ORDER ON MOTION FOR SANCTIONS UNDER 11 U.S.C. § 362 (h)

On September 26, 1985 debtor John Pe-truceelli filed his petition for relief under Chapter 13. His principal debts were tax obligations, the bulk of which were owed to the IRS for income taxes from 1974-1984, and for certain withholding taxes for 1980-1985. Debtor is a practicing attorney. The precipitating events for his bankruptcy filing involved seizures by the State of California of debtor’s business and trust accounts, foreclosure on his home, and the freezing of certain assets by the IRS.

Debtor proposed his plan on October 11, 1985 to pay $1,800 per month to the trustee and a resulting dividend to unsecured credi tors of 50%. The plan was confirmed by order filed January 10, 1986. Debtor thereafter substantially performed under the plan.

On April 27, 1989 debtor filed a pleading styled “Ex Parte Motion for Order to Show Cause Why the Internal Revenue Service Should be Held (sic) in Contempt and for Release of Post-Petition Levy and for Sanctions Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 362 (H)”. Debtor has alleged that the IRS caused a levy to be made on debtor’s business checking account on April 24, 1989, which debtor contends is an act in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362 .

This Court declined to consider the motion ex parte, but set it for hearing the next day. At that hearing the Court directed that the levy would stand until further order, but the bank was to disburse no funds in the interim. The Court set an evidentiary hearing for June 29, 1989, to take evidence on whether the funds in the account levied upon were “property of the estate.”

At the evidentiary hearing several facts were established. The taxes sought by the IRS levy were post-petition obligations for 1986 and 1987. The funds levied upon were account funds earned post-petition by the debtor. Those account funds were also the source for debtor’s payments to the Chapter 13 trustee. Indeed, the IRS agreed to release $1,800 from its levy so debtor could make his plan payment before the hearing. Following the hearing and supplemental briefing, this Court took the matter under submission. This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and General Order 312-D of the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2)(A), (0).

Section 362(a) of Title 11, United States Code, provides in pertinent part:

As courts have regularly recognized, the automatic stay operates in three specific ways. It “bars certain actions against the (1) debtor, (2) property of the debtor and (3) property of the estate.” In re Johnson, 51 B.R. 439, 442 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1985), citing In re Casgul of Nevada, Inc., 22 B.R. 65, 66 (9th Cir. BAP 1982). Actions against the debtor are barred if the actions could have been brought before the petition was filed “or if those efforts are attempts to collect on a prepetition debt.” In re Johnson, 51 B.R. at 442 . That portion of § 362 is not applicable to the instant proceedings because it is established that Petruccelli’s debt is for taxes accruing post-petition.

The automatic stay operates similarly with respect to acts against the property of the debtor. The automatic stay applies only if the acts are to collect on prepetition debt. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a)(5); In re Johnson, supra.

The third area of operation of the automatic stay is the protection it affords to property of the estate. The protection here is much broader and prohibits acts against property of the estate regardless of “whether the debt arose before or after the filing of the petition.” In re Johnson, 51 B.R. at 442 . Since § 362 does not bar actions against the debtor or property of the debtor for post-petition claims, debtor here must establish that the funds in the bank account levied upon by the IRS were property of the estate before a violation of § 362 could possibly be found.

Of course, debtor does contend that the funds in the account are property of the estate. In support of his position, he cites 11 U.S.C. § 1306 (a)(2). That section provides:

There is no debate about the proposition that upon the filing of a petition under Chapter 13 an estate is created. Section 1306 provides the conceptual definition of the property which comprises that estate. Post-petition earnings are clearly and expressly included within that definition. In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540, 541 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981); In re Johnson, 36 B.R. 958, 959 (Bankr.D.Utah 1983); In re Denn, 37 B.R. 33, 35 (Bankr.D.Minn.1983); In re Nash, 765 F.2d 1410 , 1413-1414 (9th Cir.1985).

Debtor, however, seeks more from § 1306(a)(2). He argues not only that post-petition earnings are property of the estate, but also that they retain that character until “the case is closed, dismissed, or converted to a case under chapter 7, 11, or 12 of this title, whichever occurs first.” 11 U.S.C. § 1306 (a)(2).

