Manning

Defendant, Gail Manning, was charged by a first amended complaint, filed in the municipal court, which alleged a violation of section 316 of the Penal Code in that she “did willfully and unlawfully keep a house used for the purpose of assignation or prostitution, and did let rooms, apartments, or tenements, knowing that it [íz'c] was to be used for the purpose of assignation or prostitution.” She demurred to the complaint, contending, inter alia, that section 316 was unconstitutional because it was overbroad and void for vagueness. The municipal court overruled the demurrer, and defendant then sought a peremptory writ of mandamu$ or prohibition from the superior court to compel the municipal court to sustain the demurrer. The superior court denied her such relief and now she has appealed from the order of denial.

Defendant claims that section 316 is so worded that its enforcement could infringe upon an individual’s constitutional right to privacy. To the extent that the statute prohibits conduct described as an “assignation,” we agree.

If a statute is worded in such a manner that its enforcement could infringe upon the exercise of a First Amendment right, then that…