United States v. Guy Savage

MEMORANDUM *

Guy William Savage appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to three counts of armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (a) and (d), and two counts of bank robbery, in violation of § 2113(a). We affirm.

1. Savage’s appeal waiver bars our review of his argument that the district court failed to comply with two procedural rules imposed by Rule 32(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Savage expressly waived his right to appeal “the manner in which [his] sentence [was] determined.” This language plainly encompasses the district court’s alleged errors under Rule 32(i)(l)(A) and (i)(4)(A)(ii). See United States v. Baramdyka, 95 F.3d 840, 843 (9th Cir.1996) (“In reviewing a waiver of appeal, we ... focus ... upon the language of the waiver to determine its scope.”). United States v. Petty, 80 F.3d 1384 (9th Cir.1996), upon which Savage relies, is distinguishable. As Petty explains, the scope of a plea agreement turns on the intent on the parties. See id. at 1387 . Here, in contrast to Petty, the language of the agreement refers to the manner in which the sentence was determined. It thus expressly covers the errors that Savage seeks to…

concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that an appeal waiver applies prospectively to a district court’s unforeseeable post-waiver errors. I would follow United States v. Petty, 80 F.3d 1384 (9th Cir.1996), and remand for resentencing because Savage’s personal right of allocution under Rule 32 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was not honored before sentence was rendered. It does not matter that Savage had submitted a letter and that after the sentence he thanked the court. The right personally to allocute before issuance of the sentence is a bedrock requirement of Rule 32, and is explicitly mandated by Rule 32(1)(4). It may seem like a waste of time to resentence and permit the defendant to be present and speak at his sentencing, when the sentencing judge may be likely to reimpose the same reasonable sentence. However, the principle of permitting allocution is an important one and I would not disregard it. When the defendant exercises a right to speak to the court, there is always the chance of a judicial change of mind, and further when the court addresses the defendant the court’s words may have important…

FILED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION DEC 20 2010

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS U .S . CO UR T OF AP PE A LS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 09-50456

Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. 8:05-cr-00139-CJC-1

v.

MEMORANDUM *

GUY WILLIAM SAVAGE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Cormac J. Carney, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted September 1, 2010 Pasadena, California

Before: O'SCANNLAIN, FISHER and GOULD, Circuit Judges.

Guy William Savage appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea

to three counts of armed banµ robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. y 2113(a) and (d),

and two counts of banµ robbery, in violation of y 2113(a). We affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. 1. Savage's appeal waiver bars our review of his argument that the

district court failed to comply with two procedural rules imposed by Rule 32(i) of

the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Savage…