The IRS responds to debtor’s argument by citing 11 U.S.C. § 1327 (b), which describes the effect of confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan:

The IRS argues that by operation of § 1327(b), property which was property of the estate prior to confirmation vests in the debtor upon confirmation and is thus no longer property of the estate. Since the monies in debtor’s account are no longer property of the estate post-confirmation, the IRS argues that the automatic stay does not bar efforts of a post-petition creditor to collect from debtor’s property.

The central issue for the Court is how the terms of 11 U.S.C. § 1306 (a) can or should be reconciled with the provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1327 (b). This is an issue which has troubled a number of courts in recent years. In re Littke, 105 B.R. 905, 908 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1989); Laughlin v. U.S.I.R.S., 98 B.R. 494, 495 (D.Neb.1989); In re Walker; 84 B.R. 888 (Bankr.D.D.C.1988); In re Aneiro, 72 B.R. 424, 429 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987); In re Clarke, 71 B.R. 747, 749 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987); In re Root, 61 B.R. 984, 985 (Bankr.D.Colo.1986); In re Mason, 45 B.R. 498, 500 (Bankr.D.Ore.1984), aff'd, 51 B.R. 548, 550 (D.Ore 1985); In re Denn, 37 B.R. 33, 35 (Bankr.D.Minn.1983); In re Johnson, 36 B.R. 958, 959 (Bankr.D.Utah 1983); In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540, 541 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981). As reflected in the pleadings of the parties, those courts which have considered the issue have reached differing conclusions. In re Littke, 105 B.R. 905, 908 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1989); In re Clarke, 71 B.R. 747, 750 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987).

The problem was early recognized by the court in In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981). In that case the court was concerned with ascertaining what property, if any, was available in a Chapter 13 case post-confirmation which a former spouse could pursue to satisfy a nondischargeable debt for past alimony and child support. The court does not mention whether the obligation arose pre-petition or later, or whether any such obligation was treated under the confirmed plan.

The Adams court recognized that the filing of the Chapter 13 petition caused the creation of an estate the composition of which is defined by 11 U.S.C. § 1306 . The court stated:

12 B.R. at 541-542 .

The Adams court was candid in expressing its interest in balancing the effect of § 1327(b) with the presumed interests of the debtor. The court wrote that after considering both, “an asset line can be drawn, subsequent to confirmation, between ‘property of the estate’ and ‘property of the debtor’ which may fairly protect the rights of debtor and his dependents.” 12 B.R. at 541 . The court then concluded:

12 B.R. at 542 . What is clear from the Adams opinion is that the reason revested property is “subject to the reach of” the ex-spouse is because it is no longer property of the estate. What is not clear, however, is how the Adams court determined, procedurally, that “wages paid to the trustee or creditors under a plan” were still property of the estate and not within the reach of the ex-spouse. Presumably, it is fair to assume that the court wanted to protect the debtor’s ability to perform under the plan. However, the court does not tell us what the plan or confirmation order provided to achieve that result.

The case of In re Root, 61 B.R. 984 (Bankr.D.Colo.1986) presents a particularly interesting scenario in which to consider the problem. In Root , the debtor filed under Chapter 13 and had his plan confirmed. The IRS was one of his creditors and filed a proof of claim. Thereafter, the IRS served a Notice of Levy on the debtor to require the debtor to pay to the IRS funds which the debtor owed to his attorney because the attorney owed the IRS for certain taxes. As it happened, the debtor had made his payments to the trustee from which the trustee had paid the attorney in full.

The Root court concluded that the IRS Notice of Levy was not a violation of the automatic stay. Apparently, the court arrived at that conclusion because:

61 B.R. at 985 . The result seems curious since the debtor was paying his attorneys fees through his plan payment to the Chapter 13 trustee, with the trustee making the disbursement to the attorney. To the extent the funds comprising the plan payment remained property of the estate post-confirmation, it would seem a levy on those funds would violate the automatic stay. The Root court clearly was of the view that funds constituting plan payments were property of the estate. After noting the Adams decision, the court wrote:

61 B.R. at 985 . Perhaps it was the fortuity that the attorney had already been paid in full which permitted the result.

Like the Adams court, the Root court does not tell us how those funds preserve their character as property of the estate. Unlike Adams , however, the Root court insists some sort of “estate” continues to exist post-confirmation. The court wrote:

61 B.R. at 985 .

The decision of In re Clarke, 71 B.R. 747 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987) presents another interesting set of circumstances in which the apparent conflict between § 1306 and § 1327(b) arose. The debt arose post-confirmation. At the hearing on a motion brought by the creditor regarding the status of its lien on debtor’s residence the court learned that the debtor had signed an agreement to sell his house, and the sale was to close the next day. The Court was concerned with whether the creditor’s lien should be stricken. Part of the analysis required a determination of whether the lien was placed on property of the debtor or property of the estate.

