MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs, residents of California qualified and duly registered to vote in the State, filed suit in the district court for the Eastern District of California on March 30,1993, challenging California’s 1992 redistricting plan, adopted by the State in Wilson v. Eu, 1 Cal.4th 707 , 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 379 , 823 P.2d 545 (1992). Plaintiffs raised three causes of action challenging the constitutionality of the redistricting plan. Claims one and two challenged the constitutionality of California Election Code, section 25003, a term limitation statute, and section 6402(b), a statute permitting candidates to run for only one congressional seat. The third claim for relief alleges that California’s redistricting plan relied on race-conscious reapportionment and diluted white voter strength in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

The court, sitting with a single judge, dismissed causes one and two as nonjusticiable. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (a), the court certified the reapportionment claim to be heard by a three judge district court. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 (b)(1), the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Judicial Circuit appointed this panel to hear this case.

The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The motions were heard on January 7, 1994. After considering the parties’ written and oral arguments, the record, and case law in this matter, we deny plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and grant the State’s motion for summary judgment.

FACTS

On September 23, 1991, Governor Wilson vetoed the California legislature’s reapportionment plan. Recognizing the legislative impasse and the importance of having a plan in place prior to the upcoming 1992 elections, the California Supreme Court issued a mandate and appointed three retired California judges to serve as Special Masters to resolve the election year crisis.

The Masters were directed to hold public hearings to permit the presentation of evidence and argument with respect to proposed plans of reapportionment. Wilson, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 381 , 823 P.2d at 547 . The Masters were further directed to compile a report and recommendation on reapportionment, basing the report on the public hearings and the guiding principles of the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended ( 42 U.S.C. § 1973 et seq.), federal law pertinent to redistricting, the provisions of article XXI, section 1 of the California Constitution, and the criteria developed by an earlier panel of Special Masters for the reapportionment plans adopted by the California Supreme Court in 1973, see Legislature v. Reinecke, 10 Cal.3d 396 , 110 Cal.Rptr. 718 , 516 P.2d 6 (1973). Wilson, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 383 , 823 P.2d at 549 .

The two relevant sections of the Voting Rights Act are sections 2 and 5. Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids state voting procedures which abridge voting rights “on account of race or color” and states that redistricting plans which provide “less opportunity [to minorities] than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice” abridge voting rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (Supp.1994). Section 5 of the Act prohibits a region subject to its provisions from implementing changes in any “standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting” without authorization from the United States Attorney General. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. Four California counties, Kings, Merced, Monterey, and Yuba, were subject to section 5; and, thus, the Masters had to devise a plan that would gain preclearance.

The state constitutional standards required that the Masters comply with the following redistricting procedures:

Cal. Const, art. XXI, § 1.

The redistricting criteria established in Reinecke called for:

Wilson, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 383 , 823 P.2d at 549 .

With these criteria in mind, the Masters conducted six days of public hearings in Sacramento, San Francisco, San Diego, and Los Angeles, and reviewed the transcripts from 12 public hearings held by the California State Senate on redistricting. They also considered 22 proposed redistricting plans submitted by various public and private organizations. The Masters did not adopt any one of the 22 proposed plans because each of them, in one manner or another, could not satisfy the redistricting criteria the California Supreme Court required to be followed. Thus, the Masters developed their own redistricting plan.

In approving the Masters’ Report, the California Supreme Court stated:

Wilson, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 385-86 , 823 P.2d at 551-52 (citations omitted).

With regard to the Voting Rights Act, the California Supreme Court stated:

Id. 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 383-84 , 823 P.2d at 549-50 (citations omitted).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs contend that because the Masters’ redistricting plan considered race in redrawing the districts, that this constitutes suspect “racial gerrymandering” actionable under the Equal Protection Clause, as set forth in Shaw v. Reno, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2816 , 125 L.Ed.2d 511 (1993). Plaintiffs further contend that summary judgment should be granted in their favor because the Masters’ plan is not, as required by Shaw , narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government interest. We disagree.

