Adam Shelton, Jr. v. Mike Knowles
Opinion
lead Opinion
MEMORANDUM *
Appellant-Petitioner Adam Shelton, Jr., appeals the district court’s denial of habeas relief. Shelton was convicted of grand theft and burglary and was sentenced under California’s three-strikes law to thirty-one years to life in prison. Shelton argues that there was constitutionally insufficient evidence to convict him, that his right to present a defense was violated when he was not allowed to present evidence of his recidivism to the jury, and that his sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(c) and we affirm.
I. RELEVANT FACTS
A few minutes before closing on April 20, 2004, an alarm sounded at a CompUSA store, indicating that the rear emergency exit door had been opened. Two employees, Richard Robinson and Kevin Fuller, went out the rear emergency exit door, which had been propped open. Robinson saw Shelton peek above the dumpster. He recognized Shelton as a customer who he had seen in the store some minutes earlier but had not seen leave through the front door.
As Shelton began walking away, Robinson and Fuller followed him, telling him to stop so they could talk to him. Shelton continued to walk…
concurrence Opinion
Rawlinson, J.
concurring:
I concur in the result.
Opinion
facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.' 28 U.S.C. y
2254(d). Under AEDPA, an unreasonable application of law is not merely clearly
erroneous; it is 'objectively unreasonable.' Locµyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63,
75-76 (2003).
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Shelton claims that his due process rights were violated because there was
insufficient evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could have found him
3 guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged crimes. Shelton argues that the
state court unreasonably applied Jacµson v. Virginia, in which the Supreme Court
held that evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction as long as,
'after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.' 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 'After AEDPA,' we apply 'the
standards of Jacµson with an additional layer of deference.' Juan H. v. Allen, 408
F.3d 1262, 1274 (9th Cir. 2005).