The Clarke court stated that it was persuaded that the language of § 1306 “militated against the movant’s contention that ‘property of the estate’ lost its status as such upon the confirmation of the Debtor’s plan_” 71 B.R. at 749 . After quoting the language of § 1306 the court wrote:

The Clarke court recognized that § 1306(a)(1):

Id. Turning to § 1327(b), the court wrote:

Id. Of course, the creditor did not argue that property of the estate “disappeared” upon confirmation, but rather that it re-vested in the debtor as property of the debtor. Moreover, the Clarke court fails to discuss that the concept of “vesting” is not peculiar to § 1327(b), but is also contemplated by the Congress in cases under Chapter 11 [see 11 U.S.C. § 1141 (b)], and in dismissal of most cases brought under Title 11 [see 11 U.S.C. § 349 (b)(3)],

The Clarke court acknowledges the conflict in cases which have considered the issue, including an earlier decision from its own district. Without further explaining why, the court concluded:

71 B.R. at 750 . The court then makes a curious statement.

Id. Notwithstanding the court’s inclination to follow Root , the Clarke court does not explain how the debtor can unilaterally dispose of his house post-confirmation, without any court or trustee involvement or approval, yet a post-petition creditor cannot act against the same property without relief from the automatic stay. In order for the stay of § 362 to apply to the debtor’s residence post-confirmation, the residence must be property of the estate or the creditor must be trying to collect from property of the debtor for a pre-petition debt. Section 362 does not apply, otherwise.

Within a week of the Clarke decision, Judge Malugen of this court rendered her opinion in In re Aneiro, 72 B.R. 424 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987). In that case, she was faced with a motion for relief from the automatic stay by the debtor’s landlord. The debtor had an original lease executed in 1984 which the court found had been assumed through confirmation of the debt- or’s Chapter 13 plan. Some months after confirmation the debtor entered into a revised lease with the agent for the earlier landlord. The issue before the court was whether the revised lease was validly entered into by the debtor post-confirmation and without court approval. As the court noted:

72 B.R. at 428 . It was the debtor’s position that the revised lease was invalid because no court approval had been sought, and therefore the landlord could not enforce its terms.

To resolve the dispute, the Aneiro court had to consider whether the 1984 lease remained property of the estate after confirmation, or whether it was no longer property of the estate. If the latter, then the debtor could properly execute the 1986 revision without court approval, and the landlord would be in a position to enforce its terms. If the former, then the 1986 revision was invalid.

The Aneiro court reviewed several of the decisions which concluded that § 1327(b) revested all property of the estate in the debtor upon confirmation, absent a provision to the contrary, and that revesting meant the property was no longer property of the estate. The Aneiro court took issue with that conclusion. The court wrote: “These cases are premised upon the mistaken belief that revesting under § 1327(b) transforms property of the estate into property of the debtor.” 72 B.R. at 429 . The court relied on the language of § 1306 regarding closing, dismissal or conversion as evidencing the fact that confirmation is not an event which alters the status of property of the estate. The court wrote:

72 B.R. at 429-430 .

Interestingly, the Aneiro court found support for its construction of the effect of § 1327(b) in the legislative history of § 1227 of the Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986. The court quoted:

72 B.R. at 430 (emphasis added). The Aneiro court does not discuss the rule of § 1306(b), that property of the estate normally remains in possession of the debtor. Nor does the court discuss what additional power the debtor gains on the revesting of the property after confirmation. Instead, the Aneiro court concluded that the 1984 lease “was and at all times remained property of the estate, albeit revested in debtor upon confirmation of his plan....” Id. Accordingly, the lease could not be modified post-confirmation without court approval, and the 1986 revision was invalid. However, like the Clarke court the Aneiro court does not discuss the concept of vesting in light of § 1141(b) or § 349(b)(3). Further, while the Aneiro court wrote:

( 72 B.R. at 429 ), the court did not discuss how § 1327(b) retained any meaning at all in light of the court’s construction, or that, to the extent possible, statutes are to be construed so as to give effect to both. Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567 , 571 (9th Cir.1971).

