22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4a9,MEMORANDUM Mary Csanyi appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment awarding her damages on her claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) following our remand vacating the district court’s judgment for defendant Supercuts on this claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review for clear error the district court’s computation of damages, Amantea-Cabrera v. Potter, 279 F.3d 746, 750 (9th Cir.2002), and we affirm. The district court did not clearly err in its calculation of damages based on the evidence presented at the bench trial. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (a)(1)(A) (setting forth damages available under the FMLA). The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that a second trial on damages was not warranted. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 551 , 103 S.Ct. 2541 , 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983) (“On remand, the decision on whether to reopen the record [on damages] should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”). Csanyi’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T4e0,

MEMORANDUM

Mary Csanyi appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment awarding her damages on her claim under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) following our remand vacating the district court’s judgment for defendant Supercuts on this claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review for clear error the district court’s computation of damages, Amantea-Cabrera v. Potter, 279 F.3d 746, 750 (9th Cir.2002), and we affirm.

The district court did not clearly err in its calculation of damages based on the evidence presented at the bench trial. See 29 U.S.C. § 2617 (a)(1)(A) (setting forth damages available under the FMLA).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that a second trial on damages was not warranted. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Pfeifer, 462 U.S. 523, 551 , 103 S.Ct. 2541 , 76 L.Ed.2d 768 (1983) (“On remand, the decision on whether to reopen the record [on damages] should be left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”).

Csanyi’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.