The United States filed its complaint under Section 4 of the Sherman Act ( 15 U.S.C.A. § 4 ) seeking to prevent and restrain a continuing violation by defendants of Section 1 of the Act ( 15 U.S.C.A. § 1 ).

The defendant Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers Union, Local 626, is affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Ware-housemen and Helpers of America, and has its principal place of business in Los Angeles, California. Defendant Meyer Singer is business representative of the Union who actively managed and coordinated the affairs and acts of the grease peddler members of the Union. Defendants Lee Taylor, Hubert Brandt, Walter Klein and Harold Carlis are grease peddler members of the Union.

“Grease peddlers” are defined as independent businessmen who are in the business of buying, transporting and selling waste restaurant grease for their own account. These self-employed peddlers have no established place of business; no employees, except an occasional loader; no capital investment, except a small equity in a truck; no skill or special qualifications except the ability to load, unload and drive a truck. Grease peddlers drive from restaurant to restaurant picking up small amounts of waste grease in cans and, on the same day, transport and unload the entire collection to one of the processing companies. Their earnings represent the difference between the buy and sell price of the waste grease, diminished by the cost of maintaining and operating the truck.

The processing companies who buy the waste restaurant grease from the peddlers then convert it into yellow grease, which they sell either directly to buyers in foreign countries or to buyers in California for shipment to foreign countries. Therefore, any restraint on or disruption in, or interference with, the purchase of waste restaurant grease by peddlers and its sales to processors, and any suppression or elimination of competition in the purchase and sale of waste grease by processors from peddlers, necessarily and directly restrains and affects the flow of yellow grease in foreign commerce.

Prior to 1954, the grease peddlers of Los Angeles were not members of, or in any way affiliated with, any labor union. However, in the fall of 1954, the defendant Singer, a business agent of defendant Union, and certain grease peddlers, caused most of the grease peddlers in Los Angeles County to become members of defendant Union. In soliciting their membership, Union representatives, including defendant Singer, proposed the following general plan: The Union would increase the profits of the grease peddlers by increasing the margin between the prices paid by said peddlers for restaurant grease and the prices they would be paid by processors; grease peddlers would be prevented from soliciting or buying grease from the accounts of other peddlers; the processors would be required to deal only with those grease peddlers who were members in good standing of the Union; and unless grease peddlers became members of the Union, they would have no place to sell their restaurant grease and would be forced out of business.

In October 1954, a majority of grease peddlers in Los Angeles County, including defendants Taylor, Brandt, Klein and Carlis, joined the defendant Union, thereby agreeing to make operative the plan outlined by defendant Singer and other Union representatives.

During the period between October 1954 and May 27, 1959 (the period covered by the complaint), there were in Los Angeles County about 40 to 50 grease peddlers, 35 to 45 of whom were members of defendant Union. After April 1955, these grease peddlers held their membership in a subdivision of the Union known as Local 626-B.

During this same period, there were in Los Angeles County eight processors of yellow grease, six of which acquired all or most of their waste grease from grease peddlers.

The parties filed a stipulation providing that seventy-two facts set forth therein were admitted, required no proof and should be accepted by the court as being true for purposes of the instant action. These facts relate in detail the plan and the activities of the defendants, and support fully the allegations of the complaint that defendants were guilty of price-fixing and elimination of competition in the gathering and sale of waste grease in the Los Angeles area.

It is further stipulated:

In the instant case, the facts contained in the stipulation show that neither of these conditions for the proper joinder of independent contractors with a labor union, is present.

The members of defendant Union (Los Angeles Meat and Provision Drivers Union, Local 626) are truck drivers engaged in loading, unloading and transporting meat and meat products for packing houses and related employers. Every processor of yellow grease in the Los Angeles area has employees who are members of the defendant Union.

The grease peddler defendants are independent, self-employed businessmen who purchase.waste grease from restaurants and other institutions, and then transport the grease in their own trucks to the processing companies, to whom they sell the grease.

These facts do not show that there is competition between the peddlers and the union employees of the processors. On the contrary, there is no competition between these groups because each is engaged in a different line' of work, the peddlers buying grease, transporting and selling it to the processors, and the union members performing other functions for their employers (the processors).

