take into consideration the fact that while a committee of lawyers had been appointed for discovery, it would be a denial of due process to prohibit other lawyers for plaintiffs from being present. Also it would require an order for each session, as counsel for both sides would need experts to consult on the very technical matters of design and engineering, which would lead to unnecessary delays. I did not articulate this in my order because I did not think it was necessary, and felt that ordering compliance with clause (6) of Rule 26(c), requiring sealing of the depositions until opened by order of the court, would sufficiently protect the witnesses and the defendants. Moreover, the parties had agreed [F.R.Oiv.P. 29] to take the depositions in defendant Packard’s office, and that the parties would rent a room near his office for a temporary depository. All counsel and such other persons as the court may order were to be provided free access to the depository. . “Rule 30(e) Submission to Witness; Changes; Signing. When the testimony is fully transcribed the deposition shall be submitted to the witness for examination and shall be read to or by him, unless such examination and reading are waived by the witness and by the parties. Any changes in form or substance which the witness desires to make shall be entered upon the deposition by the officer with a statement of the reasons given by the witness for making them. The deposition shall then be signed by the witness, unless the parties by stipulation waive the signing or the witness is ill or cannot be found or refuses to sign. If the deposition is not signed by the witness within 30 days of its submission to him, the officer shall sign it and state on the record the fact of the waiver or of the illness or absence of the witness or the fact of the refusal to sign together with the reason, if any, given therefor; and the deposition may then be used as fully as though signed unless on a motion to suppress under Rule 32(d) (4) the court holds that the reasons given for the refusal to sign require rejection of the deposition in whole or in part.” “Rule 30(f) Certification and Filing by Officer; Exhibits; Copies; Notice of Filing. (1) The officer shall certify on the deposition that the witness was duly sworn by him and that the deposition is a true record of the testimony given by the witness. He shall then securely seal the deposition in an envelope indorsed with the title of the action and marked ‘Deposition of [here insert name of witness]’ and shall promptly file it with the court in which the action is pending or send it by registered or certified mail to the clerk thereof for filing.”