Opinion

Defendants appeal from an order denying their motion to vacate a judgment by confession. We reverse the order.

Plaintiff and defendant Joseph Infante had a dispute over monies allegedly due from Joseph to plaintiff. They agreed on a settlement of that dispute, which included the execution by Joseph and his wife of a promissory note and of a confession of judgment. The parties then went to a lawyer who had, in the past, represented both plaintiff and the defendants, with a request that he draw the necessary papers, which he did. Defendants having fallen in default under the note, the confession of judgment was filed, accompanied by a certificate from the lawyer, and judgment was entered thereon. Shortly thereafter defendants moved to vacate that judgment. The motion was denied and this appeal followed. We reverse.

After the decision in Isbell v. County of Sonoma (1978) 21 Cal.3d 61 [ 145 Cal.Rptr. 368 , 577 P.2d 188 ], the Legislature amended section 1132 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Subdivision (b) of that section, as so amended, reads as follows:

Plaintiff contends here that the purpose of section 1132 was to make sure that a defendant was properly advised as to his rights and that, since the giving of that advice is not here questioned, the procedure was adequate. We find that argument unconvincing.

We accept, for the purpose of this opinion, that, assuming the facts set forth in the lawyer’s certificate to be true, he did not violate the ethical rules on representing adverse interests. However, the confession of judgment procedure is an extreme remedy. The Legislature, in protecting the interests discussed in Isbell , was not content merely to require advisement by counsel but to require that that advice was free of any possible bias. The statutory provision for “independent” counsel was, in the obvious opinion of the Legislature, a necessity to prevent even an inadvertent bias and also, for the protection of the potential judgment creditor, to prevent later litigation over the quality and quantity of the advice on which the potential judgment creditor relied. A cer tificate such as the one here before us does not satisfy the legislative purpose and a judgment entered in reliance on it was beyond the power of the clerk to enter. It is void and must be vacated.

The order is reversed with directions to grant the motion to vacate.

McClosky, J., and Amerian, J., concurred.

A petition for a rehearing was denied December 30, 1982, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 10, 1983.