MEMORANDUM

William McGrann appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his diversity action arising from Federal Insurance Company’s denial of his disability insurance claim. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo, Learned v. City of Bellevue, 860 F.2d 928, 931 (9th Cir.1988), and we affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment on McGrann’s breach of contract claim because he failed to raise a triable issue as to whether his wrist injuries from using his computer mouse were the result of an “accident” and therefore covered by the insurance policy. See Williams v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 158 Cal.App.3d 229 , 204 Cal.Rptr. 453, 456 (Ct.App.1984) (rejecting argument that the term “accident,” for insurance coverage purposes, includes an injury due to a commonplace act); see also Gin v. Pennsylvania Life Ins. Co., 134 Cal.App.4th 939 , 36 Cal.Rptr.3d 571, 574 (Ct.App.2005) (rejecting accidental disability claim for carpal tunnel syndrome because “a disability that is the culmination of repetitive stresses caused by the insured’s normal, everyday activities is not the result of an ‘accidental bodily injury* and therefore does not fall within the coverage of the policy”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on McGrann’s common counts claim because McGrann failed to raise a triable issue as to whether Federal Insurance Company was indebted to him, because the company properly denied his insurance claim. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Zerin, 53 Cal.App.4th 445 , 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 707, 715 (Ct.App.1997) (stating elements of common counts claim).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on McGrann’s fraud claim based on Federal Insurance Company’s alleged oral misrepresentation because McGrann failed to raise a triable issue as to whether he was justified in believing that he had purchased an insurance policy guaranteeing him a $1.5 million payment. See Lazar v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.4th 631 , 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 377 , 909 P.2d 981, 984 (1996) (fraud claim requires “justifiable reliance”).

We do not consider McGrann’s contentions raised for the first time on appeal. See Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Conocophillips Co., 546 F.3d 1142, 1146 (9th Cir.2008).

McGrann’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

We deny McGrann’s request for sanctions.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.