Hill

In count I of an information, defendant was charged with the felony offense of pimping, committed on January 27, 1978, in violation of Penal Code section 266h. It was alleged that the pimping offense had been committed by defendant in knowing that Eugene Griswald was a prostitute and then willfully and unlawfully living and deriving support and maintenance in whole and in part from the earnings and proceeds of Griswald’s prostitution. In count II of the information, defendant was charged with the felony offense of pandering, committed on the same date in violation of section 266i of the Penal Code. It was alleged that the offense of pandering was committed by the defendant willfully and unlawfully procuring Eugene Griswald, a male person, for purposes of prostitution.

Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and was tried by a jury. The jury found defendant guilty as charged in both counts of the information. Proceedings were suspended and defendant was granted probation *528 for three years subject to certain specified terms and conditions including spending the first ninety days in county jail. Defendant has appealed from this judgment of conviction.

Defendant primarily…

I am writing this separate concurring opinion because I believe there is a need for a critical analysis of the *538 question of appropriate instructions on the element of “intent”— whether the crimes involved are so-called general-intent crimes or specific-intent crimes—both of which types are present in the offenses of prostitution and pandering, the crimes before us in the instant case.

In the instant case, the instruction which the trial court gave on “intent” was CALJIC No. 3.30 (1975 revision), which is labelled “Concurrence of Act and General Criminal Intent.” This instruction provided as follows: “In the crimes charged in Counts 1 and 2 of the information, namely, pimping and pandering, there must exist a union or joint operation of act or conduct and general criminal intent. To constitute general criminal intent it is not necessary that there should exist an intent to violate the law. Where a person intentionally does that which the law declares to be a crime, he is acting with general criminal intent, even though he may not know that his act or conduct is unlawful.”

The general-intent instruction is derived from the requirement of Penal Code section 20 which provides…

JEFFERSON (Bernard), J. [*]

In count I of an information, defendant was charged with the felony offense of pimping, committed on January 27, 1978, in violation of Penal Code section 266h. It was alleged that the pimping offense had been committed by defendant in knowing that Eugene Griswald was a prostitute and then willfully and unlawfully living and deriving support and maintenance in whole and in part from the earnings and proceeds of Griswald's prostitution. In count II of the information, defendant was charged with the felony offense of pandering, committed on the same date in violation of section 266i of the Penal Code. It was alleged that the offense of pandering was committed by the defendant willfully and unlawfully procuring Eugene Griswald, a male person, for purposes of prostitution.

Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and was tried by a jury. The jury found defendant guilty as charged in both counts of the information. Proceedings were suspended and defendant was granted probation for three years subject to certain specified terms and conditions including spending the first ninety days in county jail. Defendant has appealed from this judgment of…