MEMORANDUM

Clarence Rose was convicted in California state court of first degree murder and related charges, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal. Rose thereafter launched a collateral attack on his conviction in the state courts, which ultimately resulted in an evidentiary hearing in Superior Court on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Rose v. Superior Court, 81 Cal.App.4th 564 , 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 843 (Cal.Ct.App.2000). In ordering the ev-identiary hearing, the Court of Appeal noted that Rose’s lead private counsel was a recent California Bar admittee who had tried only one jury case. He was assisted by another attorney who had three years of experience. Neither attorney had ever defended a felony case. Id. at 846. After the ensuing evidentiary hearing, the Superior Court entered findings and conclusions that may be paraphrased as follows:

The court concluded by pointing out that defense counsel had presented several witnesses that testified that Rose was not outside where the shooting occurred at the time in issue. The witnesses testified to facts tending to indicate that another gang member, “A1 Dog,” was the shooter. The court stated that the impeachment of these defense witnesses did not demonstrate ineffective assistance. Finally, the court stated that defense counsel’s failure to object to prosecution argument referring to gang membership was not prejudicial because the gang membership was in evidence and the argument was not improper. In summary, the court held that Rose had failed to demonstrate prejudice as a consequence of counsel’s alleged deficiencies. It accordingly denied the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the court’s order without opinion, with one justice noting dissent. The California Supreme Court subsequently denied Rose’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus without opinion.

Rose then filed this petition for habeas corpus in the federal district court. The district court denied the petition, holding that Rose had not shown prejudice with regard to any of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. We granted a certificate of appealability. We affirm the judgment of the district court.

There is no question that Rose’s lead counsel was woefully inexperienced for conducting the defense of a charge as serious as murder. But Rose comes to federal court seeking a writ of habeas corpus to release him from state custody, and we cannot grant such a writ unless “he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (a). The applicable constitutional standard for establishing ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment is provided by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To show that counsel’s defective performance requires reversal of a conviction, a defendant must satisfy two requirements:

Id. at 687 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 . It is primarily because of failure to meet the second requirement — prejudice—that the state court denied collateral relief.

In addressing this state court ruling, we are constrained by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”). AEDPA precludes us from granting habe-as corpus relief as to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits by the state court unless the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1). Thus, even if we were to determine in our own analysis that Rose had shown sufficient prejudice to meet the second Strickland standard, we could not grant the writ of habeas corpus unless it was unreasonable for the state court to come to a different conclusion. “It bears repeating that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court’s contrary conclusion was unreasonable.” Harrington v. Richter, — U.S.-, 131 S.Ct. 770, 786 , 178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011).

We conclude that it was not unreasonable for the state court to conclude that Rose was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged errors. Rose’s claims of prejudice were noticeably unsupported by evidence. For example, he contends that his counsel failed to investigate prosecution witnesses, and failed to search for additional witnesses. Yet in the collateral proceedings there was no showing as to what evidence might have been discovered in a thorough investigation, or what testimony the undiscovered witnesses might have given. The same is true of the failure to call Rose’s physician, or to investigate more thoroughly claims of bias by police officers. There is no evidence in the record of what any missing testimony would have shown. Rose also claims that his counsel was insufficiently aware of the basic rules of evidence, such as hearsay, and other rules of trial procedure. Yet there is no showing of what harmful, inadmissible hearsay was admitted, or what materially favorable admissible evidence was excluded. In addition, Rose claims that his counsel was ineffective in failing to object to an impermissible portion of the sentence, but that error was corrected on appeal and cannot possibly have prejudiced Rose.

There are two claims of deficient performance on which Rose provided evidence to the state court. First, at the evidentiary hearing, he presented an expert on eyewitness testimony who would have been able to testify that the accuracy of eyewitness testimony is decreased by poor lighting, stress, presence of a weapon, the absence of distinguishing physical characteristics, the presence of multiple people at the scene, and the fact that the identification is cross-racial. This evidence might have been helpful, but we are not convinced that it was unreasonable for the state court to conclude that there was no “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 .

