Coad

Jon Laurence Coad appeals from a judgment entered after he was convicted by a jury of possession of a concealable firearm by a felon *1099 (Pen. Code, § 12021), 1 assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), vandalism resulting in less than $1,000 damage (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)), and misdemeanor battery of a police officer (§§ 242, 243, subd. (b)). The jury also found that the assault with a deadly weapon was committed while appellant was free on bail pending trial on a felony charge (§ 12022.1) and that appellant had been convicted of a prior serious felony (voluntary manslaughter) within the meaning of section 667. We modify the judgment and, as so modified, affirm.

Background

The four convictions arose out of three separate incidents which occurred over a period of eight months.

Possession of a concealable firearm

The conviction for violating section 12021 arose out of an incident which occurred on April 3, 1982. 3 At 11 p.m. on that date, Albert Negovan, an employee of the City of San Jose, was performing some job related tasks at a pump station in Alviso during a period of severe flooding in that area. As he was working outside the pump station, Negovan saw…

I concur in the judgment because, for the reasons set forth by the majority, I agree that the error is harmless. I write separately for the sole purpose of expressing my disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that the offense of voluntary man *1115 slaughter necessarily involves “moral turpitude” within the meaning of People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 696 P.2d 111 ].

Castro expounds upon the principle that a witness may not be impeached with a prior felony conviction unless that conviction is rationally indicative of a propensity to lie. The determination whether a felony conviction bears adversely upon credibility would not be difficult if it could be assumed either that any felony conviction provides the necessary nexus or that it is only provided by conviction of those felonies which involve an element of dishonesty. Such assumptions are, however, forbidden by Castro ; the former on due process grounds, 1 the latter on the theory that felonies which involve “moral depravity” other than dishonesty, such as crimes of violence, still may provide “some basis—however, tenuous—for inferring that a person who has committed [such a crime] is more likely…

[Opinion certified for partial publication. [*] ]

OPINION

SMITH, J.

Jon Laurence Coad appeals from a judgment entered after he was convicted by a jury of possession of a concealable firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 12021), [1] assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), vandalism resulting in less than $1,000 damage (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)), and misdemeanor battery of a police officer (§§ 242, 243, subd. (b)). The jury also found that the assault with a deadly weapon was committed while appellant was free on bail pending trial on a felony charge (§ 12022.1) and that appellant had been convicted of a prior serious felony (voluntary manslaughter) within the meaning of section 667. We modify the judgment and, as so modified, affirm. [2]

The four convictions arose out of three separate incidents which occurred over a period of eight months.

The conviction for violating section 12021 arose out of an incident which occurred on April 3, 1982. [3] At 11 p.m. on that date, Albert Negovan, an employee of the City of San Jose, was performing some job related tasks at a pump station in Alviso during a period of severe flooding in that area. As he was working outside the pump…