Longinetti

Part I *

Part n

By unpublished part of this opinion we find no reversible error by the trial court in accepting appellant’s plea to and sentencing him for robbery, with a five-year enhancement based on a prior felony conviction for burglary.

Appellant’s further contention is that the five-year enhancement is invalid, because it cannot be determined solely from the judgment of the *706 prior conviction, that it was a burglary of a residence. We reject this contention.

Penal Code section 667 provides that a five-year “enhancement” be added to the term of imprisonment of one convicted of a serious felony where such person previously has been convicted of a serious felony. Both the present robbery and the prior burglary of a residence, as charged, are by statutory definition serious felonies. (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (d) and Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subds. (c)(18) & (19).)

Citing People v. Crowson (1983) 33 Cal.3d 623 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 660 P.2d 389 ], appellant argues that the trial court in sentencing him impermissibly went beyond the judgment in the prior case to determine that the prior offense was “burglary of a residence.” Appellant errs.

At bench appellant was…

I am aware that the concurring opinion in People v. Jackson (1985) 37 Cal.3d 826 [ 210 Cal.Rptr. 623 , 694 P.2d 736 ], expressed reservations regarding the holding in People v. Crowson (1983) 33 Cal.3d 623, 632-635 [ 190 Cal.Rptr. 165 , 660 P.2d 389 ], and the hope that *709 some day that decision might be reconsidered. Perhaps the instant appeal will provide a suitable vehicle for such a review.

However, unless and until our highest court does, in fact, elect to reexamine, and subsequently to reject, the reasoning so explicitly and so emphatically announced in both Jackson and Crowson , I would follow the clearly defined course they have dictated, albeit in dicta, and eliminate the Penal Code section 667 enhancement from the instant judgment.

A petition for a rehearing was denied February 26, 1985, and appellant’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied May 23, 1985.

[Opinion certified for partial publication. [*] ]

OPINION

BEACH, J. —

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By unpublished part of this opinion we find no reversible error by the trial court in accepting appellant's plea to and sentencing him for robbery, with a five-year enhancement based on a prior felony conviction for burglary.

(1) Appellant's further contention is that the five-year enhancement is invalid, because it cannot be determined solely from the judgment of the prior conviction, that it was a burglary of a residence. We reject this contention.

Penal Code section 667 provides that a five-year "enhancement" be added to the term of imprisonment of one convicted of a serious felony where such person previously has been convicted of a serious felony. Both the present robbery and the prior burglary of a residence, as charged, are by statutory definition serious felonies. (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (d) and Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subds. (c)(18) & (19).)

Citing People v. Crowson (1983) 33 Cal.3d 623 [ 190 Cal. Rptr. 165 , 660 P.2d 389 ], appellant argues that the trial court in sentencing him impermissibly went beyond the judgment in the prior case to determine that the prior…