Tovar

I respectfully dissent.

It appears to me that the lead opinion overlooks the elemental but fundamental principle that in passing upon a general demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of action the court must take the material allegations of the complaint at face value, assume they are true and resolve any doubt or ambiguity that may exist in the pleading in favor of the plaintiffs. A demurrer raises only issues of law, issues of fact properly pleaded being admitted by the demurrer, however improbable they may be. (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, §§ 895, 902, pp. 334, 342.)

It is undisputed that the master account was delinquent on November 14 when Southern California Edison Company (SoCal) gave its four-day notice of termination, that on that date SoCal had the duty to give the ten-day notice required by Public Utilities Code section 777 and that by failing to give the section 777 notice at that time SoCal breached the duty. The fifth cause of action of the complaint against SoCal alone thereupon alleges: “As a direct and proximate result of defendant, Southern California Edison Company’s failure to comply with Public…

Esther Tovar and 10 other plaintiffs appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint for damages against Southern California Edison Company (SoCal) after the trial court sustained SoCal’s demurrer to plaintiffs’ only cause of action against it without leave to amend.

We are here called upon to decide when, if ever, a public utility company becomes tortiously liable to the actual users of utility services for violating *609 the notice requirements specified in Public Utilities Code section 777 1 by terminating those services at the direction of a master customer. 2 The statute has received no prior judicial construction and thus presents a case of first impression. We will conclude such liability may arise only if the utility company’s failure to give the notice of pending termination required by section 777 is the proximate cause of damages suffered by the users of utility services as a result of the termination. Under the circumstances of the instant case, plaintiffs have alleged no facts upon which to predicate the requisite element of causation. Since it appears plaintiffs cannot, we will affirm the judgment.

Procedural Background

On May 22, 1986, plaintiff Esther…

HAMLIN, Acting P.J.

Esther Tovar and 10 other plaintiffs appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint for damages against Southern California Edison Company (SoCal) after the trial court sustained SoCal's demurrer to plaintiffs' only cause of action against it without leave to amend.

We are here called upon to decide when, if ever, a public utility company becomes tortiously liable to the actual users of utility services for violating the notice requirements specified in Public Utilities Code section 777 [1] by terminating those services at the direction of a master customer. [2] The statute has received no prior judicial construction and thus presents a case of first impression. We will conclude such liability may arise only if the utility company's failure to give the notice of pending termination required by section 777 is the proximate cause of damages suffered by the users of utility services as a result of the termination. Under the circumstances of the instant case, plaintiffs have alleged no facts upon which to predicate the requisite element of causation. Since it appears plaintiffs cannot, we will affirm the judgment.

On May 22, 1986, plaintiff Esther…