In Shaw v. Reno, the Supreme Court held that the appellants pled a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on an allegation that the State of North Carolina had practiced racial gerrymandering when it reapportioned the State’s voting districts. — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2832 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 536 . The two congressional districts challenged in Shaw were drawn to create two majority black districts in the state. The plaintiffs in Shaw alleged that the state had created an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. Their claim was that the North Carolina General Assembly deliberately “create[d] two Congressional Districts in which a majority of black voters was concentrated arbitrarily — without regard to any other considerations, such as compactness, contiguousness, geographical boundaries, or political subdivisions with the purpose to create Congressional Districts along racial lines and to assure the election of two black representatives to Congress.” Id. — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2818 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 522 (quotations omitted).

The first district challenged in Shaw was somewhat hook shaped. At one end it shot out with finger-like extensions. Id. — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2820-21 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 521 . It has been compared to a “Rorschach ink-blot test” and a “bug splattered on a windshield” Id.

The second majority black district challenged in Shaw was 16 miles long and for much of its length was no wider than an interstate highway. Id. The district wound its way, in snake-like fashion, gobbling up black enclaves. Id. It passed through 10 counties, divided towns, and, at one point, remained contiguous only because it intersected at a single point with two other districts before crossing over them. Id.

The Court in Shaw defined racial gerrymandering as “the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries ... for [racial] purposes.” Id. — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2823 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 524 (quoting Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 , 106 S.Ct. 2797 , 92 L.Ed.2d 85 (1986)) It then held that the appearance of the anomalous district boundaries was sufficient to state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause for racial gerrymandering.

Shaw held when districts are drawn in such an extremely irregular fashion as to be unexplainable, other than being based solely on race, a claim under the Equal Protection Clause for racial gerrymandering can be stated. Shaw , — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2832 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 536 . Redistrieting based solely on race affronts our sense of voter equality because it creates districts with residents who have little in common with each other except the color of their skin. It fails to take into account geographic and political boundaries, age, economic status, and the community in which the people live. Id. — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2827 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 529 . Redistrieting based solely on race assumes that members of the same race think alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates at the polls, not because of shared community interests, but only because of their skin pigmentation. It is the equivalent of political apartheid. When a district is drawn in such a manner that it rationally can only be understood as race-based, then a cause of action arises under the Equal Protection Clause. Id. — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2832 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 536 . Thus, if an allegation of deliberate and arbitrary redistrieting based solely on race is not contradicted by the State, then it must be determined whether the redistrieting plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Id.

The Court in Shaw specifically noted that “we express no view as to whether the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more, always gives rise to an equal protection claim. We hold only that on the facts of this case, plaintiffs have stated a claim sufficient to defeat the state appellees’ motion to dismiss.” Id. — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2822 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 530 (quotation omitted).

The narrow holding of Shaw is that “a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification.” Id. Shaw applies to redistrieting plans that on their face are so dramatically irregular that they can only be explained as attempts to segregate by the races for purposes of voting without regard for traditional redistrieting principles. Id. — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2823-24 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 525 .

The California redistrieting plan does not fit within the narrow holding of Shaw . As the California Supreme Court noted, the Masters’ Report sought to balance the many traditional redistrieting principles, including the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. Wilson, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 383 , 823 P.2d at 549 . No bizarre boundaries were created. The effort to comply with the Voting Rights Act emphasized geographical compactness, which “takes into account the presence or absence of a sense of community made possible by open lines of access and communication.” Id. This case, therefore, involves the constitutionality of a redistrieting plan that created majority-minority districts in a manner that was consistent with traditional redistrieting principles, not based solely on race, and not involving extremely irregular district boundaries. It involves the question left open by the Court in Shaw .

As the Court noted in Shaw ,

Id. — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2826 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 528 . Thus, in redistrieting, consciousness of race does not give rise to a claim of racial gerrymandering when race is considered along with traditional redistricting principles, such as compactness, contiguity, and political boundaries.

Redistrieting had been used to dilute minority voting power by spreading minority voters throughout different districts or packing minority voters into a single district. Id. — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2823 , 125 L.Ed.2d at 524 . It is this problem the Voting Rights Act sought to remedy. Consciousness of race in redistrieting through the creation of majority-minority districts, properly performed, alleviates this inequity. Thus, the Supreme Court has stated that

United Jewish Organizations, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168 , 97 S.Ct. 996, 1011 , 51 L.Ed.2d 229, 247 (1977).

