Spengler

Defendant, Daniel S. Spengler (Spengler), who appears here in pro. per., purports to appeal from the memorandum of decision and notice of intended judgment. A memorandum of decision is not an appealable order. (Estate of Pieper (1964) 224 Cal.App.2d 670, 675 [ 37 Cal. Rptr. 46 ].) However, we construe the notice of appeal, filed November 26, 1980, as referring to the judgment entered August 4, 1980. (See Gregory v. Hamilton (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d213, 215, fn. 1. [ 142 Cal.Rptr. 563 ]; Channell v. Anthony (1976) 58 Cal.App.3d 290, 302 [ 129 Cal.Rptr. 704 ].)

Suit was originally filed by Grubb and Ellis Commercial Brokerage Company (Grubb and Ellis) on certain promissory notes executed by Spengler in favor of Grubb and Ellis totaling $9,100, of which Grubb and Ellis claimed $6,574.84 remained due and payable by Spengler, plus interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. Grubb and Ellis took the position that Spengler had been engaged by them on July 12, 1976, as a real estate salesman under what they termed an “independent contractor agreement” that provided for compensation based solely on commissions to be collected from parties to real estate transactions. Grubb and Ellis…