The defendant Union solicited the membership of the peddler defendants not for the purpose of raising the wages and working conditions of the peddlers and the union employees of the processors, but for the sole purpose of increasing the income of the peddlers alone, and enabling the Union, the peddlers and the processors to control the business of purchasing and selling waste grease in the Los Angeles area.

In United States v. Fish Smokers Trade Council, Inc., D.C.S.D.N.Y.1960, 183 F.Supp. 227 , which is quite similar on its facts to the instant case, the court concluded 'that the jobbers (independent businessmen) were not a proper subject of unionization because, regardless of how the jobbers were characterized, there was no competition between them and the union employees.

The Fish Smokers case involved a suit under Section 4 of the Sherman Act to prevent and restrain continuing violations by defendants of Section 1 of the Act. There, the defendant Union had a total membership of about 700, of which about 75 were jobbers (the counterpart of the peddlers here) who purchased fish from smokehouses for resale to customers. The remaining members of the defendant Union were true employees, a number of whom performed the same function in their capacity as employees of the employer smokehouses, i. e., the employees delivered the fish from the smokehouses to wholesale or retail outlets. The jobbers had joined the Union because of an agreement between the Union and the smokehouses providing that the latter would not sell fish to jobbers who were not Union members. This agreement the Union enforced by threats of strikes against smokehouses refusing to boycott non-Union jobbers.

Under these facts, the court concluded that the jobbers were not properly Union members, stating at pages 234 and 235 of 183 F.Supp.:

Thus, the rationale of the court in the Fish Smokers case, supra, appears to substantiate the inference drawn from the two Supreme Court cases discussed earlier, namely, that the membership of so-called “independent contractors” in a labor union is not proper unless the purpose of the membership is to secure better wages and working conditions for all union members through the elimination of competition caused by the fact that the independent contractor and the union employees perform the same function.

However, the true significance of the Fish Smokers case is not that it merely states the circumstances under which independent contractors may not properly be forced into a union. Rather, the real importance of this decision lies in the fact that it indicates the result of such a misalliance, which is that the union and the independent contractors have put together a combination in restraint of trade, in violation of the Sherman Act. The court makes this clear by stating at page 229 of 183 F.Supp.:

and again at page 234:

Defendant peddlers and the defendant Union’s employees in this case did not compete with each other. Therefore, the peddlers are not a labor group and are not the proper subject of unionization. Moreover, in this case the peddlers were taken into the defendant Union for the purpose of raising their income and enabling the Union, the peddlers and the processors to put together a combination to control the business of buying and selling waste grease in the Los Angeles area, thereby restraining foreign commerce in yellow grease in violation of the Sherman Act.

Defendants contend that it is not possible to grant the relief sought by plaintiff because of Section 6 of the Clayton Act [ 15 U.S.C.A. § 17 ] and Section 4 (b) of the Norris-La Guardia Act [29 U. S.C.A. § 104(b)] .

It has long been settled law that neither the Clayton Act nor the Norris-La Guardia Act permits labor unions to combine with other, non-labor groups for the purpose of monopolizing trade in violation of the Sherman Act. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 1945, 325 U.S. 797 , 65 S.Ct. 1533 , 89 L.Ed. 1939 ; Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 1942, 315 U.S. 143 , 62 S.Ct. 520 , 86 L. Ed. 750 .

In Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, supra, the Electrical Workers Union and its members, prompted by the desire to get and hold jobs for themselves at good wages and under high working standards, combined with employers and manufacturers of electrical equipment to restrain competition in, and to monopolize the marketing of, electrical equipment. The Supreme Court held that the Union’s activities constituted a violation of the Sherman Act, despite the provisions of the Clayton and Norris-La Guardia Acts. In this regard, the court made the following pertinent observations at pages 809 and 810 of 325 U.S., at page 1539 of 65 S.Ct.:

Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 1942, 315 U.S. 143 , 62 S.Ct. 520 , 86 L.Ed. 750 , is another instance where the Supreme Court held that injunctive relief was not barred by the Norris-La Guardia Act, when a violation of the Sherman Act was involved.

