Marsha

*268 Opinion

In her complaint, appellant alleged she was sexually molested by her stepfather beginning when she was eight years old and ending when she was seventeen years old. She filed her complaint 15 years later when she was 32 years old. The trial court, finding the delayed discovery doctrine inapplicable (DeRose v. Carswell (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1011 [ 242 Cal.Rptr. 368 ]), sustained without leave to amend respondent’s demurrer. Appellant appeals from the judgment of dismissal. We affirm.

Procedural and Factual Background

On August 11, 1987, appellant filed a complaint in Sonoma County alleging two causes of action: personal injury and negligent infliction of emotional distress. By stipulation filed October 7,1988, the parties agreed to transfer the matter to Los Angeles County. On February 10, 1989, asserting the statute of limitations barred the complaint, respondent filed a general demurrer. On March 10, 1989, the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Appellant appealed. On January 24, 1990, in an unpublished opinion, we dismissed the appeal because, after the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, no judgment of dismissal had been…

I respectfully dissent.

At the outset, I want to highlight that the rationale of the majority opinion and the previous Sixth District opinion on which my colleagues principally *275 rely has limited application at best. 1 It cannot affect cases like appellant’s if they are filed on or after January 1, 1991. That is because, as explained later in this opinion, the California Legislature has amended Code of Civil Procedure section 340.1 2 to expressly extend the limitations period until a child sex abuse victim discovers the cause of the psychological injuries she or he is suffering as an adult. 3 Thus, the fact a child may have been aware she or he was wronged in some way at the time of the abuse or realized it thereafter does not start the statutory period as to psychological problems which surface later in life.

Consequently, this appeal is really about a limited, yet important class of child abuse victims—those who discovered the cause of their adult psychological injuries more than three years before January 1, 1991, and were over *276 the age of twenty-six on that date, as well. 5 Is this group to be singled out and denied the right to compensation for their equally…

WOODS (Fred), J.

In her complaint, appellant alleged she was sexually molested by her stepfather beginning when she was eight years old and ending when she was seventeen years old. She filed her complaint 15 years later when she was 32 years old. The trial court, finding the delayed discovery doctrine inapplicable ( DeRose v. Carswell (1987) 196 Cal. App.3d 1011 [ 242 Cal. Rptr. 368 ]), sustained without leave to amend respondent's demurrer. Appellant appeals from the judgment of dismissal. We affirm.

On August 11, 1987, appellant filed a complaint in Sonoma County alleging two causes of action: personal injury and negligent infliction of emotional distress. By stipulation filed October 7, 1988, the parties agreed to transfer the matter to Los Angeles County. On February 10, 1989, asserting the statute of limitations barred the complaint, respondent filed a general demurrer. On March 10, 1989, the court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Appellant appealed. On January 24, 1990, in an unpublished opinion, we dismissed the appeal because, after the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend, no judgment of dismissal had been entered. On…