Aranda v. Commissioner Social Security Administration

FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION NOV 30 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U.S . CO U RT OF AP PE A LS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

STEPHANIE ARANDA, the beneficiary No. 09-35774 of the claim of Linda Clarµ, deceased; LINDA CLARK, DC No. 3:08-cv-0340 MA

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

MEMORANDUM *

v.

COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY

ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon Malcolm F. Marsh, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted October 7, 2010** Portland, Oregon

Before: TASHIMA, PAEZ, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. ** The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C). Stephanie Aranda, daughter of Linda Clarµ, appeals the final decision of the

Commissioner of Social Security denying Clarµ's application for disability

insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C.…

MEMORANDUM **

Stephanie Aranda, daughter of Linda Clark, appeals the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Clark’s application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 , and we reverse and remand for the calculation and payment of benefits.

Aranda contends that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) improperly rejected the opinions of Clark’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Suckow, in favor of the opinion of a non-treating psychologist, Dr. Stoltzfus. We agree. If a treating physician’s opinion is contradicted by other substantial evidence, such as the opinion of an examining physician, it may be rejected only for specific and legitimate reasons supported by substantial evidence. Lester v. Chater, *141 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.1995). Here, the ALJ relied heavily on Dr. Stoltzfus’ summary of Clark’s Minnesota Multi Phasic Inventory (“MMPI”) results, but failed to account for the fact that the MMPI was administered to Clark four and one-half years after her date last insured. While the time lapse does not render Dr. Stoltzfus’ findings irrelevant, it detracts from their weight in a…

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The ALJ gave specific and legitimate reasons, supported by substantial evidence, to discredit the opinion of Clark’s treating psychiatrist, Dr. Suckow, in favor of the opinion of Dr. Stoltzfus. See Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.1995). The ALJ incorporated by reference his January 30, 2004 *142 decision denying Clark benefits. In that decision, the ALJ offered a host of specific and legitimate reasons to discredit Dr. Suekow’s opinion. Those reasons were supported by the record and are not discussed by the majority.

The majority expresses concern that the ALJ failed to acknowledge that Dr. Stoltzfus examined Clark four-and-a-half years after her date last insured. The majority does not extend similar concern, however, to the fact that Dr. Suckow did not begin treating Clark until July 1999, more than four years after her initial alleged onset date of March 31, 1995, such that the claimant’s evidence was subject to the same criticism. In that context, the failure of the ALJ to discuss the time lapse was not so surprising. More importantly, the claimant does not contend that Clark’s condition improved prior to the examination by Dr.…