Forrest

[Opinion certified for partial publication. [*] ]

OPINION

HOLLENHORST, Acting P.J.

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty before a magistrate (Pen. Code, § 859a) to two counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), admitted the allegations that, in connection with each robbery, defendant used a dangerous weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd.(b)), admitted the truth of two alleged prior serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)) and admitted that he had served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). [1] After defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for 15 years, in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.

Defendant asserts three issues in this appeal from the judgment. We conclude that each of defendant's contentions lacks merit and affirm the judgment.

(1a) Defendant's first claim is that the magistrate who took defendant's guilty plea failed to advise defendant expressly of defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of the prior convictions and failed to obtain an express waiver of that right from defendant. (2) (See fn. 2.), (1b) The Attorney General…

Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty before a magistrate (Pen. Code, § 859a) to two counts of robbery (Pen. Code, § 211), admitted the allegations that, in connection with each robbery, defendant used a dangerous weapon (Pen. Code, § 12022, subd.(b)), admitted the truth of two alleged prior serious felony convictions (Pen. Code, § 667, subd. (a)) and admitted that he had served a prior prison term (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). 1 After defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied, the trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for 15 years, in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement.

Defendant asserts three issues in this appeal from the judgment. We conclude that each of defendant’s contentions lacks merit and affirm the judgment.

I.

Advisement and Waiver of Constitutional Rights

Defendant’s first claim is that the magistrate who took defendant’s guilty plea failed to advise defendant expressly of defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of the prior convictions and failed to obtain an express waiver of that right from defendant. The Attorney General contends that a “full and fair reading of the record”…

I concur.

The majority’s conclusion that, in this particular case, there was nothing in the manner in which the magistrate accepted the pleas of guilty to the *682 substantive charges, which actually or in effect separated the substantive offenses from the alleged sentence enhancements (enhancements), is correct. In other words, the pleas of guilty and admissions of the enhancements occurred at a single judicial proceeding during which both the pleas and the admissions were simultaneously made by the defendant. Further, People v. Wright (1987) 43 Cal.3d 487 [ 233 Cal.Rptr. 69 , 729 P.2d 260 ], supports the majority’s conclusion by its comment (at p. 493, fin. 2) that at such a proceeding a defendant is not entitled to a separate advisement of his constitutional rights regarding the enhancements.

I concur reluctantly, however, in the holding that defendant was properly advised of his basic constitutional rights regarding those sentence enhancement allegations which he admitted to be true, and that as to such allegations he expressly waived those rights intelligently, knowingly and voluntarily.

If judges and magistrates follow the lead in the majority opinion, defendants who are…