In the instant case, Section 6 of the Clayton Act ( 15 U.S.C.A. § 17 , supra) does not sanction the alliance of the peddler defendants and the defendant Union, because such alliance was not formed for the purpose of “mutual help”, but rather for the purpose of enabling the peddlers, the Union and the processors together to obtain control of the waste grease trade in the Los Angeles area, with consequent restrictions upon the free flow of yellow grease in foreign commerce. As stated in the Allen Bradley case, supra, Congress did not intend to permit violations of the Sherman Act to go unpunished merely because a labor union is one of the parties to the unlawful combination condemned by that Act.

Nor does the Norris-La Guardia Act furnish refuge for the defendants. The strikes and picketing here involved are not “labor disputes” within the meaning of the Act: for these disputes grew out of the refusal of some of the processors to buy waste grease only from Union peddlers, and in no way related to the improvement of wages or working conditions of the Union members. The instant case is clearly parallel to the Columbia Packers case, supra, in that the disputes centered about the processors’ purchase of a commodity (waste grease), and in nowise related to the employer-employee relationship. Therefore, Section 4(b) of the Norris-La Guardia Act ( 29 U.S.C.A. § 104 (b), supra) does not prohibit the issuance of a decree which would terminate the membership of grease peddlers in defendant Union.

Defendants assert that this court cannot frame a decree compelling defendant Union to oust its grease peddler members, because such a decree would violate due process by abrogating the contract rights of those who are not parties to the within proceeding.

Defendants’ argument runs thus: The defendant Union is affiliated with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Warehousemen. Both the defendant Union and other unions affiliated with the International Brotherhood, have peddler members. Since neither the International Brotherhood nor its other affiliated unions are parties to this action, a decree of this court ordering the ouster of grease peddlers from the defendant Union would violate due process by abrogating the contracts between the absent unions and their peddler members.

To state this argument is to refute it: for how can a decree ordering the defendant Union to expel its grease peddler members possibly affect the contracts between other unions in the International Brotherhood and their peddler members ?

In support of their contention, defendants cite Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. N. L. R. B., 1938, 305 U.S. 197 , 59 S.Ct. 206 , 83 L.Ed. 126 and N. L. R. B. v. Sterling Electric Motors, 9 Cir., 1940, 112 F.2d 63 . In both of these cases the issue under consideration was whether the National Labor Relations Board had jurisdiction to enter orders affecting vital •rights of union members without first giving the union notice or an opportunity to be heard.

This issue is not pertinent in the instant case: for here, the decree terminating the peddlers’ membership in the Union would be rendered by a court of the United States and not by an administrative agency, such as the National Labor Relations Board. Furthermore, such a decree would be rendered only after having given the interested parties (Local Union 626, including its grease peddler members) a full hearing. Surely it cannot be seriously contended that the International Brotherhood and its other affiliated unions are “interested parties” to a decree which would terminate only the membership of grease peddlers in Local 626, and would in nowise affect the membership of other peddlers in Local 626, or of grease peddlers or any species of peddlers in any other union affiliated with the International Brotherhood.

The mandatory injunction sought by plaintiff would embody a provision that the Union be ordered to terminate the membership of peddlers in' said Union and be perpetually enjoined from accepting peddlers as members thereof, unless they become bona fide employees.

Defendants argue that such a mandatory provision is too vague and broad because it would expel from defendant Union not only the 30 or 40 grease peddler members, but in addition all of the Union’s 500 or 600 peddler members.

The term “peddlers” as used throughout this action is defined by sub-paragraph 15, Paragraph IV of the complaint (page 3) as “persons who are self-employed entrepreneurs engaged in the business of buying and selling restaurant grease for their own account from restaurants, hotels, and institutions, transporting said grease in trucks owned or operated by themselves to the plants of processors, and selling such restaurant grease to said processors.”

Such a definition certainly excludes all peddler members of defendant Union who deal in any commodity other than waste restaurant grease. Therefore, a decree compelling defendant Union to oust peddlers from its ranks would not be too vague or too broad because it would not affect the membership of any but the grease peddlers, whose activities as Union members are stipulated to have contributed to the violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.

