22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4a4,MEMORANDUM Arizona state prisoner Johnny Ray Washington appeals from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c), and we affirm. Washington contends that the prosecutor in his first trial intended to provoke the defense into moving for a mistrial and that, consequently, his retrial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment. Washington’s contention is not supported by the record. Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (“[o]nly where the governmental conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion”). AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T4d1,

MEMORANDUM

Arizona state prisoner Johnny Ray Washington appeals from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (c), and we affirm.

Washington contends that the prosecutor in his first trial intended to provoke the defense into moving for a mistrial and that, consequently, his retrial violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the 5th Amendment. Washington’s contention is not supported by the record. Accordingly, the state court’s decision was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court law, or an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d); see also Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (“[o]nly where the governmental conduct in question is intended to ‘goad’ the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion”).

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.