Martin

Facts

On July 26, 1990, a criminal complaint was filed in the Kern County Municipal Court charging petitioner in count I with arson (Pen. Code, § 451, subd. (b)) and in count II with burglary (§ 460.1). Both counts were accompanied by several special allegations. Petitioner’s preliminary hearing was held on September 20, 1990. At the preliminary hearing Mr. Griggs, an investigator for the Kern County Fire Department, was allowed to testify to hearsay statements pursuant to section 872, subdivision (b), one of the statutory provisions incorporated in Proposition 115. Petitioner was held to answer on both counts based in part on the hearsay testimony of Mr. Griggs. Petitioner filed a section 995 motion arguing that an arson investigator is not qualified to testify as a “law enforcement officer” within the meaning of section 872, subdivision (b). The court rejected petitioner’s argument and denied the motion.

We conclude a “peace officer” under section 830.37, subdivisions (a) and (b) falls within the definition of a “law enforcement officer” in section 872, subdivision (b).

Discussion

I.

Whether a Peace Officer Under Penal Code Section 830.37, Subdivisions (a) and (b)…