Bonnetta

Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: “The judge . . . may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.” 1 The discretion thereby conferred on the trial courts includes the discretion to dismiss or strike an enhancement in the furtherance of justice. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ]; People v. Thomas (1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 209 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 , 841 P.2d 159 ].) But whether the decision is to dismiss the entire action or, as here, only an enhancement *146 allegation, Penal Code section 1385 requires that the reasons for the dismissal be set forth “in an order entered upon the minutes.” (Id., subd. (a).) Here they were not.

A century of judicial decision, looking to the Legislature’s intent in enacting Penal Code section 1385, has construed its provisions to be “mandatory,” so that an order of dismissal is ineffective in the absence of a written statement of reasons entered upon the minutes. Despite the multitude of decisions adopting this construction, defendants…

Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a), requires that the reasons for a trial court’s dismissal of a criminal action “be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes.” (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.) This court has said that this legislative directive is mandatory and that noncompliance results in an automatic reversal of the trial court’s judgment. (People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 531 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ]; People v. Orin (1975) 13 Cal.3d 937, 944 [ 120 Cal.Rptr. 65 , 533 P.2d 193 ].) Such reversal is required even when, as occurred here, the trial court’s reasons for the dismissal, though not stated in a minute order, are expressed in open court and recorded in a transcript of the proceeding. (People v. Superior Court (Romero), supra, at p. 531, citing the Court of Appeal’s decision in People v. Beasley (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 617, 637 [ 85 Cal.Rptr. 501 ]; People v. Orin, supra, at p. 944 , citing Beasley and also citing People v. Winters (1959) 171 Cal.App.2d Supp. 876, 881-882 [ 342 P.2d 538 ].) 1

In this case, the Court of Appeal pointed out that strict adherence to this rule can be a waste of judicial time…

Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a) provides in relevant part: "The judge . . . may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed." [1] The discretion thereby conferred on the trial courts includes the discretion to dismiss or strike an enhancement in the furtherance of justice. ( People v. Superior Court ( Romero ) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497, 504 [ 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 789 , 917 P.2d 628 ]; People v. Thomas (1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 209 [ 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 174 , 841 P.2d 159 ].) But whether the decision is to dismiss the entire action or, as here, only an enhancement allegation, Penal Code section 1385 requires that the reasons for the dismissal be set forth "in an order entered upon the minutes." ( Id., subd. (a).) Here they were not.

(1) A century of judicial decision, looking to the Legislature's intent in enacting Penal Code section 1385, has construed its provisions to be "mandatory," so that an order of dismissal is ineffective in the absence of a written statement of reasons entered upon the minutes. Despite the multitude of decisions adopting this construction,…