Bautista

Roberto Bautista appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). The court denied appellant’s in limine motion to exclude his prior conviction of felony hit-and-run (Veh. Code, § 20001). The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in admitting appellant’s prior felony conviction for impeachment purposes. Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting the prior conviction because that offense does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. The issue is one of first impression. We conclude that the offense of felony hit-and-run does involve moral turpitude under the prescription of People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 696 P.2d 111 ],

Statement of the Case

By information filed May 16, 1988, in the San Francisco Superior Court, appellant was charged with first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). Trial commenced on October 3, 1988. Appellant’s counsel made an in limine motion to exclude appellant’s prior felony hit-and-run conviction from being used for impeachment purposes. The motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on October 6, 1988.

Judgment of…

Reiterating what we said in People v. Thomas (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 689 [ 254 Cal.Rptr. 15 ], the majority states that all People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 696 P.2d 111 ] should be taken to require “ ‘is that from the elements of the offense alone— without regard to the facts of the particular violation—one can reasonably infer the presence of moral turpitude.’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 6-7, italics added, quoting People v. Thomas, supra, at p. 698 .) This test, I think it must forthrightly be acknowledged, is difficult to square with the idea that “a witness’ prior conviction should only be admissible for impeachment if the least adjudicated elements of the conviction necessarily involve moral turpitude” (Ca stro, supra, at p. 317 , italics added) which is the principle for which Castro is widely understood to stand.

I accept the “reasonable inference” twist to the Castro test because, as we explained in Thomas , the least adjudicated elements analysis cannot be applied literally without producing a reductio ad absurdum. 1 Appellant’s contention that the least adjudicated elements of felony hit-and-run do not necessarily involve moral turpitude—which,…

Roberto Bautista appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty of first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). The court denied appellant's in limine motion to exclude his prior conviction of felony hit-and-run (Veh. Code, § 20001). The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in admitting appellant's prior felony conviction for impeachment purposes. Appellant argues that the court erred in admitting the prior conviction because that offense does not necessarily involve moral turpitude. The issue is one of first impression. We conclude that the offense of felony hit-and-run does involve moral turpitude under the prescription of People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301 [ 211 Cal. Rptr. 719 , 696 P.2d 111 ].

By information filed May 16, 1988, in the San Francisco Superior Court, appellant was charged with first degree burglary (Pen. Code, § 459). Trial commenced on October 3, 1988. Appellant's counsel made an in limine motion to exclude appellant's prior felony hit-and-run conviction from being used for impeachment purposes. The motion was denied. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on October 6, 1988.

Judgment of conviction was…