In contrast to the cases that accord great weight to the language of § 1306, the vast majority of the cases have given primary effect to § 1327(b), often with little discussion. One of the earliest was In re Stark, 8 B.R. 233 (Bankr.N.D.Ohio 1981). In that case, a creditor moved post-confirmation to compel the abandonment of certain personal property. The court found the motion unnecessary, writing:

8 B.R. at 234 .

The issue was dealt with in a footnote in In re Walker, 20 B.R. 372 , 373 at n. 1 (Bankr.E.D.Va.1982). There, the court wrote:

The court in In re Lewis, 33 B.R. 98 (Bankr.W.D.N.Y.1983) reached a similar conclusion, although with an interesting variation in the facts. In Lewis , a post-petition creditor asked for administrative priority in payment of the obligation incurred post-confirmation by the debtor. The confirmation order provided that the debtor’s wages and property would remain under the court’s jurisdiction, that title to property vested in the debtor, and, importantly, the, debtor was enjoined from incurring new debts in excess of $250 without prior approval of the trustee (except emergency or medical circumstances). Even with the confirmation order language regarding the court’s jurisdiction over the debtor’s wages and property, the court concluded:

33 B.R. at 100-101 .

In re Johnson, 36 B.R. 958 (Bankr.D. Utah 1983) largely follows the earlier decision in In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981). The issue in Johnson involved a post-confirmation tax refund due the debtors which was paid over by IRS to the Department of Social Services for post-petition child support arrearages. The debtor sought an OSC re: contempt against both the IRS and the state agency. In discussing the character of the monies as property of the estate or not, Judge Clark wrote:

36 B.R. at 959 .

In In re Denn, 37 B.R. 33 (Bankr.D.Minn.1983) Judge Kressel recognized the argument that § 1327(b) takes the property back out of the estate. He wrote:

37 B.R. at 35 . However, Judge Kressel determined he need not resolve the issue because in the case before him the plan did provide otherwise.

The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit had occasion to consider the operation of § 1327(b) in In re Winchester, 46 B.R. 492 (1984). Writing for the BAP, Judge Ashland observed:

46 B.R. at 494 . The court elaborated:

46 B.R. at 495 .

The case most often cited in discussing § 1327(b) is In re Mason, 45 B.R. 498

(Bankr.D.Or.1984), aff'd, 51 B.R. 548 (D.Or.1985). After confirmation of debtor’s Chapter 13 plan, the debt arose, and the creditor obtained a judgment. Subsequently, the creditor caused debtor’s wages to be garnished. The debtor filed a complaint to recover the funds, and contended that the actions of the creditor violated the automatic stay. The Mason court discussed the operation of § 1327(b) at length:

45 B.R. at 500 . In affirming the bankruptcy court’s decision, the district court expressly recognized the apparent conflict between § 1306 and § 1327(b). However, the court concluded:

In re Mason, 51 B.R. 548, 550 (D.Or.1985).

As already noted in the discussion of the original Mason decision, Judge Hess there observed that Chapter 11 contains provisions identical to § 1327(b). Specifically, 11 U.S.C. § 1141 provides in pertinent part:

Some of the courts which have confronted the issue of § 1327(b) have looked to § 1141 for assistance. In re Gyulafia, 65 B.R. 913 (Bankr.D.Kan.1986); In re Mason, 45 B.R. 498 (Bankr.D.Or.1984); In re Johnson, 51 B.R. 439, 442 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1985); In re Walker, 84 B.R. 888 (Bankr.D.D.C.1988).

