Knowlden

Defendant Knowlden, who had suffered two prior felony burglary convictions, at least one of which was first degree residential burglary, was found guilty by a jury of second degree burglary. His appeal is from the judgment which was entered on the jury’s verdict, as enhanced by one of his prior felony convictions.

For reasons as follow, we affirm the judgment.

We consider the several appellate contentions as they are stated by Knowlden.

I. Contention: “The trial court committed reversible error by denying appellant’s motion to preclude the prosecution from impeaching appellant with his prior convictions.”

On a so-called Beagle (People v. Beagle (1972), 6 Cal.3d 441 [ 99 Cal.Rptr. 313 , 492 P.2d 1 ]) motion, the trial court ruled that were Knowlden to take the witness stand on his own behalf, he might be impeached by his two prior burglary convictions. He thereafter took the witness stand and was so impeached.

Although the point was not raised in the superior court, Knowlden now argues: “The prosecutor did not show that appellant’s prior burglary convictions arose from theft related target offenses as opposed to violent or assaultive target offenses. Therefore, the…

Since I agree that the error is, in any event, harmless under the conventional Watson standard, I would not reach the unargued question of whether defendant’s prior convictions met the threshold moral turpitude requirement based upon the “least adjudicated elements” of burglaries in general. (See People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 317 [ 211 Cal.Rptr. 719 , 696 P.2d 111 ].) Thus, I concur in the result only.

In my opinion a much clearer dichotomy could be drawn between more and less serious crimes by resorting to the objectively measurable common law categories of crimes mala in se and mala prohibita. But I am compelled by the decision in People v. Castro to say whether a particular crime involves moral turpitude, and since I believe moral turpitude inheres in all burglaries I agree that Knowlden’s conviction should be affirmed.

Defendant Knowlden, who had suffered two prior felony burglary convictions, at least one of which was first degree residential burglary, was found guilty by a jury of second degree burglary. His appeal is from the judgment which was entered on the jury's verdict, as enhanced by one of his prior felony convictions.

For reasons as follow, we affirm the judgment.

We consider the several appellate contentions as they are stated by Knowlden.

On a so-called Beagle ( People v. Beagle (1972), 6 Cal.3d 441 [ 99 Cal. Rptr. 313 , 492 P.2d 1 ]) motion, the trial court ruled that were Knowlden to take the witness stand on his own behalf, he might be impeached by his two prior burglary convictions. He thereafter took the witness stand and was so impeached.

(2a) Although the point was not raised in the superior court, Knowlden now argues: "The prosecutor did not show that appellant's prior burglary convictions arose from theft related target offenses as opposed to violent or assaultive target offenses. Therefore, the prior burglary convictions are not relevant to appellant's credibility and are not admissible to impeach appellant."

(3) It is a prime rule of appellate…