Lenthall

I respectfully dissent.

The majority, by its opinion today, extends the “fireman’s rule” to bar recovery by a police officer or a firefighter who is injured or damaged by the intentional act of a participant in the event which brought the police officer or firefighter to the place of his injury. No California case has ever extended the “fireman’s rule” to bar recovery against such intentional tortfeasor and I can see no reason in law or public policy for doing so.

Up until today in California, assumption of risk, where not recklessly entered into, or carried out, has not been a defense to the tort of intentionally inflicting injuries on another. To the contrary, our state has even recognized that “[wjhen a person’s lawful employment requires that he work in a dangerous location or place that involves unusual possibilities of injury, or requires that in the line of his duty he take risks which ordinarily a reasonably prudent person would avoid, the necessities of such a situation, insofar as they limit the caution that he can take for his own safety, lessen the amount of caution required of him by law in the exercise of ordinary care. ” (See BAJI (6th ed. 1977) No. 3.40; Austin…

Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment against him in an action for personal injuries. We affirm.

Plaintiff is a police officer for the City of San Luis Obispo. In company with other officers of that city, he responded to an order to proceed to defendant’s home, because of a report that, at that address, “a 415 Family With Weapons, possibly shots fired, was in progress.” Arriving at the residence, he was shot and injured by defendant. The complaint, and plaintiff’s answers to a request for admissions, claim that the shooting was intentional.

The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant on the theory that plaintiff’s claim fell within.the so-called “fireman’s rule." We conclude that the decision was correct.

The fireman’s rule began with a case holding that a fireman has no cause of action against a person who negligently started a fire, where the fireman was injured in attempting to put out the fire. The rule has since been extended to cover police officers, and has been applied where the defendant’s action was “wanton and reckless.” In some cases applying the rule, an appellate court has *718 remarked that the cases before them did not involve intentional…

KINGSLEY, Acting P.J.

Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment against him in an action for personal injuries. We affirm.

Plaintiff is a police officer for the City of San Luis Obispo. In company with other officers of that city, he responded to an order to proceed to defendant's home, because of a report that, at that address, "a 415 Family With Weapons, possibly shots fired, was in progress." Arriving at the residence, he was shot and injured by defendant. The complaint, and plaintiff's answers to a request for admissions, claim that the shooting was intentional.

The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant on the theory that plaintiff's claim fell within the so-called "fireman's rule." We conclude that the decision was correct.

(1) The fireman's rule began with a case holding that a fireman has no cause of action against a person who negligently started a fire, where the fireman was injured in attempting to put out the fire. The rule has since been extended to cover police officers, and has been applied where the defendant's action was "wanton and reckless." In some cases applying the rule, an appellate court has remarked that the cases before them did…