For purposes of the present discussion, one of the more interesting Chapter 11 decisions is In re Paradise Valley Country Club, 31 B.R. 613 (D.Colo.1983). In that case, Bankruptcy Judge Brumbaugh (who subsequently authored the Root decision) found that a state court suit commenced post-confirmation by a landlord for unlawful detainer did not violate the automatic stay. The district court reported:

31 B.R. at 614 . In affirming, the district court added:

31 B.R. at 615 .

Without conducting an exhaustive review, it is nevertheless apparent that courts which have considered § 1141(b) have had little difficulty in understanding its effect. For example, in In re Westholt Mfg., Inc., 20 B.R. 368 (Bankr.D.Kan.1982), aff'd sub nom., United States v. Redmond, 36 B.R. 932 (D.Kan.1984), the court wrote:

20 B.R. at 372. Accord, In re Korgan, 52 B.R. 557 (Bankr.D.Or.1985).

Similarly, in Prince v. Clare, 67 B.R. 270 (N.D.Ill.1986), the district court wrote:

67 B.R. at 272 .

Returning to a review of cases involving petitions under Chapter 13, it is pertinent to consider the opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Nash, 765 F.2d 1410 (1985), particularly inasmuch as the Aneiro court believed Nash supported its view that revesting property in the debtor upon confirmation does not convert property of the estate into property of the debtor.

At the outset, it is important to recognize that Nash did not involve application of § 1327(b), but rather the revesting provision of § 349(b)(3) upon dismissal. The relevant facts were that the Chapter 13 trustee received certain monies through a wage order. Before those monies were distributed the debtors exercised their right to dismiss the Chapter 13 case. After dismissal, the trustee distributed the funds to creditors. In defense of an action brought by the debtors, the trustee and creditor urged that the debtor was bound by the confirmed plan. The bankruptcy court and district court agreed, but the Ninth Circuit reversed. The issue was who owned the funds upon dismissal. The Ninth Circuit wrote: 765 F.2d at 1414. In order to conclude that Nash supports the conclusion in Aneiro , one would have to determine that the Congress had two different concepts in mind when it used the terms “revests” and “vested” in § 349(b)(3), as contrasted with the term “vests” in § 1141(b) and § 1327(b). But there is nothing in the legislative history of the several statutes, or in case law to support such a proposition, so far as has been brought to this Court’s attention.

The two most recent cases to consider and rule on the issue [the court did not need to resolve the conflict in In re Littke, 105 B.R. 905 (Bankr.N.D.Ind.1989) ] conclude that revesting under § 1327(b) means the property is no longer property of the estate. Laughlin v. U.S. I.R.S., 98 B.R. 494 (D.Neb.1989); In re Walker, 84 B.R. 888 (Bankr.D.D.C.1988). In the latter case, the court wrote:

Id. After noting the contrary decisions in Clarke and Aneiro , the court continued:

84 B.R. at 888-889 .

This Court concludes that the reasoning of In re Mason, 45 B.R. 498 (Bankr.D.Or.1984) is persuasive and that § 1327(b) means what it appears to say — that is, that upon confirmation property of the estate vests in the debtor and is no longer property of the estate, unless the plan or order of confirmation provides otherwise. There are multiple reasons why this Court arrives at that conclusion.

In this Court’s view, canons of statutory construction support such a result. As the district court observed in Laughlin v. U.S.I.R.S., 98 B.R. 494 (D.Neb.1989):

98 B.R. at 496 . Given that § 1306(b) gives debtors possession of property of the estate, § 1327(b) would be rendered meaningless if it were not found to vest title and ownership in the debtor upon confirmation (absent a provision to the contrary in the plan or order of confirmation). See Rockbridge v. Lincoln, 449 F.2d 567, 571 (9th Cir.1971).

Similarly, when § 1306(a) and § 1327(b) are compared to each other, this Court believes § 1327(b) is the more specific statute relating to the circumstances. It is a traditional canon of construction that the specific statute controls the more general statute in the face of an apparent conflict.

As already discussed, the terms of § 1141(b) and § 1327(b) are identical. The Congress is not to be presumed to have intended different meanings when it uses identical language in different sections. To the same extent, the Congress should not be presumed to have intended different meanings when it used the words “re-vests”, “vested”, and “vests” in 11 U.S.C. §§ 349 (b)(3), 1141(b), and 1327(b) absent some indication to that effect.

There are policy reasons, also, which support such a conclusion. The legislative history of § 1227, cited by the court in In re Aneiro, 72 B.R. 424, 430 (Bankr.S.D.Cal.1987), makes it clear that the drafters of that section wanted debtors to be able to obtain credit after confirmation of a plan. They recognized that a debtor’s ability to utilize the revested property of the estate was important to achieve that end. See, also, In re Mason, 45 B.R. 498, 500 (Bankr.D.Or.1984). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit recognized in In re Winchester, 46 B.R. 492, 495 (1984) that § 1327(b) gave the debtor the power to do so post-confirmation.