The Masters did not draw district lines based deliberately and solely on race, with arbitrary distortions of district boundaries. The Masters, in formulating the redistrieting plan, properly looked at race, not as the sole criteria in drawing lines but as one of the many factors to be considered. We agree with the California Supreme Court that the Masters’ Report evidences a judicious and proper balancing of the many factors appropriate to redistrieting, one of which was the consideration of the application of the Voting Rights Act’s objective of assuring that minor ity voters are not denied the chance to effectively influence the political process.

The Masters’ Report carefully analyzed and reconciled the redistricting requirements of the State Constitution, the Reinecke case, and the Voting Rights Act. See Wilson, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 405-09 , app. I, 823 P.2d at 571-75 . In addition to the fundamental requirement of population equality, the Masters noted the state requirements of contiguity, geographic integrity, community of interest, and compactness. In discussing the application of the latter four traditional redistricting principles, the Masters’ Report states:

Id. 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 408-09 , 823 P.2d at 574-75 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In discussing the particular relationship of these criteria to the Voting Rights Act, the Masters’ Report states:

Id., 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 409 , 823 P.2d at 575 (citations omitted).

Adhering to their definitions of contiguity and compactness, the Masters refused to create districts that wound in snake-like fashion or resembled a “Rorschach inkblot test” found objectionable in Shaw . This is exemplified in the Masters’ refusal to create a district which ran along the Sierra Nevadas where no road exists and where populated areas were separated by 130 miles, and their refusal to “extend a long arm between the Richmond District and ‘Chinatown’ in order to bring these two areas into the same district.” Wilson, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 411-12 , 415 n. 44, 823 P.2d at 577-78 , 581 n. 44. The Masters noted that these were only two of the many examples of bizarrely shaped districts suggested to them, and that a cogent justification for any bizarre-shaped district would be necessary before they could recommend them. Id. 4 Cal.Rptr.2d at 411 n. 24, 823 P.2d at 577 n. 24. Thus, the Masters did not redistrict based solely on race, but showed depth and insight in considering race as a component of traditional redistricting principles.

We conclude that the Masters’ redistricting plan, as approved by the California Supreme Court, is not racial gerrymandering, but rather a thoughtful and fair example of applying traditional redistricting principles, while being conscious of race. Thus, we find that the plaintiffs have failed to state a claim of racial gerrymandering. We conclude that in the context of redistricting, where race is considered only in applying traditional redistricting principles along with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, that strict scrutiny is not required. However, if it were required, we conclude that this California redistricting plan has been narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that legislative reapportionment is primarily a matter for state determination. Most recently, in Voinovich v. Quilter, — U.S.-, -, 113 S.Ct. 1149, 1156-57 , 122 L.Ed.2d 500, 513 (1993), the Court stated:

Id. — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 1156, 122 L.Ed.2d at 513 (citations omitted). Unless the Voting Rights Act itself is found to be unconstitutional or unless the creation of majority-minority districts, in implementation of that Act, is found to be unconstitutional, it is difficult to see how' California’s carefully drawn plan, utilizing traditional redistricting principles, while seeking to comply with the requirements of the Voting Rights Act, can violate the Equal Protection Clause. We conclude that the redistricting plan adopted by the California Supreme Court appropriately balances the traditional reapportionment principles, does not involve racial gerrymandering, and does not violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.

The appellants also contend that the reapportionment plan violates the Equal Protection Clause by unduly minimizing white voter strength. The asserted basis for this contention is that even though the districts are equated as to population, the registered voters in the white majority districts far exceed those in the majority-minority districts, giving greater impact to a vote in the latter districts. There is no merit to this contention; population, not voter registration, is the appropriate basis for apportioning districts. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 , 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1385 , 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 531 (1964).

ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED and defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. The clerk is directed to enter judgment for the defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

. To the extent that Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F.Supp. 1188 (W.D.La.1993), gives a broader meaning to racial gerrymandering, we disagree.