22:I[98912,["/_next/static/chunks/0asocxi83kb~5.js","/_next/static/chunks/0n4z.7yu76je-.js","/_next/static/chunks/0eyt_ou8dj52g.js","/_next/static/chunks/01bcia3bjqt9z.js","/_next/static/chunks/15egrlmmf_yst.js"],"CaseDetailGate"] 23:T4fc,MEMORANDUM Lois Zells appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her action challenging the Secretary’s denial of reimbursement for hearing aids under the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 , et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 699 (9th Cir.2007). We affirm. The district court properly dismissed the action because, under the plain language of the statute, hearing aids are not covered by Medicare. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(7) (excluding from coverage “hearing aids or examinations therefor”); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 , 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). Contrary to Zells’s contention, there is no support for the argument that Congress intended to deny coverage only for “routine” hearing aids. Zells’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive. AFFIRMED. This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.24:T52e,

MEMORANDUM

Lois Zells appeals pro se from the district court’s order dismissing her action challenging the Secretary’s denial of reimbursement for hearing aids under the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 , et seq. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 . We review de novo the district court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim. Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d 697, 699 (9th Cir.2007). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed the action because, under the plain language of the statute, hearing aids are not covered by Medicare. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(7) (excluding from coverage “hearing aids or examinations therefor”); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 , 104 S.Ct. 2778 , 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (“If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”). Contrary to Zells’s contention, there is no support for the argument that Congress intended to deny coverage only for “routine” hearing aids.

Zells’s remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.