The jury was instructed in accordance with CALJIC No. 2.92, as follows:

Defense counsel cross-examined the eyewitnesses concerning several of these factors and argued some of these factors (although not cross-racial identification) in his final argument.

Rose contends that the above instruction is no substitute for expert testimony on eyewitness identification because the instruction does not indicate which way each factor cuts. It was not unreasonable, however, for the state court not to require such explanation when the operation of the factors is relatively self-evident.

Finally, we previously have held that, because our precedent establishes that expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony may be excluded without prejudice to defendants, it was also not prejudicial for defense counsel to fail to call such a witness. Howard, v. Clark, 608 F.3d 563, 574 (9th Cir.2010). In light of Howard and all the circumstances of this case, we conclude that it was not unreasonable for the state court to rule that Rose was not prejudiced by the failure of his counsel to call an expert to testify regarding eyewitness identification.

The second item of substance that Rose introduced in the collateral hearing was the photographic lineup. The Superi- or Court stated that the photographic display did not appear to be suggestive. We have reviewed the photographic display and agree with that conclusion. The failure to challenge the display consequently did not prejudice Rose, or at least it was not unreasonable for the state court to draw this conclusion. The assertion of Rose’s secondary counsel that the display may have been presented to the eyewitnesses in a suggestive manner was unsupported by any evidence, and it was not unreasonable for the state court to reject that speculation.

Rose contends that his counsel “promised” in his opening statement to introduce evidence of police bias and then did not produce it. The record does not substantiate a promise, but in any event some evidence of bias was introduced through the testimony of Rose’s father. It was not unreasonable for the state court to deny claims of prejudice from this alleged error of counsel.

At Rose’s request, we ordered supplemental briefing regarding Rose’s claim that the last reasoned decision of the state courts was the Superior Court decision, which Rose contends failed properly to apply the Strickland prejudice standard. Rose therefore argues that no deference is due the state court rulings under AEDPA.

We are not convinced that the Superior Court’s finding of no deprivation of a meritorious defense was inconsistent with Strickland’s prejudice standard, see In re Harris, 5 Cal.4th 813 , 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 373, 400-01 , 855 P.2d 391 (1993), but the issue of deference has been foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Richter . The Superior Court’s decision here was followed by unexplained denials of habeas corpus by the state Court of Appeal and the California Supreme Court. Richter squarely held that an unexplained denial of a writ of habeas corpus by the California Supreme Court is an adjudication on the merits that is entitled to deference under § 2254(d) unless “there is reason to think some other explanation for the state court’s decision is more likely.” Richter, 131 S.Ct. at 785 . No other explanation has been offered here. It is not necessary for the state court to cite or even be aware of the applicable cases of the United States Supreme Court; § 2254(d) still applies. Id. at 784.

Id. Because we have held that failure to show prejudice within the meaning of Strickland was sufficient reason for the California Supreme Court to deny relief, Rose’s argument fails.

We have reviewed Rose’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. The judgment of the district court denying Rose’s petition for a writ of habe-as corpus is

AFFIRMED.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3. . Our certificate permitted Rose to pursue 12 claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, arising from counsel's failure: (1) to conduct a pretrial investigation of prosecution witnesses; (2) to make an informed decision as to whether to have Rose’s physician testify to his physical condition; (3) to investigate alleged bias of a police investigating officer; (4) to present expert testimony on eyewitness identification; (5) to challenge the photographic lineup; (6) to request appointment of an investigator; (7) to discover and present additional exculpatory witnesses; (8) to introduce evidence of police bias after his opening statement said he would; (9) to understand the basic rules of evidence; (10) to understand the process of calling witnesses; (11) to object to parts of the prosecutor's closing argument; and (12) to object to the imposition of an unlawful sentence.