Cavanna

In a case of first impression, we conclude the municipal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under section 10751 of the Vehicle Code (section 10751) to dispose of an allegedly stolen vehicle during the pendency of defendant’s criminal trial for receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. 1). Accordingly, the municipal court order had no collateral estoppel effect and the superior court erred in dismissing the information on that basis. We reverse.

Background

Following defendant’s March 1987 preliminary hearing, he was held to answer on one felony count of receiving stolen property, a 1983 Porsche automobile engine. Before his trial, however, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Detective Thomas Lynch, the investigating officer who testified at defendant’s preliminary hearing, instituted a municipal court proceeding under section 10751 to dispose of the seized vehicle containing the allegedly stolen engine. (People v. 1981 Porsche Convertible (Mun. Ct. L.A. County, 1987, No. 003520).)

Subdivision (a) of section 10751 states: “No person shall knowingly buy, sell, offer for sale, receive, or have in his possession, any vehicle, or component part thereof, from which…