Parenthetically, the Court notes that standard language in the plans regularly used in this district appear to recognize the debtor’s ability to freely deal with property post-confirmation because it attempts to restrict that ability. The language provides: “Trustee may file to dismiss case if debtors) incur post petition debts without the written consent of trustee and debtor(s) fail to keep such obligations current in payment.”

The court in In re Mason, 45 B.R. 498, 501 (Bankr.D.Or.1984) noted: “Unlike the pre-petition creditors, the post-petition creditor has no opportunity to object to confirmation of the plan.” Even the court in In re Clarke, 71 B.R. 747, 749-750 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1987) observed:

Of course, there are countervailing policy considerations, as well. As characterized by the Clarke court:

71 B.R. at 750 . More specifically, the pre-petition creditors have an interest in a debt- or being able to perform throughout the operation of the plan without post-petition creditors being able to deprive the debtor of the ability to do so by seizing property or wages.

It remains for this Court to apply its conclusion to the facts in the case at bar. As noted in earlier discussion, the facts of In re Adams, 12 B.R. 540, 543 (Bankr.D.Utah 1981) illustrate a practical problem. There, the court found that the ex-spouse, post-confirmation, “has the right to proceed against the wages of the debtor in the amount they exceed the payments to the trustee under the plan....” But the court did not tell us how the monies to fund the plan were identified sufficiently to give notice to creditors which dollars were committed to plan payments and which were property of the debtor post-confirmation because not committed.

In the case at bar, there was approximately $8,500 in debtor's account when the IRS served its levy. Which of those $8,500 were committed to the $1,800 monthly plan payment? What about the next month’s plan payment? What about the funds necessary to support the debtor from month to month which, if seized, could prevent the debtor from making the plan payments? In this Court’s view, it is not enough to say the funds necessary to make plan payments remain property of the estate and thus subject to the automatic stay, because the funds generally have no independent identity. Under such circumstances, a debtor could play a shell game on post-petition creditors, always claiming the non-committed funds are under a different shell from the one the creditor seized. Such a result is not consistent with the purposes of the Code or with the policy to permit post-confirmation borrowing by debtors.

The confirmed plan in the instant case provides:

However, in this Court’s view, the “supervision and control” language in the plan is insufficient to postpone revesting in the debtor under § 1327(b). Laughlin v. U.S. I.R.S., 98 B.R. 494, 496 (D.Neb.1989). If a debtor seeks to postpone revesting of all or some of the property of the estate, the plan or order of confirmation should clearly say so. Saying so is easy to do. In In re Denn, 37 B.R. 33, 36 (Bankr.D.Minn.1983), the plan provided:

In In re Walker, 67 B.R. 811 , 812 at n. 3 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1986), the court noted:

In this Court’s view, the better approach, as recognized by many of the cases, is that revesting of all of the property of the estate occurs upon confirmation as contemplated by § 1327(b), unless revesting is expressly postponed, as authorized by § 1327(b). If revesting of less than all of the property of the estate upon confirmation is contemplated, the plan or order of confirmation should clearly identify which property is to remain property of the estate. If the debtor wishes the benefits of the revesting of property upon confirmation, the debtor should bear the correlative burdens. Alternatively, if the debtor wishes to ensure that the property is secure from post-petition creditors, the debt- or may propose to delay revesting. The latter circumstance appears to be common in the Central District of California. In re Ellis, 60 B.R. 432, 434 (9th Cir.1985); In re Walker, 67 B.R. 811 , 812 at n. 3 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1986); In re Hill, 3 CCH ¶ 71, 610 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1986); In re Stucka, 77 B.R. 777, 782 (Bankr.C.D.Cal.1987).

Conclusion

For all the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the funds in debtor’s account at the time of the IRS levy were not property of the estate because they had revested in the debtor. Because the IRS was seeking to collect on post-petition debt from property of the debtor, not property of the estate, the automatic stay of § 362 did not bar the levy. Accordingly, debtor’s motion for sanctions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362 (h) is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.