However, any remaining doubt as to which Union members would be reached by the mandatory injunction, would be quickly dispelled simply by inserting the adjective “grease” before the noun “peddlers” in the final form of the injunction.

Defendants next argue that the proposed mandatory injunction is punitive because the expulsion of grease peddlers from defendant Union is not necessary in order to insure against possible future violations of the Sherman Act by defendants.

In antitrust cases, it is the duty of the court to frame its decree so as to suppress the unlawful practices and to take such reasonable measures as will preclude their revival. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 1944, 323 U.S. 173 , 65 S.Ct. 254 , 89 L.Ed. 160 ; Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 1940, 309 U.S. 436 , 60 S.Ct. 618 , 84 L.Ed. 852 .

Accordingly, in recent years the Supreme Court has, upon at least three occasions, approved antitrust decrees providing for dissolution or divestiture in order to put an end to combinations whose activities violated the Sherman Act. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. v. United States, 1959, 358 U. S. 242 , 79 S.Ct. 245 , 3 L.Ed.2d 270 ; Schine Chain Theatres v. United States, 1948, 334 U.S. 110 , 68 S.Ct. 947 , 92 L. Ed. 1245 ; United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 1944, 323 U.S. 173 , 65 S.Ct. 254 , 89 L.Ed. 160 .

In International Boxing Club v. United States, supra, the District Court, 150 F. Supp. 397 , found, as the Government had charged, that defendants had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to restrain interstate trade and commerce in, and by monopolizing, the promotion, broadcasting and televising of world championship boxing contests. After further hearings on the nature and extent of the relief necessary to protect the public interest, the District Court entered a final judgment dissolving the international boxing clubs, directing the individual defendants to divest themselves of their stock in Madison Square Garden, and granting injunctive relief designed to open up the market in the business of promoting professional world championship boxing matches.

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the relief granted was not beyond the allowable discretion of the District Court.

In United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., supra the United States brought civil suit against nine affiliated companies operating motion picture theaters throughout five States, and against eight major distributors of motion pictures, charging them with conspiracy to restrain interstate trade and commerce in motion picture films and to monopolize the exhibition of films in violation of §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The District Court found that certain of the defendants had violated the Act, and entered a decree which required, among other things, that the corporate exhibí tors divest themselves of ownership of stock or any other interest in any other ■corporate defendant, and that certain corporate officers resign from their positions. The Supreme Court affirmed the ■divestiture and resignation provisions of the decree.

In the instant case, the stipulated facts clearly show that before the grease peddlers joined the defendant Union, there was no suppression of competition among them, and that only the support of the Union and the powerful weapons at its command enabled the peddlers and the Union together to destroy free competition in the purchase and sale of waste grease, and to drive several processors •out of business.

As long as this association of the peddlers and the Union continues, there is danger that their combined activities will be revived and that further suppression ■of competition in the yellow grease industry will result. To borrow the language of the Supreme Court in the Crescent Amusement Co. case, supra, “The ■proclivity in the past to use that affiliation for an unlawful end warrants effective assurance that no such opportunity will be available in the future.” [ 323 U.S. 173 , 65 S.Ct. 262 .]

Therefore, far from being punitive, a decree terminating the member.ship of the grease peddlers in defendant Union appears to be the most effective, if not the only, means of preventing a ■recurrence of defendants’ unlawful activities.

The decree shall include a provision ordering defendant Union to terminate the membership of its grease peddler members, and perpetually enjoining the Union from accepting grease peddlers as members unless they become bona fide employees. It shall also enjoin the peddler defendants from holding membership in .and participating in the affairs of the Union, unless they become bona fide employees.

Counsel for plaintiffs is directed to prepare, serve and lodge findings and judgment in accordance with local rule 7, West’s Ann.Code.

. Title 15 U.S.C.A. “§ 17. Antitrust laws not applicable to labor organizations “Tlie labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.” . Title 29 U.S.O.A. “§ 104. Enumeration of specific acts not subject to restraining orders or injunctions “No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are heroin defined) from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts: * * * * * “(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise as described in section 103 of this title;”