Barker

This appeal presents the question of when a final order denying a motion to vacate a default judgment based upon fraud prevents a party from relitigating the issue of fraud in a collateral proceeding.

A default judgment was entered against appellant Barker on December 26,1975, in an action filed by respondent Hull against Barker and a corporation of which Barker was president. In June 1982, Hull filed an abstract of judgment against Barker as an individual.

In July 1982, Barker filed a motion to set aside the judgment supported by his declaration stating that Barker was told by Hull that the action was not being filed against Barker individually, but in his capacity as an officer of the corporation, in order to allow Hull to obtain a judgment against the corporation so that Hull’s losses as a shareholder would qualify for a tax deduction. Points and authorities in support of the motion stated that the motion was based on oral and documentary evidence and argued that extrinsic fraud and mistake prevented Barker from asserting his defenses as a corporate officer. The parties appeared before the court on August 6, 1982, when the matter was continued to August 30. A…