STATEMENT OF DECISION ON DEBTOR’S MOTION TO AVOID LIEN

This matter came on for hearing on Debtor’s motion to avoid the non-possesso-ry, non-purchase money lien of Orange County Credit Union in a 2001 Mercedes Benz automobile. Prior to the hearing the court published its tentative decision, which is incorporated herein by reference and is repeated verbatim below:

There are lines of cases on both sides of this issue . Of particular interest is In re McNutt, 87 B.R. 84 (9th Cir. BAP 1988), where the Ninth Circuit BAP decided that a truck used in the debtor’s drywall business was a “tool of the trade” and thus eligible for the lien avoidance provisions of § 522(f). The Ninth Circuit BAP went to some lengths to distinguish and criticize the 7th Circuit in In re Patterson, 825 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir.1987) and noted that the issue is both a factual and a legal one. McNutt, 87 B.R. at 87 . The Court, however, is not prepared to go as far as this debtor wants here for two reasons:

At the invitation of the court, the parties have submitted their further briefs. After reviewing the briefs and carefully considering the matter, the Court is persuaded that its decision as announced in the tentative was correct for not only those reasons but further, as discussed below. It must be remembered that 11 U.S.C. § 522 (f) does not purport to govern what may be claimed as exempt in an opt-out state such as California. Rather, it provides that if certain kinds of property are validly claimed as exempt, then to the extent that those items also meet the narrowly-defined categories of property set forth in § 522(f), the non-possessory, non-purchase money liens thereon may be avoided within certain limits. One enumerated category in § 522(f)(l)(B)(ii) is “tools of the trade of the debtor....” On debtor’s Schedule “C,” she does not specifically claim “tools of the trade,” nor does she even invoke one of California’s versions of this phrase which is slightly different, found at CCP § 704.060(a)(1), i.e.:

Rather, debtor invokes the “grubstake” found at CCP § 703.140(b)(5) which affords a floating exemption “in any property” up to the unused portion of the homestead exemption found in (b)(1) of the same section. Specifically and separately enumerated are subsections (b)(6) which affords $1,750 in “tools of the trade” and (b)(2) another separate sum “in one motor vehicle.”

But particularly noteworthy is that the CCP § 703.140(b) schedule of exemptions may be elected “in lieu of all other exemptions provided by this chapter ...” CCP § 703.140(a). The reference to an automobile under California law exemptible if used “in the exercise of the trade, business or profession ...” appears in another portion entirely of the California exemptions chapter, i.e. Article 3 at § 704.060, and so is therefore outside of the grubstake. So, even under California’s scheme, a debtor may elect the grubstake (as debtor did here) but not simultaneously the generous definition at § 704.060 which readily accepts a “commercial” motor vehicle as a property “used in the exercise of the trade, business or profession.” This is not mere mincing of words. Rather, this discussion is intended to highlight that even under California law, the grubstake, “motor vehicle,” “tools of the trade,” all found in § 703.140(b) and “commercial motor vehicle ... used in the exercise of a trade, business or profession” found at § 704.060, are separately defined, have separate meanings, represent separate and distinct approaches to exemptions and are not necessarily interchangeable.

But even more persuasive to the Court is the rather narrow definition found in the federal statute at 11 U.S.C. § 522 (f)(1)(B). Although “tools of the trade” are specifically described at subsection (ii), “motor vehicles” conspicuously are not found anywhere within the lien avoidance subsections. This is noteworthy in that “motor vehicles” are specifically called out at other places in the statute, for example at § 522(d)(2). This implies to the Court that motor vehicles were specifically not within the contemplation of Congress when considering non-possessory, non-purchase money lien avoidance. See In re Harrell, 72 B.R. 107, 110-11 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1987). It deserves repeating; this is not a question of what property may be exempted, which in opt-out states clearly is a question of the state’s separate definitions. Rather, it is a question of what subset of exempti-ble property may also be the subject of lien avoidance, which requires an interpretation of the federal statutory language. The Court is persuaded that Congress did not intend to extend this power to avoiding liens on automobiles. When added to the legislative history discussed in the tentative regarding the purposes behind avoiding liens in tools of the trade [see ELR.Rep. No. 95-595, at 127-27, cited in Harrell 72 B.R. at 111 ], it becomes clear to the Court that the tentative was correct.

Therefore, the motion to avoid the non-possessory, non-purchase money lien in the vehicle is denied. As necessary, this statement of decision shall also serve as findings in the case. Orange County Credit Union is directed to submit an order consistent with this decision.

. Among those cases holding or acknowledging that a motor vehicle (or motorized farm machinery) may in some instances be a tool of the trade under 11 U.S.C. § 522 (d)(6), 11 U.S.C. § 522 (f)(2)(B), or applicable state law, are: In re LaFond, 791 F.2d 623 (8th Cir.1986); In re Smith, 68 B.R. 581 (Bankr.D.Minn.1986); In re Weinstein, 44 B.R. 987 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1984); In re Dempsey, 39 B.R. 561 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1984); In re Schneider, 37 B.R. 747 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1984); In re Langley, 21 B.R. 772 (Bankr.D.Me.1982); In re Reed, 18 B.R. 1009 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1982); In re Dillon, 18 B.R. 252 (Bankr.E.D.Cal.1982); In re Eagan, 16 B.R. 439 (Bankr.N.D.N.Y.1982); In re Goosey, 10 B.R. 285 (Bankr.D.Neb.1981); In re Damron, 5 B.R. 357 (Bankr.W.D.Ky. 1980); In re Dubrock, 5 B.R. 353 (Bankr.W.D.Ky.1980); and In re Meyers, 2 B.R. 603 (Bankr.E.D.Mich.1980). Among those cases holding or opining that a motor vehicle or motorized farm machinery is by definition not a tool of the trade are: In re Patterson, 825 F.2d 1140 (7th Cir.1987); In re Nowak, 48 B.R. 290 (W.D.Wis.1984); In re Harrell, 72 B.R. 107 (Bankr.N.D.Ala.1987); In re Trainer, 56 B.R. 21 (Bankr.S.D.Tx.1985); In re Ramey, 45 B.R. 562 (Bankr.W.D.Va. 1984); In re Curry, 18 B.R. 358 (Bankr.N.D.Ga.1982); In re Steele, 8 B.R. 94 (Bankr.S.D.1980); and In re Sweeney, 7 B.R. 814 (Bankr.E.D.Wis.1980) (dicta).