Tyra

Jean Tyra appeals an order of summary judgment in favor of Lee Kearney and Local 952 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

The sole issue we address is whether the trial court's jurisdiction to entertain Tyra's wrongful discharge action is preempted by the provisions of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Act).

Tyra, employed as a business agent for Local 952 since 1967, challenged Kearney for the office of secretary/treasurer in the 1980 election. Following Kearney's reelection, Kearney terminated Tyra who then filed this action for wrongful discharge, seeking an injunction and damages. Local 952's and Kearney's motion for summary judgment was granted. We affirm the court's determination the action was "preempted by federal law under the authority of Finnegan v. Leu, [ 456 U.S. 431 , 72 L.Ed.2d 239 ] 102 S.Ct. 1867 ."

Tyra contends his cause of action is not preempted, claiming a federal court will not interfere with a state's sovereign power to hear and determine its own statutory causes of action for tortious conduct. This statement of law, while correct under some circumstances, is not applicable to Tyra. Replacement of…

Jean Tyra appeals an order of summary judgment in favor of Lee Kearney and Local 952 of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters.

The sole issue we address is whether the trial court’s jurisdiction to entertain Tyra’s wrongful discharge action is preempted by the provisions of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Act).

Tyra, employed as a business agent for Local 952 since 1967, challenged Kearney for the office of secretary/treasurer in the 1980 election. Following Kearney’s reelection, Kearney terminated Tyra who then filed this action for wrongful discharge, séeking an injunction and damages. Local 952’s and Kearney’s motion for summary judgment was granted. We affirm the court’s determination the action was “preempted by federal law under the authority of Finnegan v. Leu, [ 456 U.S. 431 , 72 L.Ed.2d 239 ] 102 S.Ct. 1867 .”

Discussion

Tyra contends his cause of action is not preempted, claiming a federal court will not interfere with a state’s sovereign power to hear and determine its own statutory causes of action for tortious conduct. This statement of law, while correct under some circumstances, is not applicable to Tyra. *923 Replacement of…

I reluctantly concur. Under compulsion of the union patronage dictum of Finnegan v. Leu (1982) 456 U.S. 431 [ 72 L.Ed.2d 239 , 102 S.Ct. 1867 ], I conclude Tyra’s cause is preempted. Beyond the reach of this plaintiff, California is fast developing a policy of protecting private sector employees at all levels from arbitrary discharge. (Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (1980) 27 Cal.3d 167 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 , 9 A.L.R.4th 314 ]; Pugh v. See’s Candies, Inc. (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 311 [ 171 Cal.Rptr. 917 ]; Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 443 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 722 ].) I find it ironic, but nonetheless clear, that the wide scope of federal regulation of labor unions does not permit its potential application to employees of unions.

When a union activity is “arguably” covered by federal labor legislation, states may not interject themselves into its regulation. (United Farm Workers Organizing Committee v. Superior Court (1971) 4 Cal.3d 556, 564 [ 94 Cal.Rptr. 263 , 483 P.2d 1215 ].) And “with regard to labor disputes, federal preemption of state law is the rule, not the exception.” {Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (1983) 